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ARTICLES
TRADEMARK MONOPOLIES
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr.*
Since 1742, when Lord Hardwicke seemingly equated trademark
protection with monopoly in one of the first trademark cases,' until the mid-
1950s, concerns that trademarks represented a form of illegitimate monopoly
effectively constrained the growth of trademark protection.2 In the twentieth
century, Edward Chamberlin became the leading proponent of the trademark
as monopoly view with the publication of his work, The Theory of
Monopolistic Competition, in 1933.' In his work, Chamberlin argued that a
trademark enabled its owner to differentiate her products and then to exclude
others from using the differentiating feature.4  By doing so, trademark
* Associate Professor of Law, Tulane University School of Law, New Orleans, Louisiana. I would like
to thank Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Robert C. Denicola, Wendy Gordon, Roberta K. Kwall, Mark A. Lemley, and
Robert P. Merges for their helpful advice and criticisms, and my research assistants, Kelliane E. Greenwood,
Vicky G. Neumeyer, Juliet Jenkins, Ryan Long, and Donna Vetrano, for their patient and tireless assistance.
As always, the final work and any errors remain my responsibility.
I See Blanchard v. Hil, 26 Eng. Rep. 692,693 (Ch. 1742) (refusing to enjoin second card-maker from
using certain stamp on his playing cards even though first card-maker was given exclusive right to use the
stamp by charter granted by King Charles). In the course of the opinion, Lord Hardwicke referred to the
charter as "one of those monopolies which were so frequent" under certain earlier monarchs. Id.
2 See Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34, 41 (2d Cir. 1945) (Frank, J., concurring)
("[E]mphasis on the exceptional nature of the monopoly-creating judge-made trade-name doctrine stimu-
lated increasing judicial caution in its application. The courts (expressly or tacitly) insisted that, more ade-
quately than theretofore, consideration must be given to the overall policy of not unduly hampering compe-
tition.").
3 EDwARD CHAMBERLIN, THE TmoRY OFMONOPOLISrnC COMPa1~mON 56,204(1933).
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protection can effectively cede control over distinct product markets to
individual producers and thereby generate for trademark owners the downward
sloping demand curve of a monopolist, with its associated monopoly rents and
deadweight losses. Although Chamberlin himself recognized the need for
product differentiation and rejected the supposed ideal of the perfect
competition model,5 his work became a common rallying point for the
trademark as monopoly argument.6 During the legislative debates leading to
the Trademark Act of 1946,7 his work served as a basis for the Justice
Department's opposition to broad trademark protection!
Beginning in the early 1900s, however, proponents of broader trademark
protection, including Edward S. Rogers and Frank Schechter, began to
5 See id. at 94, 110-13,214-15. Chamberlin explained:
The explicit recognition that product is differentiated brings into the open the problem of variety
and makes it clear that pure competition may no longer be regarded as in any sense "ideal" for
purposes of welfare economics ... Differences in tastes, desires, incomes, and locations of
buyers, and differences in the uses which they wish to make of commodities nll indicate the need
for variety and the necessity of substituting for the concept of a "competitive ideal" an ideal in-
volving both monopoly and competition.
Id.; see also EDWARD CHAMBERUIN, TOWARDS A MORE GENERAL THEORY OF VALu 93-99 (1957) ("The
main point I want to make is that the welfare ideal itself (as well as the description of reality) involves a
blend of monopoly and competition . . . ."); F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCrURE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 22 (1970) ("Chamberlin is undeniably correct. Consumers are willing to sacrifice
some allocative nicety for variety, and so the social ideal must be not pure competition but some alloy of
pure and monopolistic competition.").
6 See GEORGE J. ALeXANDER, HONESTY AND COMPETION 25-27 (1965); JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO
NEW COMPmEITION (1956); JOE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIATION 249-50, 258-59 (1968); WILLIAM S.
COMANOR & THOMAS A. WILSON, ADvEitTIsNG AND MARKET POWER 41-137 (1974); Kurt Borchardt, Are
Trademarks an Antitrust Problem?, 31 GEo. LJ. 245, 246 (1943); Ralph S. Brown, Advertising and the
Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165 (1948); Charlie E. Mueller, Sources
of Monopoly Power: A Phenomenon Called "Product Differentiation," 18 AM. U. L. REv. 1 (1968); A.G.
Papandreou, The Economic Effect of Trademarks, 44 CAL. L. REv. 503, 505 (1956); James M. Treece,
Copying Methods of Product Differentiation: Fair or Unfair Competition?, 38 NOTRE DAME L. Rev. 244,
262 (1963); James M. Treece, Protectability of Product Differentiation: The Is and Ought Compared, 18
RutGERs L. Rev. 1019, 1020 (1964).
7 Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994)).
This Act is more popularly known as the Lanham Act, after its principal sponsor, Representative Fritz G.
Lanham.
8 See Trade-Marks: Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Patents, 78th Cong. 58-71
(1944) ("1944 Trade-Mark Hearings") (Department of Justice, Report on H.R. 82, The Trade-mark Bill)
("Report of the Department of Justice on the Trade-Mark Bill"); Trade-Marks: Hearings Before a Subcomm.
of Senate Comm. on Patents, 77th Cong. 23-53 (1942) ("1942 Trade-Mark Hearings"); see also Sigmund
Timberg, Trade-Marks, Monopoly, and the Restraint of Competition, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PRODS. 323, 325-
26 (1949) (Chief, Judgments and Judgment Enforcement Section, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice
and Special Assistant to the Attorney General).
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confront the trademark as monopoly argument.9 In part, their strategy was
simply rhetorical, intended to change the terms of the debate and to ridicule
their opponents. Trademarks were simply property, proponents insisted, not
monopoly,'0 and those who believed otherwise were "infected with monopoly-
phobia."" On the substantive side, the proponents argued that trademarks
provide consumers with a convenient and essential means for distinguishing
between competing goods in the marketplace. 2  By identifying the source of
goods, a trademark provides consumers with information that they need (and
cannot otherwise readily obtain) in order to match their desires to particular
products. 3 Even if trademark protection would lead to product differentiation,
and thereby preclude perfect competition, trademark protection would
nonetheless leave room for "effective or workable,"' 4 "fair,"'" or "responsi-
ble!'6 competition. Although not perfect, such competition was thought clearly
superior to the alternative of supermarket shelves filled with goods
distinguishable only by their readily apparent physical characteristics.
7
9 See EDWARD S. ROGERS, GOOD WILL, TRADE-MARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETrION (1914); Edward S.
Rogers, Protection ofindustrial Property, 27 MICH. L. Rev. 491 (1929); Frank I. Schechter, The Rational
Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARv. L. REv. 813 (1927).
10 See, e.g., I RUDOLF CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR CowMPETTIoN AND TRADE-MARKS § 15.5, at
224 (2d ed. 1950).
11 Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren, Ltd., 137 F.2d 955,958 (2d Cir.) ('There are some persons,
infected with monopoly-phobia, who shudder in the presence of any monopoly."), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 758
(1943); see also Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34,42 & n.18 (2d Cir. 1945) (Frank, J., concur-
ring); 1 CALLMANN, supra note 10, § 15.5, at 225 (alleging a noticeable judicial monopolophobia had im-
properly limited scope of trademark protection); Beverly W. Pattishal, Trade-Marks and the Monopoly
Phobia, 50 MICH. L. REv. 967 (1952).
12 See, e.g., Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853-54 (1982); United Drug Co. v.
Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90,99 (1918); Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 632 F.2d 817, 821 n.5
(9th Cir. 1980); Standard Oil Co. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 363 F.2d 945, 954 (5th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1007 (1967); Smidler, 151 F.2d at 36; Independent Baking Powder Co. v. Boorman, 130 F.
726, 728 (C.C.D.NJ. 1904); S. REP. No. 1333 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1274-75; S.
CHESTERFIELD OPPENHEIM & GLEN E. WSTON, FEDERAL ANIRUST LAWS 772 (3d ed. 1968); ROGERS,
supra note 9, at 52-53; Pattishall, supra note 11, at 977-83.
13 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1333, supra note 12. "One [purpose of any trademark statute] is to protect the
public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a particular trade-mark which it favorably
knows, it will get the product which it asks for and wants to get." Id. at 1274. "Trademarks, indeed, are the
essence of competition, because they make possible a choice between competing articles by enabling the
buyer to distinguish one from the other." Id. at 1275.
14 OPPENHEIM & WESTON, supra note 12, at 772.
Is S. REP. No. 1333, supra note 12, at 1275 ("To protect trademarks, therefore, is ... to foster fair
competition.").
16 Levi Strauss & Co., 632 F.2d at 821 n.5 ("On the contrary, the pocket tab trademark gives the public
a reliable indication of source and thus facilitates responsible marketplace competition.").
17 See generally JEAN JACQUES LAMaIN, ADVERTISING, COMPETITION AND MARKET CONDuCT IN
OUGOPOLY OVER TIME (1976); JULIAN L. SIMON, ISSUES IN THE ECONOMICS OF ADVERTISING (1970); Lee
1999]
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Often, this debate resembled a ritualized semantic dance, where both sides
pretended the answer was simply a matter of applying the proper descriptive
label. Those on one side would assert that trademarks led to monopoly in its
descriptive sense, as if that were sufficient to establish that such protection was
undesirable, or monopoly in the normative sense. Those on the other side
would counter that trademarks were property, again in the descriptive sense, as
if that was sufficient to establish that such protection was desirable or property
in the normative sense. Yet, not all monopoly is harmful, and not all property
is desirable. Moreover, as descriptive terms, property and monopoly are not
opposites at all, 8 as the debaters seemed to assume.' 9
On rare occasion, however, the debaters would move beyond labels and
rhetoric and attempt to address the underlying substance of one another's
concerns. When they did, they usually recognized the merit in both positions.
Trademark protection can cede control of distinct product markets to
individual producers and thereby lead to monopoly. Trademark protection can
also provide consumers with a means to match desire to precise product in the
marketplace and can thereby improve the market's ability to satisfy society's
wants. Given this reality, the only sensible conclusion, and the one eventually
reached, was that trademark protection can both advance and disserve the
development of an efficient and desirably competitive market.2t The proper
Benham, The Effect of Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses, 15 J.L. & EcON. 337 (1972); Benjamin Klein
& Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Forces, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615
(1981); Phillip Nelson, Advertising as Information, 82 J. POL ECON. 729 (1974); Phillip Nelson, The Eco-
nomic Consequences of Advertising, 48 J. Bus. 213 (1975); Phillip Nelson, Information and Consumer Be-
havior, 78 J. POL ECON. 311 (1970); Carl Shapiro, Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to
Reputations, 98 QJ. ECON. 659 (1983); George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. Po. ECON.
213 (1961); see also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective,
30 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1987).
18 Property refers to a set of legal relationships or rights with respect to a thing. Monopoly refers to the
absence of substitutes for the thing in the marketplace.
19 More recent commentators have taken a similar position. See, e.g., DONALD S. CHISUM & MICHAEL
A. JACOBS, UNDERsTANDiNG INTELLEzmAL PROPERTY LAW § IC (Matthew Bender 1992); Frank H. Easter-
brook, Intellectual Property Is Still Property, 13 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 108, 109 (1990). But, as I have
explained elsewhere, the suggested dichotomy between property and monopoly is simply wrong. See Glynn
S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483, 517-19, 497
n.43, 518 n.143 (1996). Consider a simple example. If a single individual owns all land in a given geo-
graphic region, her ownership interest in the land is certainly property, but it may also amount to monopoly,
given the absence of others with land for sale in that area. For an example of land ownership turned monop-
oly, see Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (noting legislative findings by state of
Hawaii that land ownership was sufficiently concentrated within the state to generate supracompetitive land
prices).
20 Judge Frank has given some of the most thoughtful expressions of this view. See Eastern Wine
Corp. v. Winslow-Warren, Ltd., 137 F.2d 955, 957-58 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 758 (1943); see also
[Vol. 48
TRADEMARK MONOPOLIES
task was, therefore, one of crafting a trademark regime that appropriately
balanced the competitive interests at stake2 by providing protection that
minimized material deception without discouraging competitive entry.
The resulting competitive balance effectively guided and constrained the
growth of trademark protection until the mid-1950s. Since that time, however,
a substantial and ongoing expansion of trademark protection has threatened
this balance. This expansion has encompassed both the recognition of new
trademark subject matter2 and a more complete bundle of ownership rights,3
and despite some pretense on the issue, has been only tenuously connected to
concerns over material consumer deception. Instead, the expansion has fo-
cused on a trademark's value not merely as a device for conveying otherwise
indiscernible information concerning a product ("deception-based trademark"),
but as a valuable product in itself ("property-based trademark").24
While playing on some of the themes found in traditional deception-based
trademark law, this shift from viewing a trademark as a source of information
about a product, to viewing the trademark as the product, has sharply changed
the emphasis and context in which trademark's traditional themes have played
out. Under this property-based view of trademark law, confusion becomes not
just a question of probable confusion as to source, but possible confusion over
any connection between the plaintiff and the allegedly infringing use. Simi-
larly, the need for incentives that trademark law addresses becomes not just a
question of minimizing consumer deception to ensure a market that generates
accurate pricing signals, but a matter of rewarding and thereby encouraging
Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34,42 (2d Cir. 1945) (Frank, J., concurring).
The public today is displaying a revived, lively interest in "free enterprise." That revived inter-
est, one may hope, will not prevent a discriminating consideration of socially desirable monopo-
lies or partial monopolies .... Those who, oversimplifying economic problems, thoughtlessly
urge the elimination of virtually all monopolies, not only disregard the unavoidable existence of
monopolistic elements in almost all kinds of competition but dangerously invite a program
which, by neglecting socially valuable aspects of some industrial integrations ("oligopolies") in
some mass production industries, might tragically reduce our living standards.
id, See also CHAmBERLuN, TOWARDS AMORE GENERAL THEORY OF VALUE, supra note 5, at 93-95.
21 See Eastern Wine Corp., 137 F.2d at 959 ("No one seriously questions whether there should be some
monopolies; the only question is as to what monopolies there should be, and whether and how much they
should be regulated legislatively or curbed judicially."); Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632, 636
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 651 (1942).
22 See infra text accompanying notes 25-82.
23 See infra text accompanying notes 83-200.
24 See also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi
Generation, 65 NOME DAME L. REV. 397,397 (1990).
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investment in the marks themselves. And, trademarks become property not
merely in the formal, legal sense of a right assigned to an entity reasonably
well-placed to protect and vindicate the mark's information function, but in the
more ordinary, more substantive, and ultimately more absolute sense of a thing
belonging fully and completely to its owner.
As this shift took hold, many courts and commentators succumbed to
"property mania"--the belief that expanded trademark protection was neces-
sarily desirable so long as the result could be characterized as "property." The
result has been a radical and ongoing expansion of trademark protection, both
in terms of what can be owned as a trademark and in terms of what trademark
ownership entails. This expansion, and its associated reinterpretation of
trademark's underlying policies, presents a serious threat to social welfare and
has placed at risk the competitive balance that deception-based trademark law
originally established. Like deception-based trademark protection, property-
based trademark protection can enable a trademark owner to differentiate her
product and exclude others from using the differentiating feature. It can
thereby cede control over distinct product markets to individual producers and
generate for a trademark owner the downward sloping demand curve of a mo-
nopolist. However, unlike deception-based trademark, property-based trade-
mark has only a tenuous relationship to consumer deception, and therefore
lacks the offsetting efficiency advantages associated with deception-based
trademark's quality control and certification functions. As a result, property-
based trademark appears presumptively anticompetitive-it generates market
power and associated efficiency losses without the offsetting efficiency gains
that are thought to justify deception-based trademark.
Recognizing that property-based trademark cannot claim deception-based
trademark's efficiency advantages, proponents of property-based trademark
have sought alternative justifications to counterbalance its anticompetitive
costs. In particular, proponents have sought to draw an analogy between prop-
erty-based trademark and the property rights extended inventors and authors
under patent and copyright law. To the extent, the analogy goes, that property-
based trademark gives a mark's owner exclusivity in her mark and generates
some degree of market power, this result is no different than patent and copy-
right. And although such market power may generate some anticompetitive
consequences, it is nonetheless necessary and desirable to ensure the creation
of the good in the first place. Otherwise, in the absence of such protection,
free riders and other exploiters would undermine the incentive necessary to en-
sure an optimal level of investment in desired marks.
[VCol. 48
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Yet, this analogy is fatally flawed. Unlike patent and copyright, trademark
law neither ties its prerequisites for protection to a need for additional incen-
tive, nor defines its protection to ensure an appropriate incentive level. As a
result, trademark's expansion risks creating an incentive structure fundamen-
tally at odds with social welfare. Property-based trademark protection thus
risks creating "trademark monopolies," not merely in the neutral economic
sense, but in the ordinary and pejorative sense of unjustified and inappropriate
market power.
I. TRADEMARK'S EVOLUTION: FROM INFORMATION SOURCE TO PRODUCT
To explore trademark's evolution from information source to product, the
following sections present examples illustrating how trademark protection has
changed in terms both of what can be owned as a trademark and what such
ownership means. These examples are not intended to address every aspect of
trademark's expansion over the last forty years, but to illustrate the substantial
expansion that has occurred in the scope and nature of trademark ownership
and the associated shift in trademark's underlying objectives. In exploring
these examples, we find that each offers some, at least superficially plausible,
deception-based rationale to which courts will often pay token homage. Even
a casual examination, however, reveals the flimsy or otherwise problematic
nature of the proffered deception-based rationale and suggests an alternative,
sometimes unspoken, rationale behind the decision. Looking further, we find
clear indications that the decisions are ultimately about protecting a
trademark's value as a desirable product in and of itself, independent of the
mark's value as an information source.
A. Expanding Trademark's Subject Matter
At, the tim'e Congress enacted the Trademark Act of 1946, trademark law
encompassed a number of substantive limitations on what could qualify as
protectible subject matter. Advertising slogans, trade names, and trade dress,
for example, were not recognized or protected as trademarks and received
protection against imitation under the doctrine of unfair competition, if at all.
5
25 See, e.g., Elgin Nat'l Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Case Co., 179 U.S. 665, 673-78 (1901) (noting
distinction between technical trademarks and geographically-descriptive words protected only under dec-
trine of unfair competition); Barton v. Rex-Oil Co., 2 F.2d 402, 404 (3d Cir. 1924) (noting distinction be-
tween technical trademarks and descriptive names protected only under doctrine of unfair competition);
Upjohn Co. v. William S. Merrell Chem. Co., 269 F. 209, 210-11 (6th Cir. 1920) (noting distinction between
1999]
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In part, these restrictions arose from the common law's requirement that the
claimed trademark must have been affixed to the associated product to receive
protection.26 In part, they arose from the sense that consumers did not rely on
these to identify the source of the associated goods or services, and the
corresponding conclusion that slogans, trade names, and trade dress were not
therefore serving a trademark function27! Since that time, courts and the Patent
and Trademark Office, and to a lesser extent Congress, have gradually relaxed
these limitations and have allowed the registration and protection of slogans,
trade names, and trade dress as trademarks. We can explain some of this
expansion by stretching trademark's traditional deception-based rationale: As
marketing methods have changed in the twentieth century, some consumers
may have come to rely on slogans, trade names, or trade dress to identify the
source of goods or services. Yet, we must also acknowledge that much of this
expansion has little to do with any plausible concern over consumer deception
and rests squarely on the sense that someone who creates something of value
ought to receive the fruits of her labors. Of the various ways in which
trademark's subject matter has expanded, the judiciary's increased willingness
to protect a product's shape, design, or configuration as a trademark presents
technical trademark and product design or trade dress protected only under doctrine of unfair competition),
cert. denied, 257 U.S. 638 (1921); John T. Dyer Quarry Co. v. Schuylkill Stone Co., 185 F. 557, 563
(C.C.D.N.J. 1911) (recognizing distinction "between the infringement of a trade-mark proper... and such
wrongful and fraudulent simulation of mere trade-names, description, dress or package as under the circum-
stances of a given case amounts only to unfair competition in trade in contradistinction to trade-mark in-
fringemenf'); see also Walter J. Derenberg, The Lanham Act of 1946: Practical Effects and Experiences
After One Year's Administration, 38 TRADmAARK REP. 831,834-36 (1948).
26 See, e.g., Gray v. Armand Co., 24 F.2d 878, 878 (App. D.C. 1928) ("It follows, therefore, that to
establish a right to the registration of a trade-mark, two things are necessary: That it must have been actually
applied to vendible goods, and that the goods have been sold in interstate commerce."); Albers Bros. Milling
Co. v. Acme Mills Co., 171 F. 989, 992 (C.C.D. Or. 1909) ("User as a trade-mark signifies that the mark
shall be affixed, either upon the goods themselves, or upon the boxes or wrappers containing them .... It is
not sufficient that the word or symbol be employed as a means of advertisement merely."); see also
W.L.P.A. Molengraaff, The Nature of the Trade-Mark, 29 YALE L.J. 303,303-06 (1920) (noting that product
features cannot serve as a trademark because a trademark must be separable from product to which it is at-
tached).
27 See, e.g., Burmel Handkerchief Corp. v. Cluett, Peabody & Co., 127 F.2d 318 (C.C.P.A. 1942)
(affirming refusal to register "Handkerchief of the year" as trademark because it referred to qualities of
product, not its source); In re National Stone-Tile Corp., 57 F.2d 382, 383 (C.C.P.A. 1932), ("We also agree
with the Commissioner that it is probable that the purchasing public would not look upon appellant's
grooves in its tile as constituting a trade-mark; ... we do not think the purchasing public would look upon
tile containing such grooves as indicating origin of the tile ...."); Kipling v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 120 F.
631, 636 (2d Cir. 1903) ('TMe court will take judicial knowledge of the fact that it is customary to publish
books with ornamental designs stamped or printed on the covers, but no one.., ever imagined that such
pictures and ornaments were the trade-marks of the authors of the books.").
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the clearest case of the switch from deception-based to property-based
protection and will serve as the focus for our discussion in this section.
Before 1946, product features received very limited protection against
imitation under trademark and unfair competition law. At this time, trade dress
and product features (including the shape, configuration, or design of a
product) were not protected as trademarks and received protection, if at all,
only under the doctrine of unfair competition." While the standards for
trademark infringement and unfair competition were similar, they differed in
one key respect-similarity alone was sufficient to demonstrate trademark
infringement, but it was not sufficient to demonstrate unfair competition." To
2 See, e.g., Coats v. Merrick Thread Co., 149 U.S. 562, 566 (1893); Lucien Lelong, Inc. v. Lenal, Inc.,
181 F.2d 3, 4-5 (5th Cir. 1950) (It is elementary that a color or container cannot be a trade-mark....
['rhere can be no trade-mark in a package, the shape of a bottle, or a letter of the alphabet."); Philadelphia
Novelty Mfg. Co. v. Rouss, 40 F. 585, 587 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1889) ('[l]n ordinary circumstances, the adoption
of packages of peculiar form and color alone, unaccompanied by any distinguishing symbol, letter, sign, or
seal, is not sufficient to constitute a trade-mark."); Adams v. Heisel, 31 F. 279, 280 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1887);
WILLIAM HENRY BROWNE, TRDEMARKS §§ 89b, 89c, at 137-138 (2d ed. 1885) ("There are decisions which,
at the first glance, seem to hold that the mere form of a vendible article may constitute a technical trade-
mark. Careful analyses cannot fail to induce the conclusion, that the principles of unfair competition, rather
than those appertaining to trade-marks, were the bases of judgment."); Societe Anonyme de la Distillerie de
la Liqueur Benedictine de L'Abbaye de Fecamp v. Puziello, 250 F. 928, 928 (E.D.N.Y. 1918) (granting re-
lief for imitation of packaging under theory of unfair competition) ('The statute of February 20, 1905, al-
lowing the registration of a trade-mark in use for more than 10 years, does not alter the fundamental propo-
sition, that a trade-mark is a design or mark rather than a container or package."); JAMES LOVE HoPluNs, TiM
LAW OF TRADEMARKS, TRADENAmES AND UNFAIt COMPEmrON §§ 53, 54, 57 (4th ed. 1924); Molengraaff,
supra note 26, at 304. Molengraaff argues:
[P]erhaps the imitation of one of the properties of an article may give rise to an action for unfair
competition or for "passing off"; but in no case does the quality, the color, the shape or the size
constitute a trade-mark of which the essence is that it be a symbol not inherent in the article but
applied or attached to it.
Id.
29 Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 120-22 (1938); William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli
Lilly'& Co., 265 U.S. 526, 531 (1924) ("The petitioner or anyone else is at liberty under the law to manu-
facture and market an exactly similar preparation ... [, b]ut the imitator of another's goods must sell them as
his own production."); Feathercombs, Inc. v. Solo Prods. Corp., 306 F.2d 251, 257 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 910 (1962); Modem Aids, Inc. v. R.H. Macy & Co., 264 F.2d 93, 94 (2d Cir. 1959) (per curiam)
("Even [where a plaintiff is entitled to relief under unfair competition against an imitator], however, the re-
lief would go no further than to require the defendant to make plain to buyers that the plaintiff was not the
source of the machines sold by it."); Paramount Indus., Inc. v. Solar Prods. Corp., 186 F.2d 999, 1001-02
(2d Cir. 1951); Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. Frances Denney, Inc., 99 F.2d 272, 273 (3d Cir. 1938) (per curiam);
Vogue Ring Creations, Inc. v. Hardman, 410 F. Supp. 609, 613 (D.R.I. 1976) ("It is well established that
copying another's article is not, standing alone, unfair competition. It must be shown that the defendant so
confusingly presented his product through packaging, labeling or otherwise as to lead purchasers to believe
that they were buying the plaintiff's article."); Remco Indus., Inc. v. Toyomenka, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 948,
952, 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Key West Hand Print Fabrics, Inc. v. Serbin, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 287, 292 (S.D.
1999]
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
demonstrate unfair competition, a plaintiff was required to show that the
defendant had falsely represented its goods as those of the plaintiff, either
expressly, through affirmative acts of deception, or implicitly, by duplicating
too closely a feature that was non-functional and had acquired secondary
meaning.'o Moreover, in evaluating these claims, courts recognized the central
role that imitation played in ensuring a competitive marketplace31 and, for the
sake of the resulting competition, tolerated the confusion that would inevitably
result.32 So long as the defendant undertook reasonable precautions to identify
the imitation as its own, copying of articles protected by neither patent nor
copyright was privileged, and the resulting similarity, even if it generated a
certain degree of confusion, was not actionable.3
Two doctrines further limited the availability and scope of protection for
product features in those cases where a plaintiff sought to prove actionable
deception by implicit misrepresentation. First, courts would not presume
Fla. 1965). For other differences, see Milton Handler & Charles Pickett, Trade Marks and Trade Names - An
Analysis and Synthesis: 1, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 168 (1930) (describing greater requirements for and narrower
scope of protection for trade names under doctrine of unfair competition as compared to protection of and
for trademarks).
30 See, e.g., Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Sandee Mfg. Co., 286 F.2d 596,600 (7th Cir. 1961).
31 See, e.g., American Safety Table Co. v. Schreiber, 269 F.2d 255, 272 (2d Cir. 1959) (characterizing
imitation as "the life blood of competition"); Chas. D. Briddell, Inc. v. Alglobe Trading Corp., 194 F.2d 416,
418 (2d Cir. 1952) ("For the common law favors competition; and it is of the essence of competition that
competitors copy and undersell the product of an originator. The competitors do not lose their favored
common-law position merely because someone chooses to call them 'free riders."').
32 See Kellogg Co., 305 U.S. at 121; American Safety Table Co., 269 F.2d at 273 ("Since a certain
amount of confusion as to source was inherent in the process of imitation, the courts have developed a body
of principles by which to determine whether or not the confusion was permissible."); Chas. D. Briddell, Inc.,
194 F.2d at 419-20; General Time Instruments Corp. v. U.S. Time Corp., 165 F.2d 853, 854 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 334 U.S. 846 (1948); Selchow & Righter Co. v. Western Printing & Lithographing Co., 142 F.2d
707, 709 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 735-36 (1944); Grosjean v. Panther-Panco Rubber Co., 26 F.
Supp. 344,352 (D. Mass. 1939) ("Assuming the admissibility of all the evidence proffered on this subject,..
. it all shows only isolated cases of confusion such as would naturally result where a new firm enters a field
long exclusively occupied by another."), affd, 113 F.2d 252 (1st Cir. 1940).
33 See Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilbom & Bishop Co., 247 F. 299, 301 (2d Cir. 1917) (noting that so long
as defendant was careful to identify goods as its own, the defendant was fully entitled to "copy the plaintiff's
goods slavishly down to the minutest detail"); see also Warner & Co., 265 U.S. at 532; Day-Brite Lighting,
Inc., 286 F.2d at 600; West Point Mfg. Co. v. Detroit Stamping Co., 222 F.2d 581, 586, 589, 595 (6th Cir.
1955); Gum, Inc. v. Gumakers of Am., Inc., 136 F.2d 957, 960 (3d Cir. 1943); Zangerle & Peterson Co. v.
Venice Furniture Novelty Mfg. Co., 133 F.2d 266, 269 (7th Cir. 1943); Sinko v. Snow-Craggs Corp., 105
F.2d 450, 452 (7th Cir. 1939); Remington-Rand, Inc. v. Mastereraft Corp., 67 F.2d 218, 220 (6th Cir. 1933);
Meccano, Ltd. v. Wanamaker, 250 F. 450,452-53 (2d Cir. 1918), affd, 253 U.S. 136 (1920); John H. Rice
& Co. v. Redlich Mfg. Co., 202 F. 155, 158-60 (3d Cir. 1913); Marvel Co. v. Pearl, 133 F. 160, 161 (2d Cir.
1904) ("Unfair competition is not established by proof of similarity in form, dimensions, or general appear-
ance alone."); Globe-Wemicke Co. v. Fred Macey Co., 119 F. 696,704 (6th Cir. 1902).
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secondary meaning, but required affirmative proof.' Moreover, at this time,
proof of secondary meaning required a showing of both: (1) recognition-that
consumers believed that certain features came from a certain source; and (2)
materiality-that the identification of source mattered to consumers." As
Judge Learned Hand explained in Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co.,
"it is an absolute condition to any relief whatever that the plaintiff ... show
that the appearance of his wares has in fact come to mean that some particular
person... makes them, and that the public cares who does make them, and not
merely for their appearance and structure."36 Second, protection under unfair
competition extended only to nonfunctional product features. Under this
doctrine, a feature was considered functional, and therefore could be freely
copied, so long as it served "a substantial and desirable use."37 In practice,
34 See, e.g., Chas. D. Briddell. Inc., 194 F.2d at 419-20 (denying relief where plaintiff failed to demon-
strate secondary meaning); Bliss v. Gotham Indus., Inc., 316 F.2d 848, 854-55 (9th Cir. 1963) (denying
protection where secondary meaning not shown); General Time Instruments Corp., 165 F.2d at 854-55
(denying relief where plaintiff failed to demonstrate secondary meaning); Swanson Mfg. Co. v. Feinberg-
Henry Mfg. Co., 147 F.2d 500, 503 (2d Cir. 1945) ("Without [secondary meaning] or patent protection it
was not unfair competition merely to copy the plaintiffs' purses and sell duplicates of them."); Zangerle &
Peterson, 133 F.2d at 270 ("[There can be no unfair competition unless the plaintiff has clearly established
that its table had acquired in the trade a secondary meaning."); American Fork & Hoe Co. v. Stampit Corp.,
125 F.2d 472, 475-76 (6th Cir. 1942) (denying relief where plaintiff failed to establish secondary meaning);
Sinko, 105 F.2d at 452-53 (denying protection where plaintiff failed to establish secondary meaning); A.C.
Gilbert Co. v. Shemitz, 45 F.2d 98, 99 (2d Cir. 1930); Upjohn Co. v. William S. Merrell Chem. Co., 269 F.
209, 212-13 (6th Cir. 1920), cert. denied, 257 U.S. 638 (1921); Rushmore v. Manhattan Screw & Stamping
Works, 163 F. 939 (2d Cir. 1908).
35 See Crescent Tool Co., 247 F. at 300; see also Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 286 F.2d at 600 (ruling that
the findings "that the public was likely to believe that defendant's panels were plaintiff's Cleartex panels
and that the trade associates the appearance of Cleartex panels with plaintiff and its trademark 'Cleartex'
are insufficient to establish requisite secondary meaning); Selchow & Righter Co., 142 F.2d at 709 (denying
relief for failure to establish secondary meaning where the plaintiff failed to show that the public knew or
cared whether plaintiff or defendant manufactured any particular Parcheesi game set); A.C. Gilbert Co., 45
F.2d at 99-100 (denying relief where there was no evidence "to show that fruit juice extractors of the design
in question have been bought because they originated with the complainant rather than because they were
useful articles of a neat appearance"); Huston v. Buckeye Bait Corp., 145 F. Supp. 600, 607 (S.D. Ohio
1955) (To establish secondary meaning, "[t]here must be an established identity so that one looks at the
product externally and says, 'That is the article I want because I know the source of its production and I want
the article made by that manufacturer."').
36 Crescent Tool Co., 247 F. at 300 (emphasis added). See also Hygienic Specialties Co. v. H.G. Salz-
man, Inc., 302 F.2d 614, 620 (2d Cir. 1962); Blisscraft of Hollywood v. United Plastics Co., 294 F.2d 694,
697 (2d Cir. 1961) ("To establish a secondary meaning... it must be shown that... purchasers are moved
to buy it because of its source."); Lewis v. Vendome Bags, Inc., 108 F.2d 16, 18 (2d Cir. 1939) ("Nor does
the fact that bags of the appearance of exhibit 3 have become popular as a result of the plaintiff's advertising
make the defendant's duplication of them a tort.") (citations omitted), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 660 (1940);
Note, Developments in the Law: Competitive Torts, 77 HARV. L. REv. 888, 912-13 (1964) (noting distinction
between association and motivation in defining secondary meaning).
37 William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526,531 (1924) (finding that defendant could
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these doctrines, together with a willingness to tolerate confusion for the sake of
competition, made relief for product imitation difficult to obtain and
effectively limited relief, when obtained, to a requirement that the defendant
properly and clearly label its imitations as its own.s
When Congress enacted the Trademark Act of 1946, it considered the
question whether it should change this approach and expressly allow
protection of trade dress and product features as trademarks. This considera-
tion focussed on the possibility that the proposed trademark legislation, by
expressly allowing registration of trade dress on the supplemental register,
might allow trade dress to be registered on the principal register after it had
acquired secondary meaning.39 And early drafts defined the term "trademark"
imitate exactly chocolate flavoring of medication because it "serves a substantial and desirable use"). See-
also Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 271 F.2d 569, 572 (2d Cir. 1959) (finding color pink for
a stomach remedy was functional because it was .'designed to present a pleasing appearance to the customer
and to the sufferer"'); Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952); J.C. Penney Co. v,
H.D. Lee Mercantile Co., 120 F.2d 949, 954 (8th Cir. 1941) ('"A feature of goods is functional ... if it af-
fects their purpose, action or performance; or the facility or economy of processing, handling or using
them.') (quoting RESrATEmENT (FIRST) oF TORTs § 742 (1938)); Crescent Tool Co., 247 F. at 300; Smith v.
Krause, 160 F. 270, 271 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908) (refusing to protect the words 'Merrie Christmas,' woven into
a ribbon as a trademark because "the fact that it has 'Merrie Christmas' inscribed upon it adds a value to it
over the value of a plain ribbon").
38 See, e.g., Warner & Co., 265 U.S. at 532-33 (holding injunction may properly prohibit defendant
and its agents from suggesting to its customers feasibility of substituting its product for that of the plaintiff,
and may even require the defendant to attach a label to its products stating that its product is not to be sold
or dispensed in response to a request for the plaintiff's product, but a prohibition on the use of the product
feature at issue, chocolate, "goes too far" and was improper); Bose Corp. v. Linear Design Labs., Inc., 467
F.2d 304, 310 (2d Cir. 1972) (finding no unfair competition despite similarity between original and imitator
given that defendant had plainly labeled its product as its own); Modem Aids, Inc. v. RIH. Macy & Co., Inc.,
264 F.2d 93, 94 (2d Cir. 1959) (per curiam) (noting that even if plaintiff can show consumer deception as a
result of defendant's imitation, relief is limited to requirement of proper labeling); West Point Mfg. Co. v.
Detroit Stamping Co., 222 F.2d 581, 588, 589 (6th Cir. 1955); J.C. Penney Co., 120 F.2d at 955-56 (ruling
that "[1]abeling is the usual and accepted method of distinguishing the goods of one manufacturer from those
of another in the marlcet" and limiting relief to requirement of proper labeling and accuracy in statements
made concerning defendant's products).
39 Ironically, the cross-over argument was articulated during the legislative debates preceding enact-
ment by opponents of broad trademark protection. In response, proponents of broad protection denied that
the broad definition of mark incorporated for the supplemental register was intended to or would have any
such effect. They insisted that the purpose of the broad supplemental register definition was to ensure that
domestic users could obtain a registration that would enable them to seek trademark protection for trade
dress and product design in foreign countries where such were recognized as trademarks. See Department of
Justice Report on H.R. 82, supra note 8, at 62 (noting potential for cross-over registration of trade dress and
product features); Hearings on H.R. 13486 Before the House Comm. on Patents, 69th Cong. 67-68 (1927)
(statement of Henry B. Brownell) (explaining cross-over registration possibility and stating that the
"provision for the registration of goods is an exceedingly dangerous one"; in response, Mr. Rogers, one of
the draftsmen and principal supporters of the Trademark Act, responded that the provision for registration of
configurations was intended to apply only on the supplemental register, and the principal register would
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for purposes of the principal register in a way that might have allowed such
cross-over registration.40 After the Department of Justice expressed its concern
during the 1942 hearings that the trademark bill raised the spectre of
monopoly,4' Congress made two changes in the bill to eliminate the possibility
of such cross-over registration. First, Congress tightened the language
concerning registration of packages and configuration of goods as marks on
the supplemental register to limit application of this broader definition of
"mark" to the supplemental register.42  Second, and more importantly,
encompass only those trademarks recognized as such under court decisions within the United States); Hear-
ings on S. 2679 Before the Joint Comm. on Patents, 68th Cong. 94-95 (1925) (statement of S.G. Notting-
ham) (expressing worry that by recognizing configuration of goods as registrable mark on secondary regis-
ter, bill would allow registration of such on principal register, and would thereby "put all of the parts
manufacturers out of business"); see also infra note 46 (colloquy between Representative Lanham and Mr.
Rogers). Only after the Trademark Act passed did the proponents of broader protection advance the cross-
over argument as a basis for the registration of trade dress and product design on the principal registration.
Thus, Daphne Robert articulated the cross-over registration argument in her book, The New Trademark
Manual, published after the Trademark Act's enactment, as follows:
Packages and configurations of goods which have become distinctive through use may be
registrable on the principal register under Section 2(f). That section provides that nothing in the
Act shall prevent the registration of 'marks' which have become distinctive. "Marks" are
defined as trade-marks, service-marks, collective marks, and certification marks entitled to
registration, whether registered or not. Since packages and configurations of goods are entitled
to registration under the Act, it would seem to follow that if they become distinctive they are
registrable on the principal register.
DAPHNE ROBERT, THE NEw TRADEMARK MANUAL 67 (1947); see also 4 RuDoLF CALLMANN, supra note 10,
§ 98A(d), at 2137 (making same cross-over argument). In Ex parte Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., the ap-
plicant advanced precisely this argument in seeking registration on the principal register of a package con-
figuration, and the Patent and Trademark Office squarely rejected it. 92 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 74, 75-76 (Chief
Examn'r 1952) (noting that Congress adopted separate definitions for "marks" registrable on the supple-
mental register and "trade-marks" registrable on the principal register).
40 Thus, in H.R. 9041, introduced into the 75th Congress in 1938, the following definition for trade-
marks registrable on the principal register was given: "The term 'trade-mark' includes any mark so used as
to distinguish the user's goods from the goods of others ...." H.R. 9041, 75th Cong. § 43 (1938), reprinted
in, Trade-marks: Hearings on H.R. 9041 Before the Subcomm. on Trade-marks of the House Comm. on Pat-
ents, 75th Cong. 9 (1938) ("1938 Trade-Mark Hearings"); see also H.R. 102, 77th Cong. § 45 (1941), re-
printed in Trade-marks: Hearings on H.R. 102, H.R. 5461, and S. 895 Before the Subcomm. on Trade-marks
of the House Comm. on Patents, 77th Cong. 13 (1941) ("The terms 'trade-mark' and 'mark' include any
mark which is entitled to registration under the terms of this Act and whether registered or not."); H.R. 4744,
76th Cong. § 46 (1939), reprinted in Trade-marks: Hearings on H.. 4744 Before the Subcomm. on Trade-
marks of the House Comm on Patents, 76th Cong. 172 (1939) ("1939 Trade-Mark Hearings") ("The term
'trade-mark' includes any mark which is entitled to registration under the terms of this Act and whether reg-
istered or not.").
41 See 1942 Trade-Mark Hearings, supra note 8, at 40-41.
42 Compare H.R. 82,78th Cong. § 23 (1944), reprinted in 1944 Trade-Mark Hearings, supra note 8, at
14 ("For the purposes of registration on the supplemental register, a mark may consist of any trade-mark,
symbol, label, package, configuration of goods... "), and Trademark Act of 1946, § 23(c), 15 U.S.C.
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Congress rewrote the definition of "trademark" for purposes of the principal
register to include the limitation that a trademark must consist of "any word,
name, symbol or device or any combination thereof."43  This change ensured
that the definition of "trademark" for purposes of the principal register tracked
the long-standing understanding of the term under which it had been perfectly
clear that neither trade dress nor product features were eligible for protection
as trademarks." Presumably, Congress was aware of this understanding and
§ 1091(c) (1994), with H.R. 4744,76th Cong. § 23 (1939), supra note 40, at 5 ("For the purpose of this reg-
ister .... '), and H.R. 9041, 75th Cong. § 25 (1938), supra note 40, at 4 ("For the purposes of this section..
.."). Even before the change, proponents of broader protection stated that the inclusion of "label, package,
[and] configuration of goods" in the definition of marks eligible for registration on the supplemental register
was "strictly limited" and "100 percent for" the purpose of enabling domestic companies to obtain protection
for such subject matter in foreign countries where it was sometimes recognized as trademark subject matter.
See 1938 Trade-Mark Hearings, supra note 40, at 180 (statement of Mr. Rogers); 1939 Trade-Mark Hear-
ings, supra note 40, at 127 (statement of Mr. Rogers).
43 Compare H.R. 82, 78th Cong. § 45 (1944), reprinted in 1944 Trade-Mark Hearings, supra note 8, at
14 ("The term 'trade-mark' includes any word, name, symbol or device or a combination thereof adopted
and used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods and distinguish them from those manufactured
or sold by others."), and Trademark Act of 1946, § 45, codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994)
("The term 'trademark' includes any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof.., used by
a person ... to identify and distinguish his or her goods ... from those manufactured or sold by others...
."), with H.R. 4744, 76th Cong. § 46 (1939), supra note 40, at 9, 172 ("The term 'trade-mark' includes any
mark which is entitled to registration under the terms of this Act and whether registered or not."). while it is
true that the word "includes" is not ordinarily treated as exclusive in statutory interpretation, here Congress
added the phrase specifically to address the cross-over registration possibility, and the phrase ought, there-
fore, to be read at the very least to accomplish that purpose. See Derenberg, supra note 25, at 835, 841, 846
(noting that items that might qualify as trade-dress "were deliberately left outside the definition of 'trade-
mark' in section 45" and are not therefore eligible for registration on the principal register). Indeed, Com-
missioner Leeds in her decision recognizing the registrability of trade dress on the principal register implic-
itly acknowledged this, when she justified her decision by pretending that a container fell within the mean-
ing of the words "symbol or device," rather than by pretending that the words "word, name, symbol, or
device" were not intended as a substantive limitation on proper trademark subject matter. Ex parte Haig &
Haig Ltd., 118 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 229, 230-31 (Comm'r Pat. 1958). In addition, Congress's express recogni-
tion of "package" and "configuration of goods" as "marks" for the supplemental register, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1091(c) (1994), demonstrated that Congress was perfectly aware of the distinction between technical
trademarks and trade dress, and under the apt language rule, intended to retain that distinction as between the
principal and supplemental registers. See Derenberg, supra note 25, at 834 ("Since labels and packages are
expressly relegated to the supplemental register, there is no room on the principal register for registration of
entire labels or packages.").
44 See Ex parte Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 74, 76 (Chief Exam'r 1952); see
also McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 254 (1877) ("Subject to the qualification before explained, a trade-
mark may consist of a name, symbol, figure, letter, form, or device, if adopted and used by a manufacturer in
order to designate the goods he manufactures or sells to distinguish the same from those manufactured or
sold by another."); BROWNE, supra note 28, §§ 87, 89b, 89c, at 137-138 ("he mark may consist in... any
symbol or emblem, however unmeaning in itself, as a cross, a bird, a quadruped, a castle, a star, a comet, a
sun; or it may, and frequently does, consist of a combination of various objects, copied from nature, art, or
fancy." Later section titles include "§ 89b. The mere Form of a vendible Commodity not a Trade-Mark"
and "§ 137. The Style or Peculiarity of Package is not per sea Trade-Mark").
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by adopting this definition of trademarks eligible for registration on the
principal register, intended to limit registration of trade dress and product
features to the supplemental register only.45  The legislative history and other
provisions of the Trademark Act confirm this reading.4' In consequence, after
45 Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994) (providing for purposes of the principal register, "[tlhe term
'trademark' includes any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof'), with 15 U.S.C. §
1091(c) (1994) ("For the purposes of registration on the supplemental register, a mark may consist of any
trademark, symbol, label, package, configuration of goods, name, word, slogan, phrase, surname,
geographical name, numeral, or device or any combination of any of the foregoing .... "); see also Ex parte
Minnesota Mining, 92 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 74 (holding that product packages did not satisfy definition of
trademark and could not be registered on the principal register).
46 In terms of the legislative history consider the following colloquy between Mr. Rogers and Repre-
sentative Lanham concerning the broad definition of mark contained in section 23 for the supplemental reg-
ister.
Mr. Rogers. There is a very definite reason for including the language [that includes "symbols,
labels, package, configuration of goods, name, word, slogan or phrase" in the
definition of marks for the supplemental register] to which my friend objects.. In
many foreign countries, the only way one can get trade-mark protection is by
registration. That is generally so in Latin America. Moreover, in order to get
protection there-and protection depends upon registration-a foreigner must
produce a certificate of registration from his home land, and one purpose of the
supplemental register is to provide protection in foreign countries. They do not
have the same concept of trade -marks down there that we have; they regard, many
of them, as trade-mark subject-matter things that we consider designs, or what not.
Now a configuration of goods generally-take Argentina, for instance-is
regarded as a trade-mark; the shape of a perfumery bottle, or something of
that kind.
Rep. Lanham. It would be a design patent here?
Mr. Rogers. It would be a design patent here. If we cannot get registration in this country for that
sort of configuration, we cannot get any protection in Argentina. Now it is strictly
limited for that purpose in this section, that a trade-mark may be deemed to include
these various things.
1939 Trade-Mark Hearings, supra note 40, at 127. For other aspects of the legislative history indicating
that trade dress was not eligible for registration on the principal register, see supra notes 39-42. Other as-
pects of the Trademark Act that confirm this reading are: First, the language providing for registration on the
principal register was essentially identical to the registration language of the 1905 Act. Compare Act of
Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 5, 33 Stat. 724, 725 ("that no mark by which the goods of the owner of the mark
may be distinguished from other goods of the same class shall be refused registration .... "), with Trademark
Act of 1946, § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1994) ("No trade-mark by which the goods of the applicant may be dis-
tinguished from the goods of others shall be refused registration."). In interpreting this language under the
1905 Act, registration of trade dress had not been allowed. Second, Congress did not extend the secondary
meaning requirement in the registration section to trade dress, but only to descriptive and misdescriptive
marks. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)-(f) (1994). Because the secondary meaning requirement was well-
established for trade dress protection under unfair competition law, Congress surely would have extended it
to trade dress had it intended to allow registration of trade dress as a trademark on the principal register.
Third, Congress did not include a functionality limitation in the registration section. Again, the limitation
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enactment of the Trademark Act, the common law doctrine of unfair
competition remained the sole source of substantive protection available for
trade dress and product features.47 In 1952, the Patent and Trademark Office
twice confirmed this reading of the Trademark Act, and squarely held that
neither trade dress nor product features were, as a matter of law, eligible for
registration on the principal register."
Six years later, however, in 1958, the Patent and Trademark Office re-
versed its position, and allowed the registration of a product package on the
principal register.49 In her opinion, Assistant Commissioner Daphne R. Leeds
made no attempt to explain or justify her departure from established law and
Congress's plain intentions." Her reasoning, as such, consisted entirely of the
was well-established in the law, and Congress's failure to include it confirms that Congress did not intend to
recognize trade dress as subject matter eligible for registration on the principal register. The alternative in-
terpretation, that Congress intended both to recognize trade dress as registrable trademarks and to eliminate
the secondary meaning and functionality requirements, is absurd. The legislative history clearly refutes any
intention of such a radical change, given that the discussions of trade dress registration were limited to the
possibility, at best, of cross-over registration once secondary meaning was established. Cf. Colligan v. Ac-
tivities Club of New York, Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 693-94 (2d Cir. 1971) (rejecting plaintiff's proposed "plain
language" interpretation of the standing requirement for section 43(a) because "had Congress contemplated
so revolutionary a departure... ,its intention could and would have been clearly expressed"). Moreover,
even courts sympathetic to the registration of trade dress as trademarks on the principal register have not
gone so far. After adding trade dress as registrable subject matter, they have promptly rewritten the registra-
tion provision to incorporate the secondary meaning and functionality requirements for such "marks." See
In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (recognizing that trade dress is registra-
ble on the principal register but only if the dress is non-functional and has secondary meaning). Only the
Fourth Circuit has so far missed the boat on this issue. See Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp., 9 F.3d 1091
(4th Cir. 1993) (mistakenly reasoning that because Congress did not include functionality as a defense to
incontestability, Congress did not intend functionality to serve as a defense to incontestability), cert. denied,
511 U.S. 1127 (1994).
47 As others have explained, Congress did not intend for section 43(a) to provide a federal forum for
such common law unfair competition claims, and certainly did not intend to modify the substantive require-
ments of such cause of Ection. See, e.g., Kenneth B. Germain, Unfair Trade Practices Under Section 43(a)
of the Lanham Act: You've Come a Long Way Baby- Too Far, Maybe?, 49 IND. L.J. 84, 109-12 (1973).
48 Exparte Minnesota Mining, 92 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 75-76; Exparte Boye Needle Co., 100 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 124, 124 (Chief Exam'r 1952); see also Lucien Lelong, Inc. v. Lenel, Inc., 181 F.2d 3 (5th Cir.
1950); Exparte Mars Signal-Light Co., 85 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 173, 175 (Comm'r Pat. 1950); Exparte Pulitzer
Pub. Co., 82 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 229 (Comm'r Pat. 1949); 3 CALLMANN, supra note 10, § 65, at 974 n.l, §
71.4, at 1103 ("Although many marks that were not considered registrable under the 1905 Act, may now be
registered under the Lanham Act, the concept and definition of a trade-mark and its function is not expanded
by the new Act."); Derenberg, supra note 25, at 835, 841 (noting that labels and packages cannot be regis-
tered on the principal register).
49 See Exparte Haig & Haig Ltd., 118 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 229 (Comm'r Pat. 1958).
50 Commissioner Leeds had been a key supporter of the Trademark Act of 1946, and was undoubtedly
aware that Congress had specifically rewritten the definition of trademark to eliminate trade dress and
product features from eligibility for the principal register. See 1944 Trade-Mark Hearings, supra note 8, at
20 (testimony of Commissioner Leeds) (testifying that trademarks "are symbols or names, words or
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strategic placement of dashes in a way meant to suggest that a bottle was a
"symbol or device" within the meaning of the Trademark Act.5 In terms of
legitimate statutory interpretation, this reasoning could not be more wrong. As
discussed, Congress added the "word, name, symbol or device" language spe-
cifically to exclude product packaging or features from the principal register
and to relegate them exclusively to the supplemental register.52 Moreover,
when Congress added the "word, name, symbol, or device" limitation to the
bill in 1944, "symbol" and "device" were terms of art that had long been part
of the traditional definition of a technical trademark. They referred not to
"anything at all that is capable of carrying meaning,"53 but to an emblem or ar-
tistic figure attached to a product.m Even when the actions of Ms. Leeds are
viewed in the best possible light, Ms. Leeds simply took advantage of her
authority as administrator to rewrite the statute to reflect her personal predilec-
devices"). Despite this, she articulated the cross-over registration argument in The New Trademark Manual.
See Robert, supra note 39, at 67. A trademark applicant, Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing, Inc.,
articulated this argument in 1952 in an attempt to persuade the Patent and Trademark Office to permit
registration on the principal register of its package configuration. But Commissioner Leeds' predecessor as
Assistant Commissioner of Trademarks expressly rejected it. See Exparte Minnesota Mining & Mfg., Inc.,
92 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 75-76. Given this rejection of her central argument for allowing registration of
product configuration and features on the principal register, Commissioner Leeds was undoubtedly aware
that her opinion represented a departure from both Congress's intent and settled law. Moreover,
Commissioner Leeds did not articulate her argument that the term "device" would include product features
in her testimony during the process leading to the Trademark Act of 1946, nor did she articulate it in The
New Trademark Manual. In fact, it does not appear that Commissioner Leeds articulated this argument until
after her predecessor at the Patent and Trademark Office properly rejected her argument for the cross-over
registration of product features and trade dress.
51 Commissioner Leeds resorted to this artifice in two places, once at the start and once at the end of
her decision. See Exparte Haig & Haig Ltd., 118 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 230 ("The fundamental question, then,
is not whether or not containers are registrable on the Principal Register, but it is whether or not what is pre-
sented is a trademark-a symbol or device-identifying applicant's goods and distinguishing them from
those of others."); id. at 231 ("TIhe contour or conformation of the container may be a trademark-a sym-
bol or device--which distinguishes the applicant's goods, and it may be registrable on the Principal Regis-
ter.").
52 See supra notes 39-48 and accompanying text.
53 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995) (adopting literal meaning of
"symbol or device" in defining trademark subject matter, rather than recognizing their more limited scope as
terms of art).
M See Ex parte Minnesota Mining & Mfg., Inc., 92 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 76. The court reasoned that:
The word "device" appearing in the definition of trademark cannot aid applicant. The word
"device," which also appears in the older definitions, is not used as referring to a mechanical or
structural device but is used in the sense of one of the definitions of the word; "an artistic figure
or design used as a heraldic bearing or as an emblem, badge, trade mark, or the like," rather than
in one of the other meanings of the word.
Id. See also supra note 28 (discussing narrow definition of "symbol or device" within trademark law as an
emblem attached to a product).
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tions and to override by fiat Congress's deliberate choice. As an exercise of
judicial (or quasi-judicial) reasoning, the decision is an embarrassment, re-
flecting the sort of naked assertion of agency authority and administrator hu-
bris about which the theories of agency capture and bureaucratic expansion
55warn.
Rather than ridicule and rejection, however, Commissioner Leeds' decision
16found ready acceptance both with courts and commentators. The Supreme
Court attempted to slow the expansion of such protection with its rulings in
Sears and Compco." Yet, despite what seems to be very clear language in the
opinions limiting such protection," the effectiveness of these two decisions as
limits on the protection of product features under unfair competition and
trademark law proved both transient and superficial. 59  Following
55 One of the principal concerns within the theory of agency capture is the so-called revolving door,
where bias can arise from an industry's practice of hiring the administrators that are supposed to regulate
them. After leaving her position with the Patent and Trademark Office, Commissioner Leeds worked as an
attorney in trademark cases, and Haig & Haig became one of her clients. See Haig & Haig, Ltd. v. Maradel
Prods., Inc., 249 F. Supp. 575, 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (listing "Daphne Robert Leeds" as "of counsel" for
plaintiff.
56 See Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 635 (7th Cir. 1993); Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross
Bicycles, Inc., 870 F.2d 1176 (7th Cir. 1989); Service Ideas, Inc. v. Traex Corp., 846 F.2d 1118 (7th Cir.
1988); W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 337 (7th Cir. 1985); In re Teledyne Indus., Inc., 696 F.2d
968 (Fed. Cir. 1982); In re Morton Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re Mogen
David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925 (C.C.P.A. 1964); In re Kotzin, 276 F.2d 411, 414-15 (C.C.P.A. 1960);
Oxford Pendaflex Corp. v. Rolodex Corp., 204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 249 (T.T.A.B. 1973); In re Superba Cravats,
Inc., 145 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 354 (T.T.A.B. 1965).
57 See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting,
Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
58 The Court held:
That an article copied from an unpatented article could be made in some other way, that the de-
sign is "nonfunctional" and not essential to the use of either article, that the configuration of the
article copied may have a "secondary meaning" which identifies the market to the trade, or that
there may be "confusion" among purchasers as to which article is which or as to who is the
maker, may be relevant evidence in applying a State's law requiring such precautions as label-
ing; however, and regardless of the copier's motives, neither these facts nor any others can fur-
nish a basis for imposing liability for or prohibiting the actual acts of copying and selling.
Compco Corp., 376 U.S. at 238. See also Ralph S. Brown, Product Simulation: A Right or A Wrong?, 64
COLUM. L. REv. 1216, 1220-21 (1964); Walter J. Derenberg, Product Simulation: A Right orA Wrong?, 64
COLUM. L. REv. 1192 (1964) (observing that Justice Black's language would seem to preclude protection of
product features under either trademark or unfair competition law even if feature is non-functional and dis-
tinctive).
59 Lower courts took two basic tacks to eliminate the force of the Sears and Compco decisions. First,
courts and the Patent and Trademark Office took the position that the decisions were irrelevant to the issue
whether the federal law of trademarks and unfair competition could extend protection to product features.
See In re Honeywell, Inc., 497 F.2d 1344, 1349 (C.C.P.A. 1974) ("Nor do we believe that the language of
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Commissioner Leeds' decision, the recognition of product packaging, designs,
and features as trademarks steadily expanded,6W and the substantive limitations
that the common law had imposed on the protection of trade dress and product
features under unfair competition law were steadily eroded. With the
acceptance of trade dress and product features as trademarks, similarity alone
became sufficient to sustain a cause of action against an imitator, even in the
absence of some further deceptive acts.6' Moreover, the law's traditional
willingness to permit a considerable degree of confusion in order to leave
room for competitive imitiation vanished, and courts began to seize on the
slightest evidence of confusion as proof of infringement. The secondary
meaning requirement suffered dual blows. First, courts dropped the
materiality aspect of secondary meaning altogether and found secondary
the opinions in [Sears and Compco]... is pertinent to the present issue of registrability for federal trade-
mark protection."); In re Mogen David wine Corp., 372 F.2d 539 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (ruling that Sears and
Compco do not affect registrability of product features or designs under Lanham Act); see also Keene Corp.
v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 823 n.1 (3d Cir. 1981) (ruling that Sears and Compco do not affect
protection of product features or designs under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act). Second, in terms of state
law protection, courts limited the reach of the decisions by ignoring their literal words and pretending that
the decisions prohibited only that state law protection directed at "functional" "product" features, where both
"functional" and "product" were narrowly defined. See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cin-
ema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 203-04 (2d Cir. 1979); Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210,
1214 (8th Cir.) (limiting reach of Sears and Compco to functional features), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861
(1976); Time Mechanisms, Inc. v. Qonaar Corp., 422 F. Supp. 905 (D.NJ. 1976) (pretending that Sears and
Compco did not restrict state law protection of non-functional features which had acquired secondary
meaning); National Football Leagues Props., Inc. v. Consumer Enter., Inc., 327 N.E.2d 242 (11. Ct. App.
1975) (pretending that emblems bearing NFL team names and logos were not products within meaning of
Sears and Compco). Both of these positions are illegitimate. while it may be true that Sears and Compco,
because they focused on preemption of state law, are not, strictly speaking, binding authority with respect to
the proper scope of federal trademark protection for such features, clearly the Court's language and reason-
ing is relevant to whether courts and the Patent and Trademark Office should rewrite the Lanham Act to rec-
ognize such protection under federal law. See Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co., 113 F.3d
373, 379 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that "the Lanham Act must be construed in the light of a strong federal pol-
icy in favor of vigorously competitive markets," and finding Sears and Compco relevant even if their pre-
emption analysis does not strictly apply to Lanham Act); Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 648-51 (7th
Cir. 1993) (Cudahy, J., dissenting). Congress certainly did not intend to provide it and, if implied revoca-
tions are generally to be avoided, certainly they should be avoided here when it is the courts and the admin-
istrative agency, rather than Congress itself, rewriting the bargain that the Patent Act reflects. As for the
second issue, the Court, in its Compco decision, expressly denied protection for the product features, even
though the Court assumed that the features were non-functional and had secondary meaning. Compco Co.,
376 U.S. at 238.
6) The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals recognized the protection of product features or designs as
"trademarks" registrable on the principal register in 1974. See In re Honeywell, Inc., 497 F.2d 1344
(C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1080 (1974).
61 See, e.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 774, 776 (1992) (upholding infringe-
ment finding based upon similarity alone); Krueger Int'l, Inc. v. Nightingale, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595, 607
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding infringement based upon similarity alone).
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meaning on the basis of recognition alone62 Second, courts watered down the
recognition aspect of the secondary meaning requirement as well, by ruling
that at least some forms of trade dress could be inherently distinctive63 and by
allowing a plaintiff to establish recognition, where required, from use or from
the defendant's imitation of the feature." As for the third substantive
limitation, courts reinterpreted the functional limitation to focus, not on
whether a feature was useful or desirable or functional in its ordinary sense,
but on whether the feature was the only useful or desirable alternative
available.6 The right to "copy the plaintiff's goods slavishly down to the
62 See, e.g., Vaughan Mfg. Co. v. Brikam Int'l, Inc., 814 F.2d 346, 348 (7th Cir. 1987) (defining
"secondary meaning" as "an association in the minds of the consumer between the trade dress of a product
and a particular producer" and omitting any materiality requirement); Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Proctor &
Gamble Co., 434 F.2d 794, 802 (9th Cir. 1970) (explaining "secondary meaning has been defined as
association, nothing more"). Indeed, when a court recently enforced the materiality requirement, see Anti-
Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 684 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1227
(1983), in a manner and on facts essentially identical to an earlier decision, see Selchow & Righter Co. v.
Western Printing & Lithographing Co., 142 F.2d 707, 708-09 (7th Cir. 1944), there was a substantial uproar
and in response to interest group pressures, Congress amended the definition of "generic" trademarks to
eliminate a purchaser motivation inquiry. See Trademark Clarification Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620,
§ 102, 98 Stat. 3335; see also Hans Zeisel, The Surveys that Broke Monopoly, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 896, 903-
09 (1983) (arguing that Ninth Circuit's approach to secondary meaning and genericness poses a radically
different question than traditional doctrine).
63 Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 774,776.
64 Compare A.C. Gilbert Co. v. Shemitz, 45 F.2d 98, 99 (2d Cir. 1930) (ruling that similarity resulting
from imitation and "many sales and much advertising" did not establish secondary meaning in design of
article), and General Time Instruments Corp. v. United States Time Corp., 165 F.2d 853, 854-55 (2d Cir.)
(ruling that sale of 3,000,000 clocks and expenditure of $2 million in advertising from 1939 to 1946 insuffi-
cient to establish secondary meaning), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 846 (1948), with Clamp Mfg. Co. v. Enco Mfg.
Co., Inc., 870 F.2d 512, 517 (9th Cir.) (finding secondary meaning based upon sales and advertising expen-
ditures alone), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 872 (1989). The Patent and Trademark Office has indicated that the
statutory presumption of secondary meaning from five years of "substantially exclusive and continuous use"
found in section 1052(0, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1994), will not automatically apply where, under the circum-
stances, the claimed mark is a product feature or product design. See In re Craigmyle, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
791 (T.T.A.B. 1984); In re Kwik Lok Corp., 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1245, 1248 (T.T.A.B. 1983); see also
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFnCE, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMININO
PROCEDURE § 1212.05 (revised ed. 1997). Before applying the presumption in such cases, the Patent and
Trademark Office requires evidence that the feature has, in fact, been used as a trademark. See, e.g., In re
KwikLok Corp., 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1248. But at least some courts have been willing to find secondary
meaning based on use and advertising, without independent proof that the feature or design is being used as
a mark. See Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. West Bend Co., 123 F.3d 246, 255-56 (5th Cir. 1997) (applying section
1052(f) presumption to secondary meaning issue in case where claimed trademark was a kitchen stand
mixer's appearance); Clamp Mfg. Co., 870 F.2d at 517.
65 See, e.g., Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc., 870 F.2d 1176, 1188 (7th Cir. 1989)
("[F]unctional means not simply that the feature serves a function, but that the feature is necessary to afford
a competitor the means to compete effectively."); Fabrica Inc. v. El Dorado Corp., 697 F.2d 890, 896 (9th
Cir. 1983) (rejecting the notion that "a design feature is functional by definition if it increases appeal and
sales of the product"). More generally, compare Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir.
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minutest detail" touted by Judge Hand" was reduced in the hands of the Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals to "the right to compete effectively" and would
apply only where there was an absolute "need to copy."
'6
Taken together, these changes have created an environment that welcomes
claims based on little more than a defendant's imitation of a successful prod-
uct.6 While courts have continued to recite deception-based rationales, the
actual likelihood of such deception in most of these cases is typically slight or
non-existent.69 And the law has moved steadily away from the common law's
1952) (interpreting functional to incorporate any feature which is "an important ingredient in the commercial
success of the product"), and Industria Arredamenti Fratelli Saporiti v. Charles Craig Ltd., 725 F.2d 18, 20
(2d Cir. 1984), with Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enters., Inc., 644 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1981)
(limiting application of functionality to cases where design is not also serving as a trademark and to cases
where copying is necessary to avoid a monopoly), and Wallace Int'l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver
Art Co., Inc., 916 F.2d 76, 81 (2d Cir. 1990) (limiting application of functionality doctrine to cases where
protection would "significantly hinder competition by limiting the range of adequate alternative designs").
66 Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 F. 299, 301 (2d Cir. 1917); see also Chas. D. Brid-
dell, Inc. v. Algiobe Trading Corp., 194 F.2d 416, 419 (2d Cir. 1952) (noting that right to copy applied
"even if the defendant copies 'slavishly' or 'down to the last detail'); James Heddon's Sons v. Millsite Steel
& Wire works, Inc., 128 F.2d 6, 12 (6th Cir. 1942); A.C. Gilbert Co. v. Shemitz, 45 F.2d 98, 100 (2d Cir.
1930) ("It is to be remembered that the defendants would have the right to copy the Gilbert design slavishly
so long as they did not represent that the goods sold were those of the complainant.").
67 In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1339 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re Bose Corp., 772
F.2d 866, 872 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("If the feature asserted to give a product distinctiveness is the best, or at
least one, of a few superior designs for its defacto purpose, it follows that competition is hindered."); see
also Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 519 (10th Cir. 1987) (ruling that feature may be
"slavishly copied" only where necessary to create an "equally functional" product); Sicilia di R. Biebow &
Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 429 (5th Cir. 1984) (stating that a feature will be "functional" only "if it is dic-
tated by utilitarian characteristics or by the functions that the relevant product or trade dress is intended to
serve") (emphasis added); Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 F.2d 327, 331 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating
that a feature will be functional only if it is "dictated by the functions to be performed").
68 For cases finding unfair competition or trademark infringement based upon imitation and consequent
similarity, see, for example, Animal Fair, Inc v. AMFESCO Indus., Inc., 620 F. Supp. 175, 191 (D. Minn.
1985) ("In the present case, there is clearly a likelihood of confusion between the two bear's foot slippers.
The substantial similarity which plaintiff demonstrated in order to prevail on its copyright claim is the pri-
mary factor which leads to this conclusion."). See also Todd R. Geremia, Comment, Protecting the Right to
Copy: Trade Dress Claims for Expired Utility Patents, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 779, 800 (1998) (noting that
elimination of the secondary meaning requirement and the narrowing of the functionality doctrine seriously
undermine the right to copy from expired utility patents).
69 The evidence of confusion in the Sears and Compco cases has become entirely typical of the type of
evidence sufficient to establish infringement. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 226
(1964) (holding evidence of confusion consisted of similar appearance plus: (1) labels were not attached to
showroom lamps; (2) customers had asked manufacturer of higher priced lamp about the difference in the
lamps; and (3) two customers, who purchased the more expensive lamp, complained to the manufacturer of
the more expensive lamps when they learned that "substantially identical lamps" were available at a "much
lower price"); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 236-37 (1964) (explaining evidence
of confusion consisted of similar appearance plus request by a single plant manager that Day-Brite service
what turned out to be Compco fixtures); see also American Safety Table Co. v. Schreiber, 269 F.2d 255, 270
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focus on actual deception. 70  Where the common law once required actual
proof of secondary meaning, secondary meaning can now be presumed from
the uniqueness of a design7 or inferred from the fact of imitation itself.72
Where the common law once required deceptive acts in addition to mere prod-
uct similarity, similarity alone is now sufficient to support an infringement
finding.73 Where the common law once limited relief to a requirement of
proper labeling, proper labeling is no longer sufficient to avoid an infringe-
ment finding, and courts will prohibit the imitation of desired product features
even where a defendant is careful to identify the imitation as its own.74 In each
case, these changes have removed the need for a plaintiff to prove a probability
of actual consumer deception and moved sharply toward an almost irrebuttable
presumption of infringement drawn simply from the imitation of a successful
original.75
(2d Cir. 1959) (finding unfair competition from product simulation even though court recognized that
"[tihere is some but not much evidence of actual confusion").
70 See Zangerle & Peterson Co. v. Venice Funiture Novelty Mfg. Co., 133 F.2d 266, 269-70 (7th Cir.
1943) ('The essence of unfair competition is fraud. And like fraud, it is never presumed, and its existence
must be established by a clear preponderance of the evidence.") (citations omitted).
71 See, e.g., Krueger Int'l, Inc. v. Nightingale, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595, 607 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding
that chair design was distinctive and hence protected as trademark where design was "unique among high
density stacking chairs" and had "a distinctive overall look").
72 See, e.g., Coach Leatherware Co. v. Ann Taylor, Inc., 933 F.2d 162, 169 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that
inference of secondary meaning can be drawn from fact of imitation alone); Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Frue-
hauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1220 & n.13 (8th Cir.) (holding that inferences of secondary meaning and likeli-
hood of confusion can be drawn from fact of imitation alone), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976); Animal
Fair, Inc., 620 F. Supp. at 190 (drawing inferences of secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion from
fact of imitation).
73 See, e.g., Warner Bros., Inc., v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 F.2d 327, 332 (2d Cir. 1983) (enjoining defen-
dant from producing toy cars that looked like a car appearing on plaintiffs television show even though
there was no showing that purchasers knew or cared whether plaintiff sponsored or produced the defendant's
cars).
74 For example, in Dogloo, Inc. v. Doskocil Mfg. Co., 893 F. Supp. 911, 921-22 (C.D. Cal. 1995), the
district court enjoined the imitation of a successful igloo-shaped doghouse under trademark law based upon
the similarity between the shapes of the plaintiff's and defendant's respective products. In enjoining the
imitation, the district court relied on a survey where some of the labeling that ordinarily accompanied the
product had been removed. See id. at 916; see also Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d
254 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding likelihood of confusion despite distinct labeling); Boston Prof'l Hockey Ass'n v.
Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc. 510 F.2d 1004, 1008 (5th Cir.) (finding infringement even where consum-
ers were not confused as to source), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975). Some courts go further and find that
disclaimers or other labeling efforts intended to ensure proper source identification are themselves evidence
of infringement. See Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 1 Ltd., 942 F. Supp. 1513, 1544-50, 1550 n.35 (S.D. Tex.
1996) (using own name in conjunction with another's mark and including disclaimers in advertising are evi-
dence that support finding of likelihood of confusion), afTd, 155 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 1998).
75 At this time, imitation is a basis for drawing inferences of secondary meaning and likelihood of con-
fusion, but a trier of fact may decide not to draw such inferences based upon imitation in particular cases.
See Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc., 870 F.2d 1176, 1183-84 & n.16 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting that
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Perhaps recognizing that deception-based concerns cannot support these
changes, proponents of broader protection have relied increasingly on
arguments that trademark protection for product features is necessary to
provide the appropriate incentive, and to avoid providing a disincentive, for the
development of attractive and desirable product designs. 7' A district judge
from Colorado has given the clearest expression of this justification:
One salutary purpose of the Lanham Act in this context [of
protecting product design as a trademark] is to protect a creative
artists' rights in his or her creation and thus provide incentive to be
creative. By protecting and fostering creativity, a product with
features different and perhaps preferable to the Blue Mountain
product may well be developed.,n
Other courts have relied on similar concerns, although not always
articulated in such a straightforward manner. For example, when it eliminated
the secondary meaning requirement for the protection of trade dress under
section 43(a), the Court, in Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., argued that
enforcing the secondary meaning requirement would expose "the developer of
fanciful or arbitrary trade dress" to "'an unfair prospect of theft [or] financial
loss"' "at the outset of its use."78 Given that the use has just begun, the "theft"
or "financial loss" to which the Court is referring cannot be the "theft" by
defendant of the positive associations in the minds of consumers between the
restaurant's appearance and otherwise unobservableP features of the plaintiff's
imitation may be considered as a factor tending to prove secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion, but
emphasizing that it is not the sole factor); Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doe's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 843
(9th Cir. 1987) (noting that trier of fact may draw inferences of secondary meaning and likelihood of confu-
sion from fact of imitation); see also RESTATEMENT CrHIRD) OF UNFAIR CoMPETITIoN § 16 cmt. b, illus. 2
(1995).
76 See, e.g., Wallace Int'l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 916 F.2d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 1990)
(refusing to follow "important ingredient" test for functionality on the grounds that such test "discourages
both originators and later competitors from developing pleasing designs"); LeSportsac, Inc. v. KMart Corp.,
754 F.2d 71, 77 (2d Cir. 1985); Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., 653 F.2d 822, 825 (3d Cir. 1981) (justifying
broader protection for product features under trademark law in order to avoid discouraging the "use of a
spark of originality which could transform an ordinary product into one of grace").
77 Hartford House Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1533, 1540 (D. Colo. 1986), affd, 846
F.2d 1268 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988).
78 Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763,771 (1992) (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 10).
79 Early courts were careful to note that trademarks played a more essential role when they conveyed
information that could not be otherwise discerned by inspection. In Upjohn Co. v. William S. Merrell
Chemical Co., the court explained:
Nor do we overlook the fact that similarity in appearance would be more significant with a me-
dicinal tablet than with a piece of furniture. In the latter case the question of origin is important
only as to materials and workmanship, and of these the purchaser can largely judge for himself,
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food and service.'m Such positive associations do not, as the jury found and the
Court conceded, yet exist."' Until secondary meaning has developed, the only
possible losses the plaintiff might suffer from such "theft" are: (1) if the
restaurant appearance is unique and desirable, imitation would reduce the
monopoly rents the plaintiff would otherwise earn from its investment in
creating such appearance; and (2) if the plaintiff desired such monopoly rents,
allowing imitation would force the plaintiff to replace its imitated appearance
with a new, equally desirable appearance. Either of these losses flows not
from the deceptiveness of the defendant's actions, but from the fact of
imitation itself. In short, eliminating the secondary meaning requirement for
trade dress allowed the Court to protect the plaintiff's investment in creating a
desirable restaurant appearance while maintaining the fiction of a deception-
based rationale that the jury findings specifically refute. Protecting the
appearance of a restaurant in order to encourage the creation of attractive
restaurants may, of course, prove a salutary purpose, but it has little to do with
12trademark's traditional concerns.
Property-based, not deception-based, concerns lie, therefore, at the heart of
the Two Pesos, Inc. decision and of the expansion of trademark subject matter
more generally. As the next subsections explain, property-based concerns
while in the former case the efficiency of the drug must depend upon the skill and honesty of the
maker, and so the purchaser cares more about getting the original whose merit he knows ....
269 F. 209,213 (6th Cir. 1920), cert. denied, 257 U.S. 638 (1921).
80 See Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 137 (2d Cir. 1992).
81 Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 766 (acknowledging jury's finding of no secondary meaning in appear-
ance of restaurant).
82 See Stephen L. Carter, Does It Matter Whether Intellectual Property is Property?, 68 CHI-KENT L.
REV. 715,721-22 (1993) (noting that Two Pesos reflects property-based view of trademarks). The Court's
formal rationale that congressional silence on a secondary meaning requirement for trade dress suggested
that Congress did not intend to require secondary meaning before trade dress could receive protection as a
trademark is equally unpersuasive. See Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 772-73. Congress did not include a
secondary meaning requirement for trade dress in section 2(e) because it did not intend to allow registration
of trade dress on the principal register. See supra notes 39-52 and accompanying text. Presumably, if we
follow the Court's reasoning on this subject to its logical conclusion, the Court must also hold that Congress
intended to abandon the functionality limitation on the protection of product features as trademarks because
Congress did not specifically include a functionality limitation anywhere in the Trademark Act. For an ex-
ample of such a mistake, see Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp., 9 F.3d 1091 (4th Cir. 1993) (mistakenly rea-
soning that because Congress did not include functionality as a defense to incontestability, Congress did not
intend functionality to serve as a defense to incontestability), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1127 (1994). It is bad
enough that the Court is incapable of reading the plain language and legislative history of the Trademark Act
to relegate trade dress and product features exclusively to the supplemental register as Congress intended.
For the Court to use that first mistake as a basis to construct an edifice of further mistakes makes a mockery
of the principles of legitimate statutory construction.
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have driven parallel expansions in the bundle of rights accorded a trademark
owner.
B. Expanding the Exclusive Right to Use
At the dawn of the twentieth century, the right to exclude associated with
trademark ownership was carefully circumscribed, limited to excluding others
from using the same or a near identical mark on the "same" goods in the same
geographic area." The likelihood that continued use of the allegedly infringing
mark by the defendant would lead a substantial number of consumers to the
actual (and incorrect) belief that the plaintiff had manufactured the defendant's
goods and through such deception divert sales from the plaintiff to the
defendant, defined both the extent and the limit of the trademark owner's right
to exclude. 4
83 See, e.g., Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916); Hyde Park Clothes, Inc. v.
Hyde Park Fashions, Inc., 204 F.2d 223, 224 (2d Cir. 1953) (finding no infringement where plaintiff used
mark in connection with manufacture and sale of men's clothing and defendant used mark in connection
with manufacture and sale of women's clothing); Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co.,
201 F. 510 (7th Cir. 1912) (refusing to find trademark infringement where plaintiff used mark on condensed
milk and defendant used same mark on ice cream because condensed milk and ice cream are different
goods). The 1905 Act codified the "same" goods limitation in its registration provision, by prohibiting reg-
istration of a mark "substantially identical with a trade-mark appropriated to goods of the same descriptive
properties." Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724, 726; American Tobacco Co., Inc. v. Gordon, 10
F.2d 646, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1925) (ruling that existing registration for PALL MALL for cigarettes does not bar
another's registration of PALL MALL for cigars and pipes because the goods do not share the "same de-
scriptive properties").
84 See, e.g., McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245,255-56 (1877); Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Vall.)
511, 528 (1871); Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 311,322 (1871); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v.
Waxed Prods. Co., Inc., 85 F.2d 75, 80 (2d Cir. 1936); Kann v. Diamond Steel Co., 89 F. 706 (8th Cir.
1898). As the Eighth Circuit explained:
The deceit, or probable deceit, of the ordinary purchaser to such an extent that he buys, or will
probably buy, the property of one manufacturer or vendor, in the belief that they are those of an-
other, is a sine qua non of the maintenance of such a suit, because every one has the undoubted
right to sell his own goods, or goods of his own manufacture, as such, however much such sales
may diminish or injure the business of his competitors.
Kann, 89 F. at 707. See also N.K. Fairbank Co. v. R.W. Bell Mfg. Co., 77 F. 869, 876 (2d Cir. 1896);
Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Spear, 2 Sandf. 599 (N.Y. Super. 1849). As the Amoskeag court explained:
At present, it is sufficient to say that, in all cases where a trade-mark is imitated, the essence of
the wrong consists in the sale of the goods of one manufacturer or vendor as those of another,
and it is only when this false representation is directly or indirectly made, and only to the extent
to which it is made, that the party who appeals to the justice of the court can have a title to relief.
Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 2 Sandf. at 606.
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During the course of the twentieth century, courts, and to a lesser extent
Congress,85 gradually broadened the scope of the trademark owner's exclusive
use right. Expansion with respect to use of the mark on different goods, for
example, began in 1917 when the Second Circuit ruled that the Aunt Jemima
Mills Co. was entitled to exclude another from using "Aunt Jemima" as a mark
on pancake syrup." Aunt Jemima had itself only used the mark with respect to
self-rising flour, but the court found that the defendant's syrup, though
different, was sufficiently related "that the public, or a large part of it ...
would conclude that [the defendant's syrup] was made by the [plaintiff]. '87
Although the Aunt Jemima court retained confusion as to source as the relevant
test,8' its recognition that use of the trademark on related goods could create
actionable confusion opened the door to claims of infringement based upon
such use. After opening the door to such claims, the Second Circuit found it
almost impossible to define any sensible stopping point. If the defendant's
goods were not identical, they might nonetheless be sufficiently related that
consumers would likely believe that the plaintiff had produced them. 9 If not
so related to create confusion as to source, consumers might nonetheless
believe that the plaintiff had sponsored the defendant's goods9 or, given the
complexities of corporate ownership, that the plaintiff and defendant were
85 During this period, Congress's principal substantive change was reflected in the Lanham Act's con-
structive notice provision. 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (1994). By providing that registration of the mark on the prin-
cipal register was constructive notice of the registrant's ownership, Congress gave the trademark owner na-
tionwide priority over all confusingly similar marks adopted subsequent to a mark's registration. See, e.g.,
Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 362 (2d Cir. 1959). The Trademark Act of 1946
also allowed descriptive terms to be registered as trademarks after they had acquired secondary meaning, and
shifted the scope of protection from "same descriptive properties" to a likelihood of confusion. But these
changes simply recognized doctrinal changes that the courts had already made. See, e.g., Abererombie &
Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9-10 (2d Cir. 1976) (noting Act's express recognition of de-
scriptive terms as trademarks); Pep Boys v. Edwin F. Guth Co., 197 F.2d 527, 528-29 (C.C.P.A. 1952)
(noting omission of "same descriptive properties" language in 1946 Act, but interpreting the omission as a
shift in focus to likelihood of confusion directly, rather than an expansion). For a discussion of the 1962
Housekeeping Amendments that refutes the popular belief that Congress intended to expand the confusion
standard to encompass confusion as to sponsorship, see infra text accompanying notes 325-52.
86 See Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 F. 407, 408, 410 (2d Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 245
U.S. 672 (1918).
87 Id.at410.
88 Id. (finding that goods were sufficiently related that public would believe that the plaintiff had made
the defendant's goods).
89 See Wall v. Rolls-Royce, 4 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1925) (finding infringement of "Rolls-Royce" mark for
automobiles by use of same mark on radio tubes on grounds that consumers might believe that automobile
manufacturer had begun manufacturing radio tubes).
90 See Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969, 972-73 (2d Cir. 1948); Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc. v. Dunhill Shirt Shop, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
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somehow affiliated.9' In short, by opening the door to infringement claims
with respect to noncompeting goods, the Second Circuit found itself on the
often-invoked, but rarely encountered, slippery slope. Although no less a jurist
than Learned Hand set himself the task of identifying the appropriate stopping
place,92 the court was unable to do so. In Polaroid Corp. v Polarad
Electronics Corp.,93 the Second Circuit eventually abandoned the same goods
limitation almost entirely, merely incorporating proximity of goods as a factor
to be considered in resolving the likelihood of confusion issue.94
Altogether this evolution from Aunt Jemima to Polaroid took forty-four
years. Because of the time involved, each step in the evolution seemed, on its
own, exceedingly small and each step, once taken, became the justification for
taking the next step. Yet, taken together, these individually small steps
generated a radical expansion in the protection afforded trademark owners
with respect to noncompeting uses. Much of this expansion was based on an
ever more-tenuous chain of assumptions and inferences. Consumer desire for,
and the efficiency advantages associated with, trademark protection that will
enable consumers to identify easily the particular soda they want from a shelf
full of sodas seem reasonably clear. Whether consumers know of, or value,
the permissions the law may require for, or the corporate ownership structure
involved in, the production of such goods is far less clear.95 Moreover, the
91 See Carling Brewing Co. v. Philip Morris Inc., 297 F. Supp. 1330, 1337 (N.D. Ga. 1968). The court
argued:
Given the general situation where the public is generally unaware of the specific corporate
structure of those whose products it buys, but is aware that corporate diversification, mergers,
acquisitions and operation through subsidiaries is a fact of life, it is reasonable to believe that the
appearance of "Black Label" on cigarettes could lead to some confusion as to the sponsorship of
EITHER or both the cigarettes and the beer. Whether the public concludes (if it really draws a
specific conclusion) that plaintiff's Black Label beer may have become connected with Philip
Morris, or that Carling may now be putting out cigarettes is immaterial.
Id.
92 See S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Johnson, 175 F.2d 176, 179-80 (2d Cir. 1949); S.C. Johnson & Son,
Inc. v. Johnson, 116 F.2d 427, 429-30 (2d Cir. 1940); Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 973-74
(2d Cir. 1928).
93 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961).
14 Ld. at495.
95 When a consumer buys MICHELOB brand beer, presumably her principal concern is that the beer
reflect a consistent quality and qualities over time. So long as those source-related concerns are satisfied,
whether the source responsible for MICHELOB beer also manufactures, either directly or through an affili-
ate, BUDWEISER, KING COBRA, and O'DOUL'S brands is of little immediate importance. In addition,
some companies establish separate affiliates with separate marks specifically to present a variety of
price/quality mixes to the market. Chevrolet, Cadillac, and Saturn are all brands or affiliates of General
Motors, but they do not for that reason share target a common price/quality point. Similarly, when mi-
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open-ended infringement inquiry that resulted from this process is a virtual
invitation to litigation, particularly for larger rivals looking to harass their
smaller competitors. Further, this process makes it almost impossible to
predict accurately how any given trier of fact will resolve any particular case.9
6
Like other forms of legal uncertainty, trademark's open-ended infringement
standard renders investment in what may reasonably appear to be fair,
noninfringing competition vulnerable to second-guessing by a judge or jury.'
While this risk has always been present to some degree, the expansion in
trademark's likelihood of confusion standard makes the risk far more
substantial today, both because the standard reaches far more and often
seemingly-innocent conduct and because its breadth grants the trier-of-fact
almost complete discretion on the infringement issue.
Nevertheless, some aspects of this expanded infringement standard retain a
link to trademarks' traditional role of conveying otherwise indiscernible
information to the consumer. While the expanded protection encompasses
information concerning sponsorship, endorsement, or corporate affiliations,
and not merely a product's source, improving the information flow with
respect to these issues has, at least, a plausible claim to the kind of efficiency
advantages associated with traditional deception-based trademark. Whether or
not we are persuaded that these advantages will prove sufficient, in degree, to
crobreweries became popular, Miller Brewing Company established a separate division, Plank Road Brew-
ing, to target that market. Again, the distancing of affiliate from the parent was intentional, intended to al-
low the affiliate to establish its own trade identity and price/quality mix for the burgeoning microbrewed
beer market. In these cases, that there exists some relationship between the parent and subsidiary tells us
very little about the relationship between the price/quality mixes we will find in the various products of par-
ent and subsidiary.
96 See, e.g., Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947 (7th Cir. 1992) (affirming
finding of bad faith infringement of THIRST AID mark by defendant's use of the phrase "Gatorade is thirst
aid for that deep down body thirst" in an advertising campaign).
97 Cf. Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust's Protected Classes, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1, 17-20 (1989)
(recognizing and identifying as "WXL3" the welfare losses associated with rent-seeking activities of a mo-
nopolist).
98 See 1944 Trade-Mark Hearings, supra note 8, at 71-72 (statement of Mr. Moyer, Department of
Justice) ("[Tihe possibility that a competitor will be faced with a lawsuit or litigation ... is sufficient, par-
ticularly if the competitor is a small man, to keep him out of the field."). Mr. Moyer explained:
I again wish to emphasize that the right of a dominant company to maintain a lawsuit, or to find
colorable sanctions for monopoly or restraint of trade, as demonstrated in the patent field, which
has not yet been clarified and has been in litigation for over 100 years, opens the door to all the
evils of express legal sanction. The mere fact that a sanction is colorable and requires or invites
litigation is sufficient to maintain monopoly or restraint through the long course of private liti-




balance the competitive losses such protection implicates, the desirability of
such expanded protection is at least debatable when it corresponds to an
expanded informational role. However, in some cases, the link between
expanded protection and expanded informational role becomes not merely
attenuated, but altogether disappears. In these cases, protection is extended to
the trademark owner in order to protect the mark's value as a desirable product
in and of itself, rather than as a source of otherwise indiscernible information
concerning the product to which it is attached. The following subsections
discuss three situations where courts have used the likelihood of confusion
standard to generate such property-based protection.
1. Circular Confusion: The Ornamental Use Cases
The first example concerns the so-called ornamental use cases. In these
cases, the defendant markets products bearing the plaintiffs mark, not for the
information the mark conveys concerning the goods to which it is attached, but
for its own sake, as an ornament. Although the trademark's value as an infor-
mation source in these cases is either non-existent or distinctly secondary to its
value as a product, some courts will nevertheless enjoin such use by pretend-
ing that it creates a likelihood of confusion as to sponsorship. A handful of
courts have been more honest.
In Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Manufac-
turing, Inc.,9 for example, the National Hockey League and thirteen of its
member teams sought to enjoin Dallas Cap from manufacturing and selling
embroidered emblems depicting the teams' symbols. °m The plaintiffs alleged
that such use constituted trademark infringement.' ' The defendant countered
that it was simply marketing the emblems as products and did not intend the
presence of the team symbol on an emblem to indicate the emblem's source.
The trial court agreed with the defendant's contentions, and rejected the plain-
tiffs' claims. In doing so, the trial court specifically found that: (1) there was
no likelihood of confusion as to the source of the emblems; and (2) the defen-
dant had not made any false representations concerning the source of the em-
blems'02
99 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975).
1o0 Id. at 1008.
101 Protection for twelve of the team symbols was sought on the basis that such symbols had been reg-
istered on the principal register as service marks for ice hockey entertainment services. See id. at 1009.
Protection for the thirteenth was sought as an unregistered mark, under section 1125. See 1d.
102 See id. at 1012.
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On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed, concluding that "confusion [was]
self-evident from the nature of defendant's use."' ' In response to the defen-
dant's arguments and the district court's findings, that buyers would not be
confused as to who manufactured the physical article itself, the Fifth Circuit
simply asserted that such lack of confusion was irrelevant:
The certain knowledge of the buyer that the source and origin of the
trademark symbols were in plaintiffs satisfies the [confusion or
deception] requirement of the [Trademark Act]. The argument that
confusion must be as to the source of the manufacture of the emblem
itself is unpersuasive, where the trademark, originated by the team, is




Because, the Fifth Circuit explained, the teams had created both the symbols
and the demand for them, the teams were entitled under trademark law to pre-
clude others from entering the market for emblems displaying such symbols. t'
While other decisions have purported to tie the results in such ornamental
use cases more closely to an examination of consumers' actual expectations,
such an approach is, at best, pretense. Attempting to rely on consumer
expectations to resolve the issue merely generates the answer the law has
already given. Consumer expectations concerning marketing practices are not
formed in a vacuum, but grow out of what consumers experience in the
marketplace. To the extent the law is effective, it will control what consumers
experience in the marketplace and therefore, shape their expectations. If the
law prohibits unlicensed reproduction and sale of apparel or other goods
bearing team emblems, this will substantially control what happens in the
marketplace, and consumers will come to expect licensing as the norm, except
in obvious bootleg environments.'0° On the other hand, if the law allows such
103 id
104 Id.; see also id. at 1012-13 ("Where the consuming public had the certain knowledge that the source
and origin of the trademark symbol was in the Toronto team, the reproduction of that symbol by defendant
constituted a violation of § 1125.").
lO5 See id. at 1011. As the court explained:
Were defendant to embroider the same fabric with the same thread in other designs, the resulting
products would still be emblems for wearing apparel but they would not give trademark identifi-
cation to the customer. The conclusion is inescapable that, without plaintiff's marks, defendant
would not have a market for his particular product among ice hockey fans desiring to purchase
emblems embroidered with the symbols of their favorite teams.
Id.
106 In such environments, the consumer is typically fully aware that the t-shirt or watch she is buying for
far less than the price of similar authorized goods is an imitation. Courts nevertheless enjoin such sales,
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activity, again, the market will respond accordingly and consumers will come
to expect competition as the norm, except in those locations, such as stadium
souvenir shops, that are physically controlled by the trademark owner.'
7
Whether such use is likely to generate confusion, of sponsorship or otherwise,
is thus circular-both a reflection and the determinant of the trademark
owner's rights.33
Moreover, unlike true sponsorship cases, where the mark's value is almost
entirely due to the suggestion of quality control or quality certification
conveyed,' °9 in ornamental use cases, consumers value the mark's presence on
the product apart from its role in conveying any such information.t Even
where some consumers derive information from the mark's presence, the value
of that information is usually slight. A consumer may believe, for example,
that Mutual of Omaha "went along with" an ornamental use."' This is
despite this lack of confusion, by pretending that such sales may create on-looker or post-sale confusion.
See Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok Int'l Ltd., 998 F.2d 985 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (ruling on-looker confusion
actionable); Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1986) (same);
Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-LeCoultre Watches, 221 F.2d 464, 466 (2d
Cir.) (finding imitation actionable because it could create on-looker or post-sale confusion), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 832 (1955); see also infra text accompanying notes 138-56.
107 See Supreme Assembly v. J.H. Ray Jewelry Co., 676 F.2d 1079, 1083 (5th Cir. 1982) (distinguishing
Boston Profl Hockey Ass'n and finding no likelihood of sponsorship confusion with respect to manufacture
of jewelry in the shape of trademarked fraternal symbol on the basis "that there is no historical custom or
practice" with respect to such sponsorship).
108 See Boston Athletic Ass'n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22,33 (Ist Cir. 1989) (recognizing circular nature of
inquiry, but prohibiting sale of t-shirts bearing plaintiff's mark because plaintiff had created value of mark);
see also 3 J.THoMAs McCARTHY, McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAiR COMPETmON § 24.9 (4th ed.
1996).
109 Even in true sponsorship cases, the question whether mistaken perceptions of sponsorship are likely
and will prove material can be difficult. Compare Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969,
972-73 (2d Cir. 1948) (finding by majority that sponsorship confusion is likely in case involving unauthor-
ized use of "Ms. Seventeen" mark on bras), with id. at 976 (Frank, J., dissenting) (characterizing trial court's
finding of a likelihood of sponsorship confusion as a "shaky kind of guess").
110 See, e.g., Boston Athletic Ass'n, 867 F.2d at 33-34 (acknowledging that defendant's t-shirts bearing
plaintiff's mark sold even though consumers were not confused as to source, sponsorship, or endorsement);
Warner Bros., Inc., v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 F.2d 327, 332 (2d Cir. 1983) ("It was not proved that consumers
of 'General Lee' models care whether the goods are manufactured or sponsored by any single source .... );
Boston Profl Hockey Ass'n, 510 F.2d at 1012 (recognizing mark's value as product even when there was no
confusion as to source); Robert C. Denicola, Institutional Publicity Rights: An Analysis of the Merchandis-
ing of Famous Trade Symbols, 62 N.C. L. REv. 603 (1983) (noting that articles bearing trademarks as orna-
ments "frequently cost significantly more than the items in the rear [plain, unadorned articles], yet they
sell"); Dreyfuss, supra note 24, at 402 (defining as "surplus value" the value that consumers place on having
a mark on a t-shirt "in excess" of its value as information source).
I See Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 398-402 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding infringe-
ment of "Mutual of Omaha" trademark by use of the phrase "Mutant of Omaha" on a t-shirt based in large
part on survey that found 1091 of consumers believed that the plaintiff "went along with" the use); see also
1999]
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
information and if incorrect, confusion, of a sort. But consumers will likely
place little value on that information in making a decision whether to purchase
a "Mutant of Omaha" t-shirt. ' 2 Whatever information value the similar phrase
may have is distinctly secondary to its humor content, particularly for those
likely to purchase the shirt t3
Moreover, that there might be those who affirmatively desire "authorized"
goods would not justify a different result. There may be just as many consum-
ers who would rather purchase lower-priced, or receive higher quality, unau-
thorized goods."4 If a court were to use the likelihood of confusion standard to
prohibit such unauthorized use, then it would effectively preclude competitive
entry, and would sacrifice the second group's desires for the sake of the first.
This is not, in the vast majority of cases, appropriate or desirable. Rather, the
better approach, and the one trademark law traditionally adopted, is to require
the original market entrant to find some alternate way of conveying the rele-
vant distinction to the buying public so that each consumer can find and prop-
erly identify the goods that she desires."'
Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 1 Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 544 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding that confusion over whether
plaintiff gave permission for defendant's use was actionable); Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metropolitan Bal-
timore Football Club Ltd., 34 F.3d 410,415-16 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding actionable confusion based on pos-
sibility that consumers would mistakenly believe that plaintiff had given permission for the defendant's use);
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications, 28 F.3d 769, 772, 775 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding actionable
confusion where consumers believed that plaintiff gave permission for the defendant's use); University of
Ga. Athletic Ass'n v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535, 1546 (11 th Cir. 1985).
112 Cf. Nike, Inc. v. "Just Did It" Enters., 6 F.3d 1225, 1231 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that "[an intent to
parody, however, raises the opposite inference" concerning the source of the parodist's goods).
113 See Girl Scouts v. Personality Posters Mfg. Co., Inc., 304 F. Supp. 1228, 1235 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)
(finding that poster of pregnant girl in Girl Scout uniform with the motto "Be Prepared" did not infringe any
of plaintiffs trademarks and noting that "the reputation of the plaintiff is so secure against the wry assault of
the defendant that no such damage has been demonstrated").
114 The Court had long before rejected IBM's argument that it needed to control the supply of cards for
use in its computers in order to ensure their proper quality. See United States v. IBM, 298 U.S. 131, 138-40
(1936). But see University of Ga. Athletic Ass'n, 756 F.2d at 1546 (arguing that because some consumers
may desire authorized goods, complete prohibition on unauthorized goods justifiable). In these cases, the
imitator can supply either equivalent quality goods at a lower price, or higher quality goods at the same
price, as an official licensee because it uses the royalty otherwise paid to the licensor to cover its own profits
or to improve the quality of its products. This is often not the case today because the law prohibits, and
indeed criminalizes, such competition. As a result, would-be competitors cannot invest efficiently in the
production of their goods because of concerns over seizure and forfeiture.
115 This is the approach adopted in gray market good cases, for example. See, e.g., Matrix Essentials,
Inc. v. Emporium Drug Mart, Inc., 988 F.2d 587, 592-93 (5th Cir. 1993) (refusing to presume that consum-
ers will believe that every retailer marketing product is necessarily an authorized retailer); see also Sebastian
Int'l, Inc. v. Longs Drug Stores Corp., 53 F.3d 1073, 1076-77 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting bootstrap nature of
confusion argument in such cases).
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But in the ornamental use cases, the courts have rejected this traditional
approach and the competitive balance it embodies. Instead, most courts have
simply presumed that confusion is likely and enjoined the use on the strength
of that presumption.'6 In reaching this result, some courts have attempted to
tie their decision to deception-based concerns, but those that do invariably fail
to recognize the circular nature of such inquiry. Even if some non-circular
confusion may result, the better approach would be to allow the use and leave
the market to sort out alternate methods for conveying the desired information.
Yet, courts in these cases typically grant such broad relief that they foreclose
competitive entry altogether. Granting such broad relief makes clear that these
cases reflect far more concern with protecting the trademark owner's invest-
ment in her mark as a product, than they do about addressing relevant con-
sumer deception.
17
2. Imaginary Confusion: The Tarnishment Cases
The second example concerns so-called trademark tarnishment cases.
Here, the defendant has taken the plaintiff's mark, and placed the mark in an
unflattering or morally objectionable context."' Although there is little reason
to believe, and certainly no evidence to suggest, that a substantial number of
consumers will blame the mark's owner for the objectionable nature of the
116 See Boston Athletic Ass'n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 33 (Ist Cir. 1989) (enjoining defendant under
Lanhan Act from producing t-shirts with certain design independently desired by consuming public because
that would allow defendants to "obtain a 'free ride' at plaintiff's expense," and therefore plaintiff did not
have to prove "that members of the public will actually conclude that defendants' product was officially
sponsored by the [plaintiff]"); University of Ga. Athletic Ass'n, 756 F.2d at 1546 (enjoining defendant from
selling "Battlin' Bulldog Beer" with cans emblazoned with the University of Georgia's canine mascot, even
though confusion as to source or sponsorship was not shown); Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724
F.2d 327, 333 (2d Cir. 1983) (enjoining defendant under section 43(a) from entering market for toys that
replicate appearance of car from popular television series: "Nor is there any doubt that consumers wanted the
toy in part because they (or their children) identified the toy with the television series. This is sufficient
even though.., there was no showing that consumers believed that the toy cars marketed by Gay Toys were
sponsored or authorized by Warner."); Processed Plastic Co. v. Warner Communications, Inc., 675 F.2d 852
(7th Cir. 1982) (same); see also In re Paramount Pictures Corp., 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1111, 1112 (T.T.A.B.
1982) (allowing registration on principal register of ornamental use of MORK AND MINDY on t-shirts be-
cause it "can serve as an indication of a secondary source of origin").
117 See Boston Prof'1 Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1012-13 (5th
Cir. 1975).
118 See, e.g., Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979);
Coca-Cola Co. v. Alma-Leo U.S.A., Inc., 719 F. Supp. 725, 728 (N.D. I1. 1989); Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Rakow, 739 F. Supp. 116 (W.D.N.Y. 1989); General Elec. Co. v. Alumpa Coal Co., 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
1036 (D. Mass. 1979); Gucci Shops, Inc. v. R.H. Macy & Co., Inc., 446 F. Supp. 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1977);
Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
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use,119 courts have again presumed a likelihood of confusion in order to protect
the mark's value.
The leading case is again from the Fifth Circuit. In Chemical Corp. v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,' 20 Anheuser-Busch sued Chemical Corp. to enjoin the
use of the slogan "Where there's life... there's bugs" to advertise a floor wax
that contained an insecticide." Anheuser-Busch alleged that this slogan
infringed its rights in its 'Where there's life ... there's Bud" slogan used to
advertise Budweiser beer.2 The district court enjoined the defendant's use,
finding that "the association of bugs with Bud or Budweiser is sufficient to
merit the apprehension that the ill repute of one type of goods is likely to be
visited upon the other."'' A panel of the Fifth Circuit agreed. 24
In much of its opinion, the panel tried to treat the case as if it called for
simply a slight extension of the traditional infringement analysis, similar to
that required in the Aunt Jemima case. Yet, the panel's analysis in this regard
is transparently deficient. For example, the panel referred on several occasions
to a supposed finding of the district court that the defendant's use would create
confusion as to the source of defendant's waxes.'22 Yet, the district court did
not make such a finding.1 6 In fact, the district court expressly disclaimed the
necessity of such a finding, and relied instead on the doctrine of dilution, even
though the relevant state, Florida, had not adopted a dilution or anti-dilution
119 Of course, there will always be a few who make such a mistake. See Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F.
Supp. at 1189-90 & n.9. However, such isolated confusion has not traditionally been sufficient to support a
finding of trademark infringement. See, e.g., Universal Money Ctrs., Inc. v. AT&T, 22 F.3d 1527, 1535
(10th Cir. 1994) (ruling that isolated instances of actual confusion not sufficient to create genuine issue with
respect to likelihood of confusion issue).
120 306 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 965 (1963).
121 Il at435.
t22 d at434.
'23 l at 435.
'24 See id.at438.
'25 -See id. at 435, 437.
126 The panel opinion quoted the relevant portions of the district court's opinion in its decision. See id.
at 434-35. Yet, in the quoted portions, the district court found only that similarities in the parties' adver-
tisements might lead some "to confuse the[ir] advertising," and that based upon all the facts presented, "the
association of bugs with Bud or Budweiser is sufficient to merit the apprehension that the ill repute of one
type of goods is likely to be visited upon the other." Id. Because the advertising is not the product at issue,
see id. at 435 (identifying relevant goods as beer and wax), confusion as to the source of the advertising does
not establish confusion as to the source of the defendant's waxes. Similarly, "the association of bugs with
Bud" and the resulting tamishment is not a confusion as to the source of wax or beer at all.
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statute.'2 Further, the panel cited two opinions of the Florida Supreme Court
as support for its decision.'2 Yet, neither supports the panel's decision. In
one, the Florida Supreme Court did not address whether use of a similar mark
on a noncompeting good could establish trademark infringement.'2 In the
other, the court addressed the issue, but reached a resolution contrary to that of
the Chemical Corp. panel 3" Finally, the panel cited several decisions for the
proposition that "'parties need not be in direct competition for the doctrine [of
unfair competition] to be effective."'"" While this proposition is true, the
panel left out an important limitation found in the cited decisions: While the
parties need not be in direct competition, their goods must be sufficiently
related that confusion as to source becomes likely. 2 Although generalizations
127 See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, filed Mar. 24, 1961 (M.D. Fla. 1961), reprinted in
Record of Appeal, Chemical Corp. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., No. 19007, at 797 (on file with author and
available from the National Archives, A-32-33-7, Box 1559).
Where similar trademarks have been used on dissimilar goods, courts have applied the doctrine
of dilution, the underlying rationale of which is the gradual diminution or whittling away of the
value of the mark as the result of the extensive use of [a] deceptively similar mark, constitutes an
invasion of a property right and gives rise to an actionable wrong not dependent on a showing of
competitive relationship or the likelihood of confusion to purchasers thereof. This is, of course,
an equitable doctrine which cannot be obviated by defendant's observation of the fact that the
State of Florida has not enacted a statute specifically embracing it.
Id.
128 Chemical Corp., 306 F.2d at 437-38 (citing Sentco, Inc. v. McCulloh, 68 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 1953) and
Sun Coast, Inc. v. Shupe, 52 So. 2d 805 (Fla. 1951)). Because Anheuser-Busch had not yet registered its
"Where there's life ... there's Bud" mark, the case arose initially under Florida law. Chemical Corp., 306
F.2d at 436. By the time the case was tried, Anheuser-Busch had obtained registration of its mark, and the
panel indicated that Anheuser-Busch was entitled to similar relief under the Lanham Act as well. See id. at
439.
129 See Sentco, Inc., 68 So. 2d at 578 (finding confusion where competitor imitated trade dress of plain-
tiff).
130 Sun Coast, Inc., 52 So. 2d at 805. In resolving likelihood of confusion where defendant used mark
on realty business and plaintiff used mark in connection with an apartment hotel, the court concluded: "Ve
cannot see how the public could be deceived by appellees' use of the title 'Suncoast' when there is no simi-
larity in the businesses of the parties." Id. Other cases cited by the panel also weigh against the panel's
conclusion. See Webb's City, Inc. v. Bell Bakeries, Inc., 226 F.2d 700,703 (5th Cir. 1955) (ruling that there
could be neither trademark infringement nor unfair competition in the absence of proof that defendant's use
of trademark was likely to lead to confusion as to the source of the defendant's goods); Creamette Co. v.
Conlin, 191 F.2d 108, 112 (5th Cir. 1951) (finding no infringement of plaintiff's "creamette" mark for maca-
roni by defendant's use of same mark for ice cream, given distance between products).
131 Chemical Corp., 306 F.2d at 437 (citing Pure Foods, Inc. v. Minute Maid Corp., 214 F.2d 792 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 888 (1954); Tampa Cigar Co. v. John Walker & Sons, Ltd., 222 F.2d 460 (5th
Cir. 1955); and Bulova Watch Co. v. Stoltzberg, 69 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass. 1947)).
132 See Tampa Cigar Co., 222 F.2d at 461 (affirming as not clearly erroneous finding that defendant's
use of "Johnny Walker" mark for its cigars would create likelihood of confusion as to the source of those
cigars where plaintiff had used trademark exclusively on whiskey); Pure Foods, Inc., 214 F.2d at 797
(affirming as not clearly erroneous finding that defendant's use of "Minute Made" for its frozen meats would
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are difficult on this issue, the goods at issue in Chemical Corp., beer and floor
wax, fell on the unrelated side of the line-at least as that line had been drawn
by the cases the panel cited.'
In any event, the pun-ish nature of the defendant's use in Chemical Corp.
completely undermines the panel's pretense of a straightforward application of
the reasoning in the Aunt Jemima case. The Aunt Jemima case and its progeny
dealt with an attempt to transfer positive buying experiences associated with
the plaintiff's goods to the defendant's by creating a like-to-like link between
the two. These cases focused on sympathetic uses where the defendant
attempted to increase the desirability of its goods by suggesting that they were
just like the plaintiff's.?" Of course, some sympathetic uses are perfectly
legal--comparative advertising, for example. A sympathetic use constitutes
trademark infringement only if a defendant has gone beyond using the
plaintiff's trademark as a means of facilitating ready identification and
comparison of two distinct products, and has used the mark to carry the false
suggestion that the plaintiff is standing behind the defendant's products.13
Whatever the proper boundaries for liability in such cases, it is simply unclear
why they would apply in a case such as the Chemical Corp. case. Chemical
Corp.'s use of the slogan "Where there is life ... there's bugs" for its floor
wax was not an attempt to suggest that the floor wax was desirable because it
was just like Budweiser beer. It was not a sympathetic use at all. Rather, the
similarity between the plaintiff's and defendant's slogans served merely as a
mnemonic device. By creating a humorous twist on a well-known slogan, the
create likelihood of confusion as to the source of those meats where plaintiff had used trademark exclusively
on frozen orange juice); Bulova Watch Co., 69 F. Supp. at 546-47 (finding shoes and watches sufficiently
related so that defendant's use of mark on shoes would create likelihood of confusion as to the source of
those shoes where plaintiff had used trademark exclusively on watches).
133 Thus, in Pure Foods, Ina, the Fifth Circuit emphasized that both were frozen foods, an area where
expansion had, in fact, incurred. Pure Foods, Inc., 214 F.2d at 797. The Tampa Cigar Co. and Bulova
Watch Co. decisions are less forthcoming with respect to the reasons why a consumer might believe that a
producer would expand from whiskey to cigars, or watches to shoes. Yet, neither represents as great a
stretch as beer to floor wax. Indeed, beer and floor wax are as unrelated as goods such as operating an
apartment hotel and realty business, or macaroni and ice cream, which courts had found insufficiently related
to create a likelihood of confusion. See Creamette Co., 191 F.2d at I ll; Sun Coast, Inc., 52 So. 2d at 805.
134 To accomplish such a transfer, the defendant must do more than use the plaintiff's mark in order to
compare or contrast her goods with those of the plaintiff. She must affirmatively suggest that the plaintiff is
the one responsible for the qualities and quality of the defendant's goods. Otherwise, consumers will recog-
nize the comparison for what it is and weigh it accordingly.
135 See, e.g., August Storck K.G. v. Nabisco, Inc., 59 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that it is
legal to use another's mark for the sake of comparison, but not to create a likelihood of confusion as to
source, sponsorship, or endorsement).
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defendant made its slogan more memorable than it would otherwise be, and
thereby increased the efficiency of its advertising.
Such a mnemonic use differs from a sympathetic use in two critical ways.
First, a mnemonic use will remain effective only so long as the distinction
between the two parties and their products remains clear. If too many
consumers misunderstand the import of the defendant's commercial, and see it
as simply another ad for the plaintiff and its products, that would defeat the
purpose of the advertisement. These consumers would not be led to purchase
the defendant's product, thinking it was just like the plaintiff's; they would not
even realize that the defendant's product was being advertised. In contrast,
such actual confusion enhances the effects of a sympathetic use. For a
sympathetic use, the closer the use comes to suggesting that the defendant's
products are not merely like the plaintiff's, but are, in fact, the plaintiff's, the
more effective the transfer of desirable associations from the plaintiff to the
defendant's products. For this reason, relevant confusion is inherently less
likely when the similarity in the trademarks serves only as a memory aid.
Second, such a mnemonic use lacks entirely the illegitimate aspect of the
sympathetic use. It gains its effectiveness from improving consumers' ability
to recall the advertising, not from suggesting, as an illegitimate sympathetic
use does, that the defendant's products have desirable, but indiscernible,
qualities because the plaintiff is standing behind the defendant's products.
Consider the advertisements at issue in Chemical Corp. If the pun is too
subtle, consumers may mistakenly believe that the advertisements are simply
more ads for Budweiser beer, rather than a clever ad for floor wax. While
such a mistaken perception of the ads may represent confusion over the source
of the ads, as the district court found, 36 such confusion does not reflect a
mistaken link between the plaintiff and the defendant's floor wax. Indeed,
because these confused consumers do not perceive the ad as one for floor wax
at all, but as a beer advertisement, they have no opportunity to draw the
necessary link between the plaintiff and the defendant's wax. On the other
hand, for those consumers who recognize the pun, few are likely to believe
that the play on Anheuser-Busch's slogan is meant to suggest that Anheuser-
Busch is the one responsible for the quality or qualities of the floor wax.
Thus, the Chemical Corp. panel's deception-based arguments provide only
a veneer of legitimacy for the panel's conclusion. Despite its protests, the
136 Chemical Corp., 306 F.2d at 434.
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panel's decision boils down to the conclusion that "the plaintiff has a property
interest in the slogan, built up at great expense."'3 Because the defendant's
actions may reduce the value of that interest or appropriate some part of it, its
actions must be enjoined.' Other courts, though not all,' have agreed with
this reasoning, and have extended such property-based protection given the
mere possibility that a mnemonic or pun-ish use may reduce the value of a
plaintiff's trademark."4'
3. Irrelevant Confusion: The Prestige Good Cases
Prestige goods, where courts have relied on post-sale or on-looker confu-
sion as a basis for protection, represent the third example of extending prop-
erty-based trademark protection under the likelihood of confusion standard.
Here, less expensive imitations duplicate the looks or styling of a more expen-
sive, prestige good. To combat such imitation, the manufacturer or distributor
of the prestige good claims that the looks and styling of its product constitute a
trademark, and argues that imitation constitutes trademark infringement. Price
137 Id. at 437.
138 See id. at 438. The Fifth Circuit wrote:
We are aware of the fact that the Court should not be swayed by its instinctive reaction upon
reading the record that this is a brazen and cheap effort by the defendant below to capitalize on
the good will created by the tremendous expenditure in advertising by the plaintiff. This, of
course, is not enough to warrant the grant of relief, but any conduct that is of such a nature as to
fairly reek with unfairness and a callous indifference to the damage that might occur to others
from the action taken by it will naturally be examined most carefully by a trial court and by an
appellate court whose duty it is to determine whether such conduct falls afoul of any established
legal principles. Finding, as we do, the liberal trend in the equity courts of the state of Florida,
towards the protection of trade names and slogans from unfair attacks by others, we are not
reluctant to conclude that what is here morally reprehensible is also legally impermissible.
Id.
139 Some courts have refused to find such uses actionable. See Nike, Inc. v. "Just Did It' Enters., 6 F.3d
1225, 1331-32 (7th Cir. 1993); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L&L Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 318 (4th Cir.
1992); Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishers Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 496-97 (2d Cir.
1989); Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1486 (10th Cir. 1987); L.L. Bean, Inc. v.
Drake Publishers, Inc., 311 F.2d 26, 33-34 (1st Cir. 1987).
140 See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publishers, 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994); Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979); Coca-Cola Co. v. Alma-Leo
U.S.A., Inc., 719 F. Supp. 725, 728 (N.D. Il. 1989); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Rakow, 739 F. Supp. 116
(W.D.N.Y. 1989); General Elec. Co. v. Alumpa Coal Co., 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1036 (D. Mass. 1979); Gucci
Shops, Inc. v. R.H. Macy & Co., Inc., 446 F. Supp. 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising,
Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); see also Conde Nast Pubs., Inc. v. Vogue Sch. of Fashion Model-
ing, Inc " 105 F. Supp. 325, 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) ("But whether [defendant's use of mark] has led to some
confusion or not, it is plain that the use by the defendants does in fact lessen the distinctiveness of the mark
'Vogue.' Allowed to continue, the value of the mark will be impaired .... ).
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and other differences between the prestige good and the imitation almost in-
variably ensure that actual purchasers are not confused by the imitation's
similar appearance. Nevertheless, courts have posited the possibility that an
on-looker might mistake an imitation for the original, and then relied on the
possibility of such on-looker confusion as a sufficient basis for finding trade-
mark infringement. 
4'
In the leading case, Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Con-
stantin-LeCoultre Watches, Ltd.,4  Mastercrafters sought a judgment declaring
that its imitation of Vacheron's Atmos clock did not constitute unfair competi-
tion. On the likelihood of confusion issue, Mastercrafters contended that there
were substantial differences in the pricing, features, packaging, and labeling of
the two clocks that would preclude purchasers from mistaking the imitation for
the original.'43 The district court agreed, finding it "inconceivable" that pur-
chasers would confuse the two clocks in view of their differences.
44
On appeal, the Second Circuit agreed that a customer looking to purchase
one of the two clocks would not mistake one for the other.'45 On the other
hand, the Second Circuit continued, a visitor to such a customer's home might
not examine a displayed clock closely, and might, therefore mistake one for
the other.'" Given the prestige associated with the Atmos clock, such visitor
would likely assume that the clock was an Atmos clock, even when it was not,'
or so the Second Circuit was willing to assume.' 4 In consequence, by
141 See Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 871, 872-73 (2d Cir. 1986);
Montres Rolex, S.A. v. Snyder, 718 F.2d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984); Levi
Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 632 F.2d 817, 822 (9th Cir. 1982); A.T. Cross Co. v. Jonathan Bradley
Pens, Inc., 470 F.2d 689, 692 (2d Cir. 1972); Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-
LeCoultre Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464, 466 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 832 (1955); Rolex Watch
U.S.A., Inc. v. Canner, 645 F. Supp. 484,493-94 (S.D. Fla. 1986); Rolls-Royce Motors Ltd. v. A&A Fiber-
glass, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 689,694 (N.D. Ga. 1977); see also United States v. Hon, 904 F.2d 803, 804 (2d Cir.
1990) (expanding criminal liability for trademark infringement to encompass such on-looker confusion),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1069 (1991); United States v. Yamin, 868 F.2d 130 (5th Cir.) (same), cert. denied,
492 U.S. 924 (1989); United States v. Torkington, 812 F.2d 1347, 1352-53 (11th Cir. 1987) (same); United
States v. Gantos, 817 F.2d 41, 43 (8th Cir. 1987) (accepting reasoning and conclusion of TorkIngton and
finding likelihood of confusion even where seller expressly informed buyer that the item was an imitation);
Malla Pollack, Your Image Is My Image: When Advertising Dedicates Trademarks to the Public Domain-
With an Example from the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, 14 CARDOZO L. REv. 1391, 1451-74
(1993) (discussing approach).
142 221 F.2d 464 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 832 (1955).
143 Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co., 119 F. Supp. at 213-16.
144 Id.





duplicating the shape and appearance of the Atmos clock, Mastercrafters
enabled consumers to obtain the appeal of an Atmos clock at a lower price by
purchasing Mastercrafters' imitation.'48 This, the Second Circuit stated,
represented a form of "poaching on the reputation of the Atmos clock" that
would support an unfair competition action.1 49  Later cases have recognized
such on-looker confusion as sufficient to support an action for trademark
infringement, relying principally on language from Boston Professional
Hockey Ass'n to justify their results.Ir
Yet, the reasoning behind this leap from on-looker confusion to actionable
harm remains unclear. Given that duplicating the appearance is necessary in
order to duplicate the appeal of the original for consumers,' on-looker
confusion seems merely an inevitable side-effect of ensuring competitors the
freedom to introduce a product that consumers will accept as a reasonable
substitute for the original.12 In attempting to counter this point, some courts
have simply assumed that on-looker confusion, being a form of confusion,
necessarily represents actionable harm;' others have substituted name-calling
148 See id.
But, as the judge found, plaintiff copied the design of the Atmos clock because plaintiff intended
to, and did, attract purchasers who wanted a "luxury design" clock. This goes to show at least
that some customers would buy plaintiff's cheaper clock for the purpose of acquiring the prestige




15o See Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1244-45 (6th Cir. 1991); Vuitton et Fils S.A.
v. J. Young Enters., Inc., 644 F.2d 769, 775 (9th Cir. 1981); Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc. v. Canner, 645 F.
Supp. 484, 492-95, 492-93 n.2 (S.D. Fla. 1986); Rolls-Royce Motors Ltd. v. A&A Fiberglass, Inc., 428 F.
Supp. 689, 692, 694-95 (N.D. Ga. 1976). Other courts have criticized Boston Profl Hockey Ass'n for over-
extending the purpose and reach of trademark law. See, e.g., International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lin-
deburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 918 (9th Cir. 1980) ("We reject the reasoning of Boston Hockey .... [O]ur
reading of the Lanham Act and its legislative history reveals no congressional design to bestow such broad
property rights on trademark owners."), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981). The Fifth Circuit has also re-
treated from its reasoning in that case. See Kentucky Fried Chicken v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549
F.2d 368,388-89 (5th Cir. 1977) ("Our cases demonstrate unbroken insistence upon likelihood of confusion,
and by doing so they reject any notion that a trademark is an owner's 'property' to be protected irrespective
of its role in the operation of our markets.").
151 See Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co., 221 F.2d at 466.
152 See id. (noting that duplication of prestige article's appearance would allow consumers to obtain an
effective substitute at a lower price); Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio, 944 F.2d at 1242 (noting that purpose of imi-
tation was to allow consumers to obtain an effective substitute at a lower price).
153 Judge Spellman has offered the following as justification for such protection:
This Court can envision a scenario where an individual sporting a gold counterfeit Rolex watch
walks through the metal detector at an airport only to discover that he has triggered the alarm.
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("poaching") for reasoning at this key juncture, as the Mastercrafters court did.
A few have tried to explain the reasons for recognizing on-looker confusion as
actionable, and have suggested two possible justifications for this extension of
trademark law. First, they have suggested that where an article has a dis-
tinctive and readily recognizable shape or appearance, on-lookers examining
an imitation might believe it was the original, and "find[ing] themselves
unimpressed with the quality of the item[,] ... be inhibited from purchasing
the [original]."' "  This type of confusion comes very near the focus of
deception-based trademark because it concerns incorrect information that may
influence consumer-buying decisions. But courts have typically offered only
the barest possibility of such confusion,'- and it is difficult to believe that such
confusion would actually prove very widespread, particularly as consumers
became aware of the need to separate more precisely imitators from the
original. The proffering of this rationale seems, therefore, little more than a
rote recital, intended to raise the specter of possible confusion and to create
some tenuous link to trademark's deception-based foundations.
As a second reason for such protection, courts have worried that imitations
may become so commonplace that the original will lose the cache or prestige
associated with being uncommon, rare, or unique. 56 Potential buyers will turn
When he attempts to remove the watch, the guards keep insisting that a gold Rolex watch cannot
be the problem. If the "sport" isn't confused, certainly the guards should be.
Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc., 645 F. Supp. at 493 n.3.
154 Id. at 495; see also Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio, 944 F.2d at 1245 ("If the replica Daytona looks cheap
or in disrepair, Ferrari's reputation for rarity and quality could be damaged.").
155 See Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc., 645 F. Supp. at 495. As the court explained:
At this juncture, the Court can only speculate as to the forms such cheapening or dilution might
take and the injuries that might ensue. Individuals examining the counterfeits, believing them to
be genuine Rolex watches, might find themselves unimpressed with the quality of the item and
consequently be inhibited from purchasing the real time piece. Others who see the watches
bearing the Rolex trademarks on so many wrists might find themselves discouraged from ac-
quiring a genuine because the items have become too common place and no longer possess the
prestige once associated with them.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio, 944 F.2d at 1244-45 ("Because Ferrari's reputation
could be damaged....") (emphasis added).
116 See Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio, 944 F.2d at 1245; Rolex Watch U.S.A., Ina, 645 F. Supp. at 495; see
also United States v. Hon, 904 F.2d 803, 806 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Yamin, 868 F.2d 130, 132-33
(5th Cir.) (Congress's decision to criminalize the use of counterfeit marks is "'not just designed for the pro-
tection of consumers. [It is] likewise fashioned for the protection of trademarks themselves and for the pre-
vention of the cheapening and dilution of the genuine product.') (quoting United States v. Gantos, 817 F.2d
41, 43 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 860 (1987), and United States v. Gonzalez, 630 F. Supp. 894, 896
(S.D. Fla. 1986)), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 924 (1989)).
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away from the now seemingly common original, and look elsewhere for ways
to display their wealth ostentatiously.3 7 Yet, this rationale, while it may couch
itself in terms of confusion and reputation, seems to rest on the sense that the
ordinary rule of competition should not apply to prestige goods.' Trademark
law must prohibit imitations of prestige goods, the courts seem to say, because
otherwise a producer will not be able to maintain the artificial scarcity neces-
sary to preserve the status of a prestige good. As we shall see, the economics
of prestige goods do not justify such differing treatment, 59 but, in any event,
relying on trademark law to isolate and preserve such exclusive islands of
prestige from competition represents a radical shift from trademark's decep-
tion-based foundations.
4. No Confusion? An Aside Briefly Concerning Dilution
The theory of dilution, recognized by Congress in the Federal Dilution Act
of 1995, might be seen as a capstone on this expansion of the trademark
infringement standard. Certainly, when first proposed, Frank Schechter
intended dilution to reach one situation, the use of a famous mark on a
dissimilar product, that was not at that time reached by the ordinary trademark
infringement standard.'6" As discussed above, however, trademark's infringe-
ment standard has steadily expanded since Schechter's article, and now largely
addresses the case with which Schecter was concerned or that might otherwise
fall within the dilution rubric. When states nevertheless proceeded to adopt
dilution statutes beginning in the 1940s, courts responded, with very few
exceptions, by treating the protection available under dilution as coterminous
157 See Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc., 645 F. Supp. at 495 ("Others who see the watches bearing Rolex
trademarks on so many wrists might find themselves discouraged from acquiring a genuine because the
items have become too common place and no longer possess the prestige once associated with them."); see
also Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio, 944 F.2d at 1245.
158 Thus, where competition resulting in lower priced goods is generally thought desirable, courts often
complain about the lower prices that imitations of prestige goods generate. See Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc.,
645 F. Supp. at 495 ("The fact that such [imitation] watches can be obtained at cheap prices only aggravates
the problem."); Gonzalez, 630 F. Supp. at 896 (finding no likelihood of confusion because substantial price
differences readily identify the imitations "is tantamount to sanctioning the very introduction into commerce
of [imitations] that are sold at low prices"). Cf. Montre Rolex, S.A. v. Snyder, 718 F.2d 524, 528 (2d Cir.
1983) (noting that "the owners of trademarks on prestige items are particularly likely to be plagued by recur-
ring counterfeit problems"); S. REP. No. 98-526, at 4-5 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3627, 3630-
31 (suggesting that imitations of trademarks of prestige goods must be prohibited because "counterfeiters
[can earn] enormous profits ... by capitalizing on the reputations, development costs, and advertising efforts
of honest manufacturers at little expense to themselves").
159 See infra text accompanying notes 303-11.
160 See Schechter, supra note 9.
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with that available under the (expanded) likelihood of confusion standard.'6' In
practice, the dilution analysis focused on essentially the same factors62 and
reached the same result as the likelihood of confusion standard.'63 Even cases
often identified as leading dilution decisions, such as Dallas Cowboy
Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd.,'64 typically focused on, and found
infringement under, the likelihood of confusion standard.J Having found a
likelihood of confusion, some of these decisions went on to discuss dilution.
But at that point, the dilution theory was no longer necessary to the court's
161 See, e.g., Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Out in America, 481 F.2d 445, 450 (5th Cir. 1973) (rejecting
plaintiff's dilution claim on the grounds that absent a likelihood of confusion there can be no dilution);
George A. Dickel Co. v. General Mills, Inc., 317 F.2d 954, 956 (C.C.P.A. 1963). The court held:
On the other hand, if likelihood of confusion does not exist, use by appellee of CASCADE for its
prepared baking mix, which use might dilute the selling power or whittle away the mark's
uniqueness, cannot be considered by us as a basis for rendering judgment in favor of appellant
because without purchaser confusion there can be no "dilution"
Id.; see also David S. WVelkowitz, Reexamining Trademark Dilution, 44 VAND. L. REv. 531, 546-47 (1991).
On the other side, three appellate decisions have affirmed a preliminary injunction based upon a dilution
claim. See Viacom, Inc. v. Ingrain Enters., Inc., 141 F.3d 886, 892 (8th Cir. 1998) (enjoining use prelimi-
narily on the basis of a likelihood of success on dilution claim, but finding no likelihood of success on Lan-
ham Act section 43(a) claim); Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 42 (2d Cir. 1994); Ringling
Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Celozzi-Ettelson Chevrolet, Inc., 855 F.2d 480, 484 (7th
Cir. 1988). A fourth decision suggested that while the alleged infringement did not create a likelihood of
confusion, it may have been actionable under a dilution theory, but the court did not resolve the dilution
issues because the relevant state law did not recognize a dilution cause of action. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc.
v. Florists Ass'n, 603 F. Supp. 35, 38-39 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (finding no likelihood of confusion by defen-
dant's use of plaintiff's slogan "THIS BUD'S FOR YOU" for floral advertisements and refusing to reach
question of dilution because Ohio did not have a dilution statute).
162 Compare Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1035 (2d Cir.
1989) (Sweet, DJ., concurring) (suggesting that after a plaintiff proves the strength of her mark, six factors
are relevant to likelihood of dilution: similarity of the marks, similarity of the products, sophistication of
consumers, predatory intent, renown of the senior user, and renown of the junior user), with Polaroid Corp.
v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961) (identifying eight factors to resolve likelihood of
confusion: strength of the plaintiff's mark, similarity of the marks, proximity of products, bridging the gap,
actual confusion, defendant's bad faith, quality of the defendant's products, and sophistication of the buy-
ers).
163 See supra note 161. In the legislative history accompanying the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of
1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985, the Committee cited one decision--Mortellito v. Nina of Califor-
nia, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)-for the difference between likelihood of confusion and likeli-
hood of dilution. See H.R. REP. No. 374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030. Ironi-
cally, in the Mortellito decision itself, the dilution theory was unnecessary to the court's decision as the
court had already found a likelihood of confusion and therefore trademark infringement under section 43(a)
of the Trademark Act. Mortellito, 335 F. Supp. at 1294-95.
'64 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979).
165 See, e.g., Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc., 604 F.2d at 202-06 (explaining why defendant's use
created a likelihood of confusion).
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decision and was often tacked onto the court's opinion as little more than an
afterthought.'6
Because of the expansion in the likelihood of confusion standard, dilution
statutes have proven more redundant than capstone. Nevertheless, dilution de-
serves mention, even if its adoption has only encouraged courts to continue
their expansions of the likelihood of confusion standard.
C. Expanding the Right to Convey
As courts expanded trademark law's right to exclude to encompass a
mark's full "value," they also crafted a corresponding expansion in the right to
convey associated with trademark ownership. As with the right to exclude,
courts carefully circumscribed a trademark owner's right to convey in the first
half of the twentieth century to reflect its deception-based origins. A
trademark owner could assign "her" mark to another only when transferred
together with the associated business in which the mark was used. 67 From a
deception-based perspective, this limitation makes perfect sense. With
deception-based protection, a mark receives protection because it has become
distinctive and consumers have come to rely on the mark as a source of
information concerning the source or other unobservable features of the
product or service associated with the mark. When a trademark is assigned
with the underlying business and the underlying business continues with
simply a new owner, the information conveyed by the trademark remains
essentially true.'6 But when a mark is assigned without the underlying
business, there is less reason to believe that the information the mark conveyed
will remain accurate. In such a case, a consumer may or may not be satisfied
with the new goods associated with the mark, but if she buys or considers
buying them believing they are the old goods, she has been deceived.
Allowing a trademark owner to assign a mark without the associated,
underlying business risks the very confusion trademark law aims to remedy.
69
166 In Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc., for example, the court's discussion of likelihood of dilution
is relegated to a single footnote. 604 F.2d at 205 n.8 ("Even if plaintiff had not established a likelihood of
confusion, it would be entitled to relief under New York General Business Law § 368-d, which permits the
enjoining of trademark copying despite the absence of confusion as to source or sponsorship.").
167 See, e.g., Kidd v. Johnson, I00 U.S. 617, 620 (1880); Filkins v. Blackman, 9 F. Cas, 50, 51-52
(C.C.D. Conn. 1876) (No. 4,786).
168 See Levitt Corp. v. Levitt, 593 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1979).
169 See ABC v. Wahl Co., 121 F.2d 412,413 (2d Cir. 1941); Mulhens & Kropff, Inc. v. Ferd. Muelhens,
Inc., 43 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1930) (finding assignment invalid where assignee did not receive recipe for prod-
uct previously associated with mark because the assignee could not supply the genuine 4711 eau de co-
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Early on, courts recognized this and prohibited assignments of a mark apart
from the underlying business under the assignment-in-gross doctrine.'7
During the process leading to the enactment of the Trademark Act of 1946,
proponents of broader trademark protection sought to change this rule and
worked for express recognition of the principle that a trademark owner may
freely transfer her mark.17 ' Although Congress specifically considered
language in several early bills that would have authorized assignments "with or
without the good will of the business ' or "upon such terms and conditions as
the parties may agree,"' it eventually rejected this language. In its place,
Congress adopted assignment language virtually identical to that found in the
1905 Act and permitted assignment of a mark only "with the goodwill of the
business in which the mark is used."'74 Under the rules of statutory interpre-
tation, Congress's conscious consideration of this issue and its express change
of the assignment provision to track the assignment provision of the 1905 Act
provides the clearest possible indication that Congress intended to retain the
traditional prohibition on assignments in gross. Yet, some courts have refused
to accept Congress's plain statement on this issue.
logne); Bulte v. Igleheart Bros., 137 F. 492, 499 (7th Cir. 1905) ('To uphold such a transfer (without the
associated business] would be to ignore the fundamental office of a trade-mark, would be to disregard its
purpose and object, would be to sanction a fraud upon the public purchasing the article.").
170 See United Drug Co.v. Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918); ABC, 121 F.2d at 413 (stating that "a
right to the use of a trademark or trade-name cannot be transferred in gross"); Carroll v. Duluth Superior
Milling Co., 232 F. 675, 680 (8th Cir. 1916); Bulte, 137 F. at 499; MacMahan Pharmacal Co. v. Denver
Chem. Mfg. Co., 113 F. 468,474-75 (8th Cir. 1901); Independent Baking Powder Co. v. Boorman, 175 F.
448, 451 (C.C.D.NJ. 1910) ("The law is well settled that a trade-mark cannot be transferred by itself.");
Eiseman v. Schiffer, 157 F. 473, 476 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1907).
171 See ROBERT, supra note 39, at 23-24.
172 when the trademark bill was introduced in the 75th Congress, it provided that "a registered trade-
mark shall be assignable either with or without the good will of the business." H.R. 9041, 75th Cong. § 10
(1938); see also ROBERT, supra note 39, at 23-24. This language was retained when the bill was reintro-
duced in the 76th Congress. H.R. 4744,76th Cong. § 10 (1940); see also ROBERT, supra note 39, at 23-24.
173 H.R. 102,77th Cong. § 10 (1943); see also ROBERT, supra note 39, at 24.
174 Trademark Act of 1946, § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 1060 (1994). The 1905 Act provided: "Every registered
trade-mark... shall be assignable in connection with the good will of the business in which the mark is
used." Act of Feb. 20, 1905, § 10, 33 Stat. 727. In the Lanham Act, Congress also allowed a business which
had several product lines, each with its own trademark, to assign a particular trademark together with its
associated product line independently. See Trademark Act of 1946, § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 1060 (1994) (allowing
transfer "with that part of the goodwill of the business connected with the use of and symbolized by any
other mark"). However, this did not represent an attempt to weaken the traditional assignment rule. See
ROBERT, supra note 39, at 26-27. It was simply an adaptation of the traditional assignment rules to changing
business conditions in which companies had expanded and diversified their product lines. See 1944 Trade-
Mark Hearings, supra note 8, at 22-23 (noting that change from 1905 Act "would permit a registrant who
owns more than one mark to dispose of one mark if he wishes to do so") (statement of Ms. Robert).
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The first break came in 1962, when the Court of Custom and Patent
Appeals upheld an assignment in gross in Hy-Cross Hatchery, Inc. v.
Osborne."5 The facts of the case were simple: a trademark's owner assigned
the mark to another for one hundred dollars.16  There was language in the
assignment stating that the assignment was made "together with that part of the
good will of the business connected with the use of and symbolized by the
mark."' n But the "successor" admitted that he received nothing from the prior
owner's business as part of the assignment, except the mark. 7 1 Indeed, the
successor essentially stipulated that he received the name, a "goodwill" recital,
and nothing more.tW Under preexisting law, the transfer represented a clear
cut, and invalid, assignment in gross. Yet, the Court of Custom and Patent
Appeals upheld the assignment."o
To the argument that such an assignment was in gross, and therefore
invalid, the court responded by pointing out that before the assignment, the
prior owner held the right to use the mark in connection with his business."'
After the assignment, the successor held that right."m For the Hy-Cross court,
this was enough. Because the assignment transferred the exclusive right to use
the mark from one owner to another, the assignment was valid. 3 Whether
there was a simultaneous transfer of the associated business-the critical
inquiry under the traditional assignment-in-gross doctrine-simply had no
legal relevance"
On its face, the opinion appears nonsensical, substituting a play on words
at the key juncture for the reasoning and analysis usually associated with ju-
dicial opinions. Taken literally, the opinion appears to collapse the distinction
175 303 F.2d 947, 950 (C.C.P.A. 1962).
176 See id. at 948-49.
177 Id. at 949.
178 Id.
179 Id.
"o See id. at 950.
181 See id. ("Unlike the cases relied on, Osborne, so far as the record shows, was using the mark at the
time he executed the assignment of it. ... He was selling chicks which his advertising of record shows were
designated as 'No. 111 HY-CROSS (Trade Mark) AMERICAN WHITES."').
182 See id. ("As part of his assignment, by assigning the goodwill, [Osborne] gave up the right to sell
'HY-CROSS' chicks.... By the assignment Welp, the assignee, acquired that right.").
183 Id.
184 See id. ("Thus, what had once been Osborne's business in 'HY-CROSS' chicks became Welp's busi-
ness. We do not see what legal difference it would have made if a crate of eggs had been included in the
assignment, or a flock of chickens destined to be eaten.").




between the trademark and its associated goodwill, and to eliminate the tie
between goodwill and the underlying business in which the mark had been
used. 8  By doing so, the Hy-Cross court essentially eliminated the assign-
ment-in-gross rule. The opinion itself is curiously lacking in any explanation
for these radical changes in the law, but apparently rests on a definition of
"goodwill" that the proponents of a broader assignment right had advanced,
and Congress had rejected, in the debates leading to the adoption of the
Trademark Act of 1946. If, as the free assigners had argued, the "goodwill"
associated with a mark is nothing more than the mark's ability to attract cus-
tomers,'u then the transfer of the exclusive right to use a mark from one owner
to another necessarily transfers the goodwill associated with the mark. Before
the assignment, the prior owner held the right to use the mark to attract cus-
tomers; after the assignment, the successor holds that right. Under this defini-
tion of goodwill, any transfer of the exclusive right to use a mark necessarily
transfers the associated goodwill, and the Hy-Cross court's statements that the
prior owner had transferred to the successor both the mark and its associated
goodwill become tautologically true.
But accepting such a definition of "goodwill" does far more than merely
validate the assignment at issue in Hy-Cross. Every trademark assignment al-
lows the assignee to use the mark, and thereby exploit its selling power. If a
transfer of selling power is all that the Trademark Act of 1946 requires to vali-
date an assignment, every assignment necessarily entails such a transfer.
Every assignment would, therefore, be valid. 88 Moreover, if goodwill is
nothing more than selling power, and a transfer of selling power is all that the
Lanham Act requires, the reasons for a mark's selling power would presuma-
bly be irrelevant to the question of whether an assignment was valid. In con-
sequence, an assignment would be valid without regard to the potential for
consumer deceit it might create.' 9 In short, by equating goodwill with selling
186 See id.
187 As Daphne Robert explained it "[Good will] is that magnetic aura which surrounds a mark and at-
tracts customers again and again" ROBERT, supra note 39, at 25. For the contrary interpretation of goodwill
that Congress adopted, where goodwill is tied to the business, see the colloquy between Mr. Whitman and
Representative Lanham during the 1939 Hearings. See 1939 Trade-Mark Hearings, supra note 40, at 88-93.
188 See ROBERT, supra note 39, at 25, 27-28 (suggesting such a rule with caveats concerning: (1) dis-
continuance of use by assignor, and (2) situations where two marks are inextricably intertwined, such that an
assignment of one, but not the other, would necessarily result in misinformation).
189 See Hy-Cross Hatchery, Inc., 303 F.2d at 950. As the court explained:
As for the argument that the transfer should have been held illegal because Osborne sold one
kind of chick and Welp sold another under the mark, whereby the public would be deceived, we
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power, the Hy-Cross court appeared to repudiate the assignment-in-gross doc-
trine altogether.
Later court decisions have universally rejected this aspect of the Hy-Cross
decision, and have chosen to retain some semblance of the prohibition on
assignments in gross.'o However, rather than retain the traditional assignment-
in-gross doctrine and ask whether the assignment included a transfer of the
underlying business, these courts have sought to provide a trademark owner
greater freedom to assign her mark as she sees fit. They designed, therefore, a
new rule for determining whether to apply the "in gross" label, that they
believed more precisely balanced the risks of "public deceit' 9' that certain
trademark assignments can create against the "right" of the trademark owner to
convey "her" mark as she sees fit. Under this new rule, courts ask whether
sufficient continuity exists between the goods associated with the mark before,
and the goods associated with the mark after, the mark's assignment. So long
as this sufficient continuity exists courts will find the assignment valid.'92
Although the courts devised this "sufficient continuity" rule in order to
protect the public from the deception that may result from the assignment of a
trademark without the associated business, the rule fails at this purpose. Under
the rule, "sufficient continuity" turns on whether the products associated with a
mark before and after its assignment "have substantially the same characteris-
tics.."... In practice, a post-assignment product will satisfy the rule so long as it
is of the same type as the pre-assignment product. An attempt to assign a mark
used in connection with a wholesale cola syrup to one intending to use the
mark on a retail pepper beverage may be invalid.' 94 But an assignment from
think the record does not support this. The type of chick appears to have been otherwise
indicated than by the trademark ....
Id.
190 See In re Roman Cleanser Co., 802 F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1986); Money Store v. Harriscorp Fin., Inc.,
689 F.2d 666 (7th Cir. 1982); Pepsico, Inc. v. Grapette Co., 416 F.2d 285,289 (8th Cir. 1969).
191 Pepsico, Inc., 416 F.2d at 289; see also Visa, U.S.A., Inc. v. Birmingham Trust Nat'l Bank, 696 F.2d
1371, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (upholding assignment where assignee continued "sufficiently similar" services
as those offered by assignor); Money Store, 689 F.2d at 678 (upholding assignment where assignee did not
offer "a service different from that offered by the assignor"); Main Street Outfitters, Inc. v. Federated Dep't
Stores, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 289,292 (D. Minn. 1989) (upholding assignment where assignee sold goods under
mark that were "substantially the same" as those sold by assignor).
192 Courts usually define a sufficiently similar product as one "having substantially the same character-
istics" as the pre-assignment product. Pepsico, Inc., 416 F.2d at 288.
193 i
194 Pepsico, Inc., 416 F.2d at 290; see also Warner-Lambert Pharm. Co. v. General Foods Corp., 164
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 532 (T.T.A.B. 1970).
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one chick producer to another will be valid, even if the precise characteristics
of the products involved differ substantially.' Yet, it is precisely these subtle
differences in product quality and formulation that trademarks serve to iden-
tify. That a product belongs in one or another broad category of products is
usually apparent, without regard to the trademark, simply from the form, pack-
aging, and appearance of the product, or from its location on a store's
shelves.'9 A consumer does not, therefore, typically rely on a trademark to tell
her that she is buying a chick. Rather, she relies on the trademark to tell her
precisely what she can expect from this particular brand of chick. In conse-
quence, when a consumer continues to see a mark on what appears to be the
same product, she will likely expect that the product so marked is, in fact, the
precise product she recalls.' If we allow an assignee to vary the product's
formulation and qualities, yet use the same trademark, then the trademark will
serve as a means for deceiving consumers as to what they are buying. 9'
195 See Hy-Cross Hatchery, Inc., v. Osborne, 303 F.2d 947, 950 (C.C.P.A. 1962); see also Glamorene
Prods. Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 538 F.2d 894 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (upholding assignment of mark
"BOUNCE" that assignor used on its dry-cleaning detergent, when assignee used its mark on its dry-
cleaning detergent).
196 A word or phrase that denotes a broad category of product could not serve as a trademark for a prod-
uct within that category in any event See, e.g., Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., Inc., 124 F.3d
137, 151 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding "honey brown ale" to be generic and therefore unprotectable under either
trademark or unfair competition law); see also Ralph H. Folsom & Larry L. Teply, Trademarked Generic
Words, 89 YAL LJ. 1323, 1326-30 (1980) (explaining genericness doctrine).
197 The Hy-Cross court found that such confusion was unlikely because "[tihe type of chick appears to
have been otherwise indicated than by the trademark, as by the numbers above quoted as well as by name."
Hy-Cross Hatchery, Inc., 303 F.2d at 950. However, this response misses the point. A trademark owner
may well use the same mark on several species of chicks and attach an additional mark, number, or name to
indicate the species, but this does not eliminate the quality assurance that the trademark should provide for
each product to which it is attached. Every type of Kellogg's cereal, every type of Ford automobile, every
type of Microsoft software, has a separate trademark to indicate the type of cereal, automobile, or software at
issue. Nevertheless, the presence of the "family" mark on each of these varieties provides a reassurance that
each such product will share a given level of quality control and value.
198 To this argument, the Hy.Cross court and various commentators have responded by pointing out that
a trademark owner has some leeway to vary the precise formulation of the products associated with a mark.
See Hy-Cross Hatchery, Inc., 303 F.2d at 950 ("[Assignor], moreover, was not under any obligation to the
public not to change the breed of chicks he sold under the mark from time to time."); see also 3 CALLMANN,
supra note 10, § 78.1, at 1274 ("If a trade-mark owner can change his business or the qualities of his article
or service without forfeiting the right to continue his use of the same trade-mark, it should be recognized that
a,transferee can do likewise."). Having stated this proposition, the Hy-Cross court leaves implied what it
apparently sees as a necessary corollary, that an assignee should have the same leeway. See Hy-Cross
Hatchery, Inc., 303 F.2d at 950. For a variety of reasons, however, the argument is not persuasive. First, the
Trademark Act expressly limits a mark owner's freedom to change the nature of the goods or services asso-
ciated with the mark, authorizing cancellation of a registered mark where the registrant so changes the goods
or services associated with a mark that confusion as to source results. See 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (1994)
(authorizing cancellation of a mark at any time "if the registered mark is being used by... the registrant so
as to misrepresent the source of the goods or services on or in connection with which the mark is used").
19991
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
In contrast, where an assignee intends to use the mark on a "new and dif-
ferent" product, a consumer would at least have the opportunity to recognize
that the new product was not the same as the one she had previously pur-
chased, and could adjust her expectations accordingly. Deception may, there-
fore, prove somewhat less likely when the assignee uses the mark on a "new
and different" product. 99
As a result, rather than bar those assignments likely to generate consumer
confusion, the sufficient continuity rule authorizes precisely those assignments
most likely to create such confusion. Driven by a perceived need to recog-
nize some idealized, complete bundle of rights for the trademark owner, courts
have expanded the right to convey in a way that turns trademark protection on
its head and have balanced away the public interest basis for trademark pro-
tection. Rather than preserve trademarks as means of providing otherwise un-
available information, the sufficient continuity rule is likely to create the very
confusion that trademark law is supposed to prevent.
But even to the extent that mark owners are often allowed considerable leeway to change the nature of the
underlying goods, the situation of the assigned mark is materially different. Initially, the interests of a
mark's longstanding owner are more likely to coincide with the public interest than the interests of a new
assignee. When a longstanding owner makes changes in a trademarked product over the years, there is little
reason to believe that those changes reflect anything other than changes in public tastes and desires, costs
savings, or other efficiencies that might be achieved in the good's production. In contrast, it is unlikely that
an assignee's changes in the underlying product made at the time of an assignment happen to coincide with,
and match, similar external changes in the demand for, and cost of, the product. Rather, the assignee simply
wants to take advantage of the mark's selling power to market her good, whatever the differences between
the goods associated with the mark before and after an assignment. Moreover, even if either could techni-
cally exploit the selling power of a mark by deception, a longstanding owner is likely to have an emotional
and mental attachment to the mark from years of working with it that will preclude such action. In the hands
of a new buyer, however, no such attachment exists and there is simply no reason to assume that an assignee
will preserve the value of the trademark as a long-term asset, rather than simply exploit the short-term value
of the confusion that may result. As a result, expanding the assignment right authorizes the existing owner
to sell the mark to the highest bidder without considering the public interest at stake.
199 Of course, such an assignment is not therefore valid. If the products are so disparate that confusion
is not likely, then use of the trademark on the new product lies outside the boundaries of the mark owner's
property and an attempt to assign a mark to establish another's rights in the new field is necessarily ineffec-
tive. In such a case, an attempt to use an assignment to claim the assignor's priority and extend it to a new
product so as to establish priority over, or a laches defense against, one of the assignee's competitors would
be ineffective. See, e.g., Pepsico, Inc. v. Grapette Co., 416 F.2d 285, 286-87 (8th Cir. 1969) (assignee ob-
tained assignment of rights in "Peppy" mark in an attempt to obtain the assignor's privity; if the assignment




D. Summary: Trademarks are Property, But So What
As a rhetorical strategy, proponents of broader trademark have repeatedly
insisted that trademarks are "simply" a form of property. But to say that
something is someone's property is, at least from a legal perspective, to say
very little. Such a statement merely establishes that the law has defined certain
legal relations between the "owner" and others with respect to the thing.20' The
statement says nothing at all about the nature of the relations defined. ° On the
other hand, from an ordinary perspective to say that something belongs to
someone is to say quite a bit more.2I3 The label "my property" invariably
conjures images of legal rights with respect to control, disposition, and use
reminiscent of the "sole and despotic dominion" Blackstone accorded land-
owners under English common law.24 It conjures such images, ironically,
even though an English landowner's rights have never been as absolute as
Blackstone's language suggests.
When we trace trademark's continuing expansion, we find, in essence, a
transition in trademark from property in the formal sense of a certain, but
usually quite limited, set of legal rights, to property in the more ordinary sense
of full and absolute ownership. Originally, trademark law was justified on
grounds of preventing consumer deception. Ownership was assigned to the
person who adopted the mark for her trade, not because she had created it or its
favorable associations, but because such person was conveniently placed and
strongly motivated to vindicate the broader public interest in a mark's ability to
identify accurately the source of the goods to which it was attached.20 While
the mark was its owner's property, it was her property only in the limited sense
that she held the legal right to seek a remedy should another adopt a mark
sufficiently similar to threaten the mark's ability to indicate product source.2
201 RESTATEMENT(FmST) OFPROPERTY ch. 1, Introductory Note (1936).
202 See generally Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY: NoMos xxni 69 (J.
Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980).
203 'o6 the division between ordinary and legal understandings of property, see generally BRucE A.
ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTrrUTION 26-29 (1977).
204 2 WILLAMBLACKSTONF COMMENTARIES *2.
205 Although this interest could in theory be vindicated by consumers themselves, or by a government
agency (approaches that would merit serious consideration today) neither would have appeared as either a
practical or appropriate alternative when trademark protection first arose.
2(6 In Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf. the Court held:
Common-law trade-marks, and the right to their exclusive use, are of course to be classed among
property rights... but only in the sense that a man's right to the continued enjoyment of his
trade reputation and the goodwill that flows from it, free from unwarranted interference by oth-
ers, is a property right, for the protection of which a trade-mark is an instrumentality.
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Beyond this limited right the owner's property rights did not extend. As a
result, a mark's owner did not have the right to control every use that might
reduce, or capture for someone else, some part of "her" mark's value, nor did
she have the right to exercise dominion over "her" mark in whatever way she
desired.
As part of their attacks on this traditional, and in their view limited,
conception of trademarks, proponents of broader trademark invoked the
"property" label in order to tap the collective's ordinary understanding of
ownership, and to suggest sub rosa that trademark ownership should
necessarily entail a degree of control and dominion over the mark similar to
that associated with other forms of property ownership.2 Their arguments
met with some scattered success in court decisions in the 1930s and 1940s, but
they failed to obtain recognition for their views when Congress enacted the
Trademark Act of 1946.m After this rebuff, proponents of broader trademark
240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916) (citation omitted). In Industrial Rayon Corp. v. Dutchess Underwear Corp., the
court heldi
mrademark is not property in the ordinary sense but only a word or symbol indicating the origin
of a commercial product. The owner of the mark acquires the right to prevent the goods to
which the mark is applied from being confused with those of others and to prevent his own trade
from being diverted to competitors through their use of misleading marks.
92 F.2d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 640 (1938). In DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed
Products Co., Inc., the court held:
As has often been said, a trade-mark is only property in a limited sense. It may be transferred
with a business, but the only right which the owner of the mark acquires against competitors is
"to prohibit the use of it so far as to protect the owner's good will against the sale of another's
product as his."
85 F.2d 75, 80 (2d Cir. 1936) (citations omitted).
2W See also Dreyfuss, supra note 24, at 406 (noting that arguments for broader trademark are
"suggestive of real property and the relative ease with which claims in such cases are usually decided in fa-
vor of the property owner").
208 See supra text accompanying notes 25-189. Of course, many of the proponents of broader trademark
protection were also the authors of the leading trademark treatises, and at least some of them used the plat-
form their treatises provided to pretend that Congress had, in fact, adopted their proposals for broader pro-
tection. See, e.g., ROBERT, supra note 39, 23-26 (recounting Congress's rejection of "free assignability"
language and adoption of language virtually identical to assignments provision found in 1905 Act, but then
emphasizing that "the new statute is broader in scope with reference to an assignment than was the prior
law"); id. at 65-67 (noting that Congress defined trademarks for purpose of the primary register to exclude
trade dress and product configuration, while it defined trademarks registrable on the secondary register to
include trade dress and product configuration and concluding that trade dress and product configuration
were therefore registrable on the principal register with secondary meaning); id. at 159-65 (noting that Con-
gress authorized infringement actions only where use would likely create, on behalf of the purchaser,
"confusion of source," but suggesting that Act nonetheless encompassed confusion as to sponsorship or af-
filiation); see also 3 CALLMAaN, supra note 10, § 80.3, at 1365-67 (arguing that original Trademark Act
[Vol. 48
TRADEMARK MONOPOLIES
protection returned to the courts and, as the above examples illustrate, were
gradually successful in persuading courts to adopt the broader view of
trademark protection that Congress had rejected. Despite this expansion, a
trademark owner's property in her mark remains limited, at least to some
extent, even today. There remain uses of her mark that the owner cannot
control and limits on her own freedom to do with the mark as she sees fit.20
Yet, as a result of this expansion, a mark's owner today has far more ability to
control the unauthorized use of her mark and far more freedom to do with her
mark as she sees fit, often in circumstances entirely divorced from, and
sometimes actually in conflict with, her mark's informational role. 10 The mark
has become its owner's property not merely in a formal and limited sense, but
in an ordinary and increasingly absolute sense.
In evaluating this expansion, the examples set forth above serve, if nothing
else, as a useful reminder that much of what we presently take for granted in
trademark law is of recent construction, crafted by courts without much guid-
ance from Congress and sometimes in plain derogation of Congress's stated
intentions. Rampant judicial activism is not something we ordinarily associate
with trademark law, perhaps because we perceive the court-driven expansion
of property ownership (a conservative agenda) as somehow qualitatively dif-
ferent than court-driven expansions of tort or products liability (a liberal
agenda). But trademark's expansion raises the same questions concerning
competence and authority that excessive judicial activism raises in other fields,
and those questions suggest that considerably more restraint concerning trade-
mark's expansion is warranted than has recently been shown.
encompassed dilution cause of action despite requirement of purchaser confusion "as to the source" and de-
spite express lack of dilution language such as that used in state anti-dilution statutes).
209 See, e.g., Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 502-08 (2d Cir. 1996)
(holding that owner of trademark "SPAM" not entitled to stop defendant's use of "SPA'AM" as name of
character in film); Matrix Essentials, Inc. v. Emporium Drug Mart, Inc., 988 F.2d 587, 592-93 (5th Cir.
1993) (holding that owner of trademark not entitled to prevent unauthorized sale of genuine trademarked
goods); New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that trade-
mark owner not entitled to prevent use of mark in newspaper survey that raised money for charity); Pepsico,
Inc. v. Grapette Co., 416 F.2d 285 (8th Cir. 1969) (holding that trademark owner could not validly assign
interest in trademark to one who intended to use the mark on a product that was not substantially the same as
the original product associated with the mark); Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp., 906 F. Supp. 997, 1015-16
(D.$.C. 1995) (finding that fair use doctrine precludes owner of trademark in clear tip on fishing rod from
preventing defendant from using similar tip on its fishing rods where tip affected functional characteristics
of the rod).
210 See supra text accompanying notes 157-89.
211 It is always surprising how many courts and commentators who ordinarily would side with Justice
Brandeis on almost any issue forget his admonition in International News Service v. Associated Press:
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In turning to the expansion's substantive merits more directly, we begin
with the point that the "property" label, even if descriptively accurate, does not
resolve the normative issue. Both deception-based and property-based
trademark protection create property regimes, but the "property" label does not
help us determine whether one or the other of these regimes, or perhaps some
other, best serves society's needs. To make such a determination, we must
look beyond the labels and examine the welfare consequences of trademark
protection.
But with the increasing complexity of society, the public interest tends to become omnipresent;
and the problems presented by new demands for justice cease to be simple. Then the creation or
recognition by courts of a new private right may work serious injury to the general public, unless
the boundaries of the right are definitely established and wisely guarded.
248 U.S. 215,262-63 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
212 Professor Ralph S. Brown has offered a second, more fundamental critique of trademark protection
and advertising. He has argued that the principal purpose of advertising is to create artificial distinctions
between products, making one product appear superior to another, when they are, in fact, identical. In his
view, this is simply waste and trademark protection, to the extent that it encourages such advertising, is
correspondingly undesirable. See Brown, supra note 6, at 1167-83. Proponents of trademark protection
have countered that the higher prices associated with certain trademarked or advertised goods reflect a real
increase in the value of such goods. Advertising and trademarks provide valuable information to consumers,
and this information is itself the "actual" difference between the advertised and unadvertised products.
Because of the value added by advertising, consumers are willing to pay more for trademarked goods and
derive greater satisfaction from the purchase of such goods. Trademark protection is, therefore, desirable to
ensure the flow of such information. There are three difficulties with the response and its underlying
assumption that an increased willingness to pay must necessarily correspond to an increased satisfaction
level. First, to the extent that advertising and a trademark successfully generate an unthinking buying
response-a trained reaction to the presence of a trademark where perception of the mark stimulates hand to
wallet without conscious thought-does that represent a legitimate form of welfare enhancement? Were
Pavlov's dogs happier after they had been trained to salivate at the sound of a dinner bell? These questions
are fundamental in that they test the boundaries of what we mean by "rational," "utility maximizing"
behavior and challenge the assumed link between actions and desires. Our decision to prohibit subliminal
advertising suggests that, at least, some such unthinking or trained ("Pavlovian") buying responses do not
represent legitimate welfare enhancement. Second, where persuasion is involved in a purchase, that
persuasion may wear off, or be less than fully effective, and so lead to an increased incidence of divided
choosers or regret. Third, some advertising and associated trademarks serve as a form of blackmail. Such
advertising seeks to persuade us by first creating or exacerbating our insecurities and self-doubts. It tells us
that we are not pretty enough, not popular enough, not hip enough, not rich enough. Only after it has shaken
our self-image and disturbed our self-contentment does this type of advertising step forward to offer a
remedy. Many consumers are susceptible to these ads and will take the remedy offered. This advertising
can therefore persuade consumers to purchase a good they would not otherwise have bought or pay more for
a good than they would otherwise have paid. This increased willingness to buy does not, however, reflect an
aggregate increase in utility, even if we limit our consideration to those consumers who are persuaded to
purchase. In many cases, the consumer may pay the higher price simply to restore her pre-advertisement
satisfaction level. See ScHERR, supra note 5, at 381. Indeed, in some cases, the insecurities and self-
doubts that such advertising creates remain even after the purchase, so that consumers spend more and more
on products, only to experience less and less satisfaction. Thus, despite the widespread availability of
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I. THE WELFARE CONSEQUENCES OF TRADEMARK PROTECTION
In evaluating the welfare consequences of trademark protection, we begin
with its immediate consequences. In any form, trademark protection grants to
a particular individual a bundle of rights, with respect to an intangible thing,
generically labeled the "mark." One of the rights typically included in this
bundle is the right to exclude others from using the mark in certain contexts.
While trademark protection leaves others free to devise their own marks and to
build their own following among consumers, its prohibition on using another's
mark both increases the cost of introducing a competing product and can create
a difference that consumers consider material between otherwise identical
products. Trademark protection can provide a means for consumers to distin-
guish between available products more readily and can thereby ensure that
consumers have a choice in the products they buy, but choice is not competi-
tion.2"3 And, in many cases, by ensuring a difference between brands, trade-
mark protection can establish for a trademark owner the downward sloping
demand curve of a monopolist.
The Department of Justice took precisely this position during the debates
leading to the enactment of the Trademark Act of 1946, and in its 1944 Report,
strenuously opposed key provisions of the trademark bill on the grounds that
they would limit competition and promote undesirable monopoly. 24 Relying
surgical and non-surgical beauty aids (or perhaps because of them and the need to create a demand for
them), women are less satisfied with their appearances today, than they were a century ago. See SUSAN
Boino, UNBEARABLE WEIGHT 100-10 (1993) (arguing that Madison Avenue uses existing insecurities of
women, including their weight, to manipulate women further through advertising); NAOMI WOLF, THE
BEAurY MYTH 73-84 (1992) (arguing that women's self-hatred is intensified by images of women in
advertising).
213 I can choose between salt and pepper to spice my food, but the existence of such choice does not
mean that salt and pepper compete. Given the quite different taste consequences of applying these two dif-
ferent spices, it is quite likely that consumers will actively prefer one or the other and will not see one as an
acceptable substitute for the other. More generally, choice is competition only if consumers are indifferent
between the choices available. See also PAUL A. SA UELSON, ECONOMICS 452 (6th ed. 1964). As Professor
Samuelson explained:
To the economist, perfect competition does not mean spirited rivalry among cigarette advertisers.
It does not mean a titanic struggle in which Cornelius Vanderbilt cuts his freight fare on the New
York Central below Daniel Drew's cut-price rates quoted for the Erie Railroad. It does not mean
two or more textbook publishers or chemical companies vying with one another to have the best
research, quality, and trade marks.
Id.
214 Report of the Department of Justice on the Trade-Mark BilL supra note 8, at 58-71. The Department
of Justice's arguments centered on three issues. First, by allowing registration of, and providing
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on real world examples where trademarks had served to maintain monopoly or
market power, the Justice Department successfully persuaded Congress of the
legitimacy of these concerns and of the need to rewrite several key sections of
the proposed bill.215 Despite this, some remain skeptical that trademark pro-
tection can serve as the basis for monopoly. Our examination of the welfare
consequences of trademark protection begins, therefore, with a consideration
of monopoly and an examination of trademark protection's anticompetitive
potential.
A. Welfare Losses of Trademark Protection: Trademark Monopolies
In the simplest terms, a monopoly exists when there is only a single
producer in a distinct product market. Behind this superficially
straightforward definition lies the more difficult task of defining distinct
product markets. Usually, economists and antitrust lawyers define product
incontestability for, ordinary names and descriptive words, the proposed bill would give the owners of such
marks monopolies, by limiting the ability of potential competitors to identify effectively their wares as
substitutes. See id. at 59-62, 70-71; see also 1942 Trade-Mark Hearings, supra note 8, at 23-34, 41-53.
Second, by limiting the reselling of repaired or second-hand trademarked goods, the proposed bill threatened
the elimination of the used goods market, with a concomitant increase in market concentration and control
for the original manufacturer. See Report of the Department of Justice on the Trade-Mark Bill, supra note 8,
at 62-63; see also 1944 Trade-Mark Hearings, supra note 8, at 72-74 (statement of Elliott H. Moyer, special
assistant to the attorney general, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice). Third, by allowing joint use and
control of a mark through contracts, or through certification and collective marks, the bill would facilitate
and provide colorable sanction for anticompetitive agreements, pertaining to market allocation, price-fixing,
and product distribution. Report of the Department of Justice on the Trade-Mark Bill, supra note 8, at 63-
65, 68-70; see also 1942 Trade-Mark Hearings, supra note 8, 39-40; Timberg, supra note 8, at 324-45
(describing use of trademarks as direct source of market power and to facilitate anticompetitive practices);
Borchardt, supra note 6, at 251-59 (describing use of trademarks to facilitate anticompetitive practices);
Bartholomew Diggins, Trade-Marks and Restraints of Trade, 32 GEo. LJ. 113 (1944) (same).
215 The key changes include the following. The cancellation section, section 14, was rewritten to allow
cancellation of generic marks and improperly used certification marks. Compare H.R. 82, § 14, reprinted in
1944 Trade-Mark Hearings, supra note 8, at 6, with Act of July 5, 1946, § 14, 60 Stat. 433. A genericness
exception was added to the defensive incontestability provision in section 15. Compare H.R. 82, § 15, re-
printed in 1944 Trade-Mark Hearings, supra note 8, at 6, with Act of July 5, 1946, § 15(4), 60 Stat. 434.
Section 32(3), which allowed the trademark owner to control the resale of reconditioned and second-hand
goods was deleted. Compare H.R. 82, 78th Cong. § 32(3) (1944), reprinted in 1944 Trade-Mark Hearings,
supra note 8, at 10, with Act of July 5, 1946, § 32, 60 Stat. 438 (1946). Section 33(b), the affirmative in-
contestability provision, was rewritten to incorporate a genericness defense in the preamble; compare H.R.
82,78th Cong. § 33(b) (1944), reprinted in 1944 Trade-Mark Hearings, supra note 8, at 10, with Act of July
5, 1946, § 33(b), 60 Stat. 438; to broaden the defense for improper joint use; compare H.R. 82, 78th Cong.
§ 33(b)(3) (1944), reprinted in 1944 Trade-Mark Hearings, supra note 8, at 10, with Act of July 5, 1946, §
33(b)(3), 60 Stat. 438; and to add a defense where "the mark has been or is being used to violate the antitrust
laws of the United States." Compare H.R. 82, 78th Cong. § 32 (1944), reprinted in 1944 Trade-Mark
Hearings, supra note 8, at 10, with Act of July 5, 1946, § 33(b)(7), 60 Stat. 439.
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markets in terms of the cross-elasticity of demand between two products by
examining the willingness of consumers to switch from one product to another,
should the first product's price increase. 6  In markets where perfect
substitutes are available, any price increase by one producer will lead all
consumers to switch instantaneously and without cost to one of the available
substitutes. In such a case, absent collusion, a single producer would have no
market power, i.e. no ability to raise her price above market level. If a
producer were to attempt to do so, consumers would simply turn to one of the
available substitutes. On the other hand, if such perfect substitutes are not
available, then a producer will necessarily have some degree of market power.
The only question is how imperfect substitutes must be, and how much market
power a producer must have, before we label a distinct good a separate product
market and its producer a monopolist.
If we were to seek the optimal allocation of resources found in the perfect
competition model, only perfect competition would suffice. 7 The presence of
any degree of market power would render the perfect competition model's op-
timal allocation unattainable.218 Therefore, if we sought to achieve such perfect
competition, we would necessarily label any degree of market power, however
attained, an unlawful monopoly. In real world markets perfect competition, if
it exists at all, is exceedingly rare, and would be impossible to achieve if we
sought it.2 ' 9 For that reason, along with others, economists and lawyers typi-
cally define markets not in terms of perfect substitutes, but in terms of reason-
able or near-perfect substitutes. The question is not whether the alternative
products available would prevent any profitable price increase by a producer,
216 See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962); United States v. E.I
duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394 (1956); SCHmER, supra note 5, at 479-80.
217 See, e.g., R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 23 Rsv. EcoN.
STUD. 11, 16-17 (1956).
218 See id. at 16-17.
219 See, e.g., CHAMaERLIN, supra note 3, at 214-15 (noting that pure competition "may no longer be
regarded as in any sense an 'ideal' for purposes of welfare economics" and that "[i]n many cases it would be
quite impossible to establish it"); CHAmERLiN, TOWARDS A MORE GENERAL THEORY OF VALUE, supra note
5, at 93 ("[P]ure competition is evidently a theoretical concept, and ... the practical-minded economist is
often ready enough to point out that 'no one has ever advocated that it be established."'); SAMUELSON, supra
note 213, at 39,43-44. As Professor Samuelson noted:
A cynic might say of perfect competition what Bernard Shaw said of Christianity: The only trou-
ble with it is that it has never been tried.... All economic life is a blend of competitive and mo-
nopoly elements.... It would be humanly impossible, therefore, to attempt to create perfect
competition by law.
Id. SCHERER, supra note 5, at 24 ("There are many reasons why, in the real world, it is impossible or unde-
sirable to satisfy all the assumptions of the purely competitive general equilibrium model.")
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but whether the alternatives would render unprofitable a producer's attempt to
impose a "small but significant and nontransitory" price increase.r2 Product
markets are, in turn, defined by asking whether a "small but significant" price
increase, of five or perhaps ten percent, on the first product, would lead so
many first product consumers to switch to some other product that the price
increase would prove unprofitable.22' If enough consumers would switch to
render such a price increase unprofitable, then the products to which consum-
ers would turn are included within the relevant market as competing products.
If consumers would not switch, then no "competing" product exists and the
producer's goods constitute a distinct product market.2m  In such a case, the
producer is a monopolist.
If we were to apply such a test to define product markets for trademarked
goods, we would find that many of the most popular brands constitute product
markets unto themselves. I often explore this issue in my Intellectual Property
class by posing the following hypothetical: Assume that the student lounge has
two soda vending machines, one which serves a twelve-ounce can of Coca-
Cola for sixty-five cents, the other, a twelve-ounce can of Pepsi-Cola for sixty
cents. m I then ask: How many of you, who would ordinarily prefer a Coke,
220 See Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 1.11
(1992); see also Satellite Television & Associated Resources, Inc. v. Continental Cablevision, Inc., 714 F.2d
351,355 n.5 (4th Cir. 1983) (applying Guidelines approach to define relevant product market), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1027 (1984); Bon-Ton Stores, Inc. v.. May Dept. Stores Co., 881 F. Supp. 860, 872 (W.D.N.Y.
1994) (using Guidelines approach to define relevant product market).
221 A "sufficient" number will have switched if, given the number of consumers who switch, the price
increase is not profitable. In addition to depending on the percentage reduction in sales volume
("switching") caused by the price increase, the profitability of a price increase will depend on a number of
factors, including the fixed costs associated with producing the product, the "normal" or competitive profit
margin associated with the product, and any change in the marginal cost of the product given the reduced
production volume. For example, if a product has a normal profit margin of $.10 per unit, has no fixed
costs, and has a marginal cost of $.90 per unit, a 5% price increase would prove profitable so long as the
producer's sales volume did not fall by more than 33.3%. Under the same assumptions, a 10% price in-
crease would prove profitable so long as the producer's sales volume did not fall by more than 50%. Alter-
natively, if the product had a normal profit margin of $.10 per unit, had total fixed costs of $1 million, and
marginal costs of .40 per unit, the percentage reduction in sales volume necessary to render a price increase
unprofitable would vary depending on the total number of units sold at the competitive price. If 2 million
units had been sold at a competitive level, a 5% price increase would be unprofitable only if the producer's
sales volume fell by more than 7.7%. If 4 million units had been sold at a competitive level, then a 5% price
increase would be unprofitable only if the producer's sales volume fell by more than 9.6%.
222 See, e.g., FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1290 (W.D. Mich. 1996) ("The rele-
vant market is defined by identifying competitors who could provide defendants' customers with alternative
sources for defendants' services in the event defendants, as the merged entity, attempted to exercise their
market power by raising prices above competitive levels.").
223 I start with the products priced differently, rather than starting at the same price, then ask about the
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would purchase a Pepsi in this instance because of the price difference?
Invariably, almost no one indicates a willingness to switch. While obviously
unscientific, the response (or lack thereof) strongly suggests that Coke is itself
a distinct product market, even assuming the usual hand-raising reticence often
found in law school classrooms. 224
Although the characterization of Coke as a distinct product market may
generate discomfort for some, we must keep firmly in mind that the fact that
consumers can switch, or that the products are objectively similar, or that con-
sumers can "make do" with the second product, does not control the analysis.
Proper market definition must focus on actual buying decisions. In conse-
quence, it is not whether consumers can switch or whether a reasonable con-
sumer would switch, but whether actual consumers do switch, in response to
the small, but significant and nontransitory price increase. Similarly, con-
sumer perceptions of similarity and of difference, not objective "reality," ulti-
mately control individual buying decisions, and therefore define relevant mar-
effects of a price increase for two principal reasons. First, if the price increase is made express, some stu-
dents will say that they would switch as a way of objecting to the price increase itself, or perhaps with the
hope that a short boycott period will lead Coca-Cola to reverse the increase. Second, to avoid such market-
place reactions, the ability to increase the price, if available, will typically already have been exercised by
the time a good gets to market.
224 For a summary of more scientific investigations generating similar results, see Sci-RER, supra note
5, at 381-84. In class, I usually continue the cross-elasticity discussion, by asking how many Coke drinkers
would switch if the Cokes were $.75 or even $1.00. Typically, even 50-100% price increases appear poten-
tially profitable. See also David Menzies, Fabulous Food Flops, FOOD IN CANADA, May 1998, at 36 ("New
Coke 'was introduced after Coke conducted years of exhaustive blind taste tests and found consumers pre-
ferred the taste of the new formulation. Numbers don't lie but Coke never counted on the emotional and
nostalgic attachment to its 100-year-old flagship brand."); Chris Roush, Pop Went Flat, but Coca-Cola
Learned Lessons, TAMPA "IREB., Apr. 16, 1995, at C-I (noting that even though new Coke beat both Pepsi
and old Coke in blind taste tests, it failed in marketplace because consumers had a "deep and abiding emo-
tional attachment" to the old Coke) (quoting Donald Keough, president, Coca-Cola); Roy Bradshaw, Re-
sponse Regarding Brand Worship, (posted Jul. 13, 1998) <http://cards.badrmsc.edulelmarlrawld425.txt>.
Bradshaw explains:
I am not sure that this quite meets your scenario but for a number of years I have been conduct-
ing a class experiment with Marketing Research students on preferences for soft drink brands.
Even after the provision of evidence, including their own blind tasting information, about the in-
ferior qualities of their preferred brands, the majority of students continued to purchase these
same preferred brands. I have always assumed that this was because the image and cognate
feelings associated with a particular brand were more important than any differences in the range
of products on offer (e.g. differences in taste, quality, etc.).
Id.
225 See, e.g., CHAMBERLrN, ToWARDS A MORE GENERAL THEORY OF VALUE, supra note 5, at 94 (noting




kets. Objective similarities may influence consumer perceptions, but they do
not control them. Finally, if a switch requires a consumer to "make do," such
a description necessarily suggests that the switch entails some degree of con-
sumer disutility (or deadweight loss) precisely measured by the extent to which
the consumer considers the switch "making do."
Of course, consumers may consider Pepsi a closer substitute for Coke, than
a generic cola, iced tea, orange juice, or water, in that more consumers would
consider switching to Pepsi, given a price increase on Coke, than to one of
these other forms of liquid refreshment. To that extent, the availability of
Pepsi from a competing entity may limit profitable Coke price increases to a
greater extent than would the availability of one of these other, less-perfect
substitutes. But this does not establish that the availability of Pepsi from a
competing source would prevent any profitable Coke price increase, nor does
it establish that enough consumers would actually switch to Pepsi given a
small, but significant and nontransitory increase in Coke's price, to render such
a price increase unprofitable.
It may be that competition between Coke and Pepsi for new consumers, or
for the proverbial infra-marginal consumer, would effectively prevent such a
price increase from being profitable, but the difficulty with relying on these
possible sources of competition is that all too often they remain only possibili-
ties. In many cases, they exert no real influence on actual pricing and pur-
chasing decisions. Perhaps for that reason, these forms of competitive pressure
are more often assumed than proved and in any event, even where present,
serve only to limit, not eliminate, market power.22"
If we were to extend this type of pricing analysis to other products, we
would almost certainly find that many popular brands do possess sufficient
226 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 465-78 (1992) (refusing to
accept defendant's argument that Court should presume that competition for new entrants would preclude
market power over locked-in users). Compare Edmund W. Kitch, Patents: Monopolies or Property Rights?,
8 REs. INL. & ECoN. 31, 40-46 (1986) (asserting that Xerox's patents on its copying technologies gave it no
market power), with F. M. Scherer, Comment on Edmund Kitch, 8 RES. IN L. & ECON. 51, 52-57 (ridiculing
Kitch's conclusions).
2 Even admitted "monopolies" face competition from imperfect substitutes at the margins. See
CHAMaERLIN, TOWARDS A MORE GENERAL THEORY OF VALUE, supra note 5, at 71 ("And whatever the area
monopolized, the monopolist will always face competition in some degree from the wider area beyond its
limits."). With oil, for example, consumers can substitute at the margins other energy sources, conservation
measures, and oil from other countries for oil produced from nations that have joined Oil Producing & Ex-
porting Countries ("OPEC"). These alternatives have undoubtedly limited, to some extent, OPEC's ability
to set a supracompetitive price for its oil, yet they have not prevented supracompetitive prices altogether.
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brand loyalty to constitute distinct product markets.m To the extent a
protected trademark serves as the device for capturing such brand loyalty, even
narrow trademark protection will quite often prohibit competitors from
marketing a product that consumers will recognize and accept as a perfect or
even reasonable substitute for the popular brand.
This market power arises from a number of sources. First, like other forms
of information, the information that a trademark provides is imperfect. A
trademark typically provides information that concerns our satisfaction only
with respect to the trademark's associated product. It does not usually provide
information, at the same cost, concerning all of the potential substitutes and
their relative merits.2 In consequence, once a consumer has come to believe,
whether from advertising or prior purchases, that she will be satisfied with a
particular trademarked good, the cost of acquiring information with respect to
other products, when combined with a degree of risk aversion, can render other
products unacceptable as substitutes. Having found products with which she is
satisfied, the consumer is simply unwilling to expend her scarce time and
mental energies to identify alternative products that may prove marginally
228 See Borchardt, supra note 6, at 246. Professor Borchardt states:
In spite of this characterization of a trade-mark as a competitive device, Rogers admits a little
later that the preference which a buyer might have for Quaker Oats is a habit which "is worth
something to the producer of the goods to whose use we have become habituated. It eliminates
competition for to us there is nothing 'just as good."'
Id. (quoting EDwARD S. RoGERs, GOOD wIL, TRADE-MARKS AND UNFAIR TRADING 56 (1914)) (emphasis
supplied by Borchardt). While the notion of a single brand being a distinct product market will undoubtedly
discomfort some, antritrust law has begun moving in that direction as well. As antitrust's focus has shifted
from whether two products might be made to serve the same purpose in a very broad sense, to a more realis-
tic appraisal of actual consumer preferences in the marketplace, narrower and more realistic definitions of
the relevant market have inevitably followed. In cases that focus more precisely on actual consumer prefer-
ences, courts and juries have recognized that consumers may often consider a single brand the relevant mar-
ket. See Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 465-78, 482 n.31 (1992) (finding sufficient evidence that Kodak-
brand copiers constituted distinct product market and citing other cases that single brand constituted distinct
product market); NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 112-13 (1984) (affirming district court's finding
that NCAA football constitutes distinct product market); U.S. Anchor Mfg., Inc. v. Rule Indus., Inc., 7 F.3d
986, 996 (11th Cir. 1993) (finding that market for Danforth brand of anchors and market for functionally-
equivalent generic anchors were separate and distinct).
229 See Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, supra note 17, at 311 (noting the lack of perfect
information and suggesting that "monopoly power for a consumer good will be greater if consumers know
about the quality of only a few brands of that good"). Moreover, even if false advertising law limits to some
extent outright falsehoods in advertising, it leaves considerable room for a slanted presentation of a product.
See, e.g., Robert Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the Regulation ofAdvertising, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 661,663 (1977) (noting that advertising is a "self-serving source" of information).
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better or to incur the risk and uncertainty involved with switching.2 Because
of these costs and the uncertainties involved in switching, the information a
trademark provides can "lock-in" a consumer to products bearing that
trademark, just as someone who has learned the commands for a particular
electronic spreadsheet will be reluctant to switch to another. 3 ' As numerous
advertising slogans have suggested, these switching costs are often substantial,
particularly when compared to the potential gains available with respect to
small ticket items, such as cereal, toothpaste, detergent, and other common
household purchases. 32 Moreover, after sufficient experience, a consumer's
association of a trademark with certain desirable features may become so
ingrained as to pass below conscious thought and generate an unthinking or
"Pavlovian" buying response.233 Once the response reaches that level, a
consumer may no longer stop to think about which brand she buys; her
purchasing decisions will become merely a habit.24 Unless startled or shocked
230 See Folsom & Teply, supra note 196, at 1340-41; Landes & Posner, supra note 17, at 280, 292.
231 See Lotus De. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 818 (1st Cir. 1995), affd by an equally
divided court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996).
232 See ROGERS, supra note 9, at 55-59 (explaining power of habits in controlling buying and selling
practices); see also Warner-Lambert Pharm. Co. v. John J. Reynolds, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 655, 657 (S.D.N.Y.
1959) (noting that Warner-Lambert was still earning sufficient rents from production of Listerine mouth-
wash to cover its annual royalty payment of $1.5 million in the late 1950s, even though the formula for Lis-
terine mouthwash became public knowledge before 1949). Consider, for example, how many times over the
last 10 years you have switched spreadsheet or word-processing programs, with how many times you have
switched brands of breakfast food, beer, soda, or your favorite board-game. See Nelson, Information and
Consumer Behavior, supra note 17, at 327 (noting that monopoly power is greater with experience goods).
233 See LAMBIN, supra note 17, at 115-16. As Lambin explained:
Brand loyalty or consumer inertia may augment the height of the barrier of entry for new firms.
The results clearly show that a substantial degree of inertia exists in the sample markets, and a
potential entrant in these markets will have to incur the cost of overcoming consumer inertia.
Since these markets are advertising intensive, this is prima facie evidence that advertising helps
erect entry barriers.
Id.; see also Dale Hein & Cathy Durham, A Test of the Habit Formation Hypothesis Using Household Data,
73 REV. ECON. & STAT. 189 (1991) (noting traditional assumption that habit plays central role in consumer
buying, critiquing preexisting empirical studies that attempt to measure habit effect, proposing new approach
that provides lower estimate of the influence of habit effects, but concluding that "[habit effects] are still
highly significant and play an important role in consumer behavior"); Papandreou, supra note 6, at 508-09
("Consumer allegiances built over the years with intensive advertising, trade-marks, trade names, copyrights
and so forth extend substantial protection to firms already in the market. In some markets this barrier to
entry may be insuperable."). The name is an allusion, of course, to Pavlov and his stimulus-response re-
search with animals. See also supra note 212.
234 Studies have shown that consumers often enter a trance-like state when they enter the supermarket,
seeing nothing but the desired brands. See Pulling Consumers by Design, THE GROCER, Mar. 16, 1996, at
48. As the article explained:
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into action by some sharp change in price, features, or quality,235 the
consumer's rational and conscious mind may simply disengage from the
buying process, and the consumer may fail to recognize potentially competing
substitutes should they become available.
Second, a dominant brand enjoys network effects23e 6 and natural monopoly
characteristics inherent in its popularity. Only the most popular brand of cola
may be available at a restaurant;237 only the most popular game may have a
ready supply of players; only the most popular sports leagues may have a
ready audience around the water-cooler with which to share joys and sorrows
following the weekend's games. Choose a less popular product, and you may
find yourself unable to find the beverage you desire when you go out, or
unable to find others with which to share your chosen pastime. Disutility
results simply from choosing a less popular brand. Similarly, association with
a popular brand may become part of an individual's identity to such an extent
that other brands are simply unacceptable. 23t These types of "popularity
networks" undoubtedly exert a more subtle influence on decisions and conduct
A curious paradox occurs in supermarkets. When consumers enter a place where they must look
in order to buy, they develop a blind eye. Bombarded by thousands of different brands, packs,
colours, graphics, overt and covert marketing messages, shoppers protect themselves with a
personal filter system which we call selective perception. According to each person's criteria,
only certain packs "pop out" from the background noise of too many brands clamouring for
attention.
Id.; see also Sally Williams, Supermarket Shopping, THE INDEPENDENT (London), July 8, 1995, at 12
("Shopping, like any mundane activity, is done on automatic ....").
235 See. e.g., Menzies, supra note 224, at 36 (noting that radical reduction in quality of Schlitz beer
caused it to fall from second best-selling beer to less than 1% of the beer market, from 24 million barrels of
beer in early 1970s to 15 million barrels in 1980).
236 A network effect refers to a case where "the utility that a user derives from consumption of the good
increases with the number of other agents consuming the good." Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network
Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REv. 424,424 (1985); see also Mark A. Lem-
ley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL L. Rsv. 479, 488-95
(1998).
237 If each restaurant serves only one cola, then each must choose between the most popular cola and
some less popular cola. If prices and quality are otherwise the same, a rationale profit-maximizing restau-
ranteur will choose to carry the most popular brand, because that brand is likely to satisfy more of her cus-
tomers than any other choice.
238 See Susan Fournier, Consumers and Their Brands: Developing Relationship Theory in Consumer
Research, 24 J. CONSumE R.s. 343, 348-63 (1998) (exploring the various relationships that can develop
between individuals, their self-identities, and their brand preferences); Roush, supra note 224, at C-1 (noting
that old Coke maintained its market position over Pepsi and new Coke, even though blind taste tests ranked
old Coke third among the three); see also Pollack, supra note 141, at 1397-1422, 1429 ("Theoretically, if
objects and advertising interact as I have described, the self-definition aspects of a product should be pro-
tected from trademark monopoly as functional ....").
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than the network effects associated with telephone networks, but people are
social creatures, and these effects, together with the imprimatur of desirability
often associated with popularity, undoubtedly pressure consumers to conform.
Dominant brands also experience returns to scale and declining costs,
particularly with respect to advertising,29 that can provide significant
advantages over smaller rivals. Taken together, these advantages substantially
insulate dominant brands from competitive pressures, and tend to ensure that
dominant brands remain dominant over time.m
Thus, many consumers will often not switch from the brand they know to
another even if, in a perfect information world, they would recognize the
second product as offering a better price/quality mix. In such cases, products
bearing the appropriate brand will constitute a distinct product market, and
trademark law will enable the mark owner to prohibit a competitor from
offering products bearing that brand and to exclude would-be competitors from
the market. As with any other monopoly, protecting such a market-defining
trademark will enable the trademark owner to charge supracompetitive prices
for her goods and will generate rents for the trademark owner. Such protection
will, in consequence, lead to waste of the sort associated with monopolies
generally. First, the supracompetitive prices and available rents will lead
individuals to expend excessive resources attempting to capture the potential
rents such market power offers.?4 The expensive scrambling that will result as
239 See, e.g., COMANOR & WUnSON, supra note 6, at 217-34; LPmw, supra note 17, at 127-29. With
advertising, these advantages extend both to formal advertising, because of declining costs, and informal,
word-of-mouth advertising, because of a larger consumer base. Moreover, if, as Phillip Nelson has sug-
gested, the primary information that consumers obtain from advertising is "that the brand advertises," Nel-
son, Advertising as Information, supra note 17, at 732, where more extensive advertising is evidence of
product superiority, see iL, then dominant brands necessarily have a distinct advantage over would-be com-
petitors considering entry into a market.
240 Thus, where the Interet was once thought to represent a brave new world for competition, estab-
lished brands are now beginning to replicate their traditional dominance on the Net. See, e.g., Brands Bite
Back, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 21, 1998, at 78-79 (noting that "brands that are already big have an enormous
advantage [on the Internet], particularly among people coming online for the first time who will tend to turn
to names familiar from the real world"). Established brands enjoy this advantage even when their efforts to
transition to the Internet fail to recognize the strengths and weaknesses of the new medium. See id. at 78-81.
("[The Time Warner Internet entry] is a slow, badly designed site. Nevertheless, the power of its brands
[Time, People, and Fortune] attracts customers."). The steady erosion of Apple's market share in the com-
puter market during the 1990s, serves as a useful reminder that the power of a brand does not preclude mar-
ket share erosion when the associated product fails to keep pace, but only serves to slow that erosion. See,
e.g., Peter H. Lewis, Clan Macintosh Feels the Pain, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1998, at G-1 (noting Apple's de-
clining share of the computer market from 11.8% in 1993 to 4.2% in 1997).
241 See generally Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. EcON. J.
224 (1967) (articulating need to recognize resources wasted seeking the rents available from monopolies as
one of the social welfare losses generated by monopoly); Arnold Plant, The Economic Theory Concerning
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each producer seeks a market niche from which she can capture such rents,
will both increase the costs associated with popular branded goods and lead to
excessive product differentiation.242 Moreover, as part of this scramble,
producers will advertise and incur other selling expenditures to shape
consumer wants in ways that can skew consumer preference toward less
desirable products.24 Second, supracompetitive prices will impose deadweight
losses, as some consumers who would have paid a more competitive price will
be unwilling to pay the higher, more monopolistic price for access to the
branded good. In addition, consumer taste and preferences change over time
and satisfying those demands calls for a dynamic process of identifying and
keeping up with changing demands. We should fully expect that a single
producer, facing only indirect or marginal "competition," will have somewhat
less reason and ability to satisfy those demands than a multitude of producers
competing directly against each other.
B. Welfare Benefits of Trademark Protection: The Mark As Source of
Valuable Information
Despite the anticompetitive consequences that flow from trademark
protection, such protection may nevertheless remain justified so long as the
mark improves the flow of otherwise indiscernible information concerning: (1)
the product to consumers, and (2) consumer desires to producers. 244 Where a
Patents for Inventions, 1 ECONOMICA 30 (n.s. 1934) (arguing that the availability of rents from patent pro-
tection may lead to investment of excessive resources seeking the available rents).
242 See, e.g., Treece, Protectability of Product Differentiation, supra note 6, at 1021-22.
243 Economists have taken to pretending that the shifts in demand achieved through selling expenditures
are necessarily efficient. If an advertisement persuades a consumer to pay more for an article or to buy one
article rather than another, the assumption seems to be that the consumer's actual buying decision must nec-
essarily reflect the consumer's preference structure. See, e.g., Nelson, The Economic Consequences of Ad-
vertising, supra note 17, at 213 ("We economists have no theory of taste changes, so this approach leads to
no behavioral predictions."). As discussed supra note 212, this is inaccurate-at best a consumer's pur-
chasing decision reflects her perception of what best satisfies her desires, and this perception may well be
wrong, particularly when shaped by advertising. The assumption remains plausible only because for most
products measuring satisfaction by anything other than actual purchasing decisions is difficult. But where
an objective standard for identifying superior products exists, studies have shown that selling expenditures
can skew demand toward less desirable products. See, e.g., Daniel Q. Haney, Older, Better Heart Drugs
Often Ignored, CHATTANOOGA TIMEs, Mar. 21, 1998, at A5 (noting that extensive advertising and promo-
tional expenditures on newer heart drugs still protected by patent lead to increased usage of such drugs even
though studies had shown that they were less effective than older drugs not so heavily marketed). Similar
effects are likely, but more difficult to quantify, for products whose desirability cannot be as easily measured
by objective standards.
244 Courts and commentators have suggested other rationales for trademark protection, such as encour-
aging higher quality products, allowing a producer to exploit exclusively favorable consumer demand that
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trademark serves as a source of otherwise indiscernible information concerning
a product, protecting the trademark enables consumers to connect their desires
to a specific good on the store shelf.2" Protecting a mark in such cases can
thereby eliminate, for example, the impractical (and unsanitary) need for a
consumer to taste every beverage displayed on the soda aisle to find the taste
that she has been looking for; she need only look at the label. Trademarks can,
thus, reduce the searching costs involved in identifying the desired product.4 6
Moreover, by enabling consumers to connect information to precise product
more accurately, trademarks help consumers express more accurately their
preferences and tastes for the varying mix of product features, quality, and
prices each finds desirable. Trademarks can, therefore, help ensure that the
pricing signals received by producers from the market (or "expressed
demand") more accurately reflect consumers' actual tastes and preferences (or
"actual demand"). By narrowing the gap between expressed and actual
demand, deception-based trademark protection allows producers to recognize,
respond to, and satisfy the actual demand more efficiently,247 at least under
certain assumptions.2
she has developed (sometimes described euphemesticalIy as capturing her goodwill), or providing a quality
guarantee. See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995) (suggesting that one
purpose of trademark law is to help "assure a producer that it (and not an imitating competitor) will reap the
financial, reputation-related rewards associated with a desirable product"); Sidney A. Diamond, The Public
Interest and the Trademark System, 62 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 528, 544 (1980) (suggesting that trademarks are
desirable because they lead to higher quality goods); Klein & Leffler, supra note 17, at 626-27, 629-634
(suggesting that trademarks can serve as a guarantee of quality). But these are effects, not purposes of de-
ception-based trademark protection. To the extent they are desirable, they are adequately captured by a fo-
cus on trademark's informational role. If we go beyond protecting trademarks as an information source, and
attempt to expand trademark to address these effects directly, for example, by protecting a producer's client
base or requiring higher quality, even when consumers are not deceived or prefer a lower quality, we will
find that we have broadened trademark too much with undesirable and anticompetitive consequences. See
infra text accompanying notes 249-63, 296-302.
245 See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 24, at 400-01; Stephen L. Carter, The Trouble with Trademark, 99
YALE L.J. 759 (1990) (describing trademarks as "packets of information").
246 See W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334,338 (7th Cir. 1985). The Seventh Circuit explained:
The purpose [of trademarks] is to reduce the cost of information to consumers by making it easy
for them to identify the products or producers with which they have had either good experiences,
so that they want to keep buying the product (or buying from the producer), or bad experiences,
so that they want to avoid the product or the producer in the future.
Id.; Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 1968) ("Without some method of product identifica-
tion, informed consumer choice, and hence meaningful competition in quality, could not exist."); see also
Stigler, supra note 17, at 220-24 (setting forth notion of consumer search costs and suggesting that adver-
tising can effectively reduce such costs).
247 Without such a means, or even in some cases with such a means, consumers will turn to price as an
indicator of quality. See FFC v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 382 U.S. 46 (1965); see also Pitofsky, supra note
229, at 671. As a higher price becomes associated with increasing quality on its own, such association will
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C. The Competitive Balance
Given the competing concerns discussed above, the question becomes
whether, in any given case,249  the resulting efficiency gains from better
satisfying consumers' actual desires outweighs the anticompetitive con-
sequences of protecting a mark. In considering this balance, we begin with a
simple observation: The surest way to avoid any possible confusion between
brands in a market is to prohibit competition altogether. If there were only one
source for sodas, one source for breakfast cereal, and one source for clothing,
then consumers would invariably purchase such goods from the corresponding
producer. In such a world, confusion over the source of goods would simply
not arise. In that sense, competition itself, by introducing the presence of
multiple sources for any given good or service, creates the potential for
confusion.2 Despite this, no one seriously suggests that we should therefore
eliminate competition altogether. Although such a step would virtually
eliminate consumer confusion, detailed empirical analysis is unnecessary to
conclude that the efficiency losses from prohibiting all competition would far
exceed any conceivable gains from the marginal reduction in confusion that
such a prohibition would achieve.
At the other end of the spectrum, allowing competitors to duplicate any
aspect of another's product, including a feature that plays no role other than
identifying the product's source, would ensure that competitors could produce
generate upward pressure on prices unrelated to higher product costs. See Mary Carter Paint Co., 382 U.S.
at 48-49 (noting that Mary Carter had typically sold its paint "two-for-one," so that it could advertise a
"higher" single can price and thereby suggest that its paint was equivalent to the quality of paints typically
sold in the higher price range); see also Klein & Leffler, supra note 17, at 634-35 (noting the risk that reli-
ance on price as indicator of quality can generate upward pressure on prices, but suggesting that consumers
can rely on price as indicator of quality in some circumstances without generating such upward pressure).
248 For trademarks to serve as an information source that improves market efficiency, we must assume,
at a minimum, that consumers: (1) have or can obtain accurate information concerning product features; (2)
can associate those features with a specific mark; (3) can recall that association; (4) can distinguish the
desired mark from other marks; and (5) that the association remains valid over time. See Nicholas S.
Economides, The Economics of Trademarks, 78 TVRADEMARK REP. 523, 526-31 (1988).
249 Or perhaps more accurately, providing appropriate protection requires a balance for certain readily
identifiable categories of cases, rather than on a case-by-case basis. As in any area of law, a case-by-case
approach would generate both excessive transaction costs and excessive uncertainty.
250 It is not uncommon in trademark surveys conducted for litigation to encounter consumers who re-
spond that they believe that the two products are manufactured by the same company because they believe
that all products of that kind are manufactured by the same entity. See, e.g., Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth
Corp., No. 6:92CV00460, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19198, at *63 n.17 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 13, 1994) ("At least
one response coded as 'same company [because] same name' should not have been: the respondent actually
said she thought the pantyhose were made by the same company 'because I think all pantyhose are made by
the same company."'), rev'd on other grounds, 81 F.3d 455 (4th Cir. 1996).
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an "imitation" indistinguishable from, and therefore perfectly competitive
with, the original. But consumers in the marketplace would face a more
difficult task matching their desires to precise products in the marketplace and
would have to turn to some alternative means for identifying precise products,
such as a personal relationship with the supplier.2' While Professor
Chamberlin has suggested an approach along these lines,sa the plausible
alternatives to trademarks for identifying precise products are likely to prove
both substantially more expensive and substantially less effective for a variety
of consumers goods.23 As with the other extreme, the marginal welfare gains
that would result from rooting out the last vestiges of market power associated
with a minimally-protective trademark regime are far outweighed by the
welfare losses entailed in forcing producers and consumers to abandon
trademarks altogether as an information source. The desirability of providing
at least some trademark protection seems equally clear.
In moving to the question of how much trademark protection is ideal, we
can break down the relevant efficiency considerations for cases between these
two extremes as follows. First, the anticompetitive losses from trademark
protection stem from three factors:
(1) The extent to which the thing claimed as a trademark has value
independent of the information it provides consumers;
2s1 See SIDNEY WEBB & BEATRICE WEBB, INDUSTRIAL DEMOcRACY 683 (1920) (arguing that the
broadening of trademark protection is undesirable because it diminishes the role merchants formerly played
as expert advisers to the consuming public).
252 CHAMBERUtN, supra note 3, at 272-74. Professor Chamberlin explained his approach and the coun-
tervailing arguments as follows:
Let us turn to the consumer. It will be said at once that trademarks are necessary in order to
protect him against deception and fraud. If producers were free to imitate the trade-marks, la-
bels, packages, and products of others, no one would have any incentive to maintain the quality
of his goods, for they would inevitably be imitated by inferior products at lower prices, put up to
look identical.... The law of trade-marks and unfair competition safeguards [the consumer] by
putting a premium on differentiation and protecting the monopolies thereby established. Equally
effective, however, would be a policy of permitting imitation provided only it were perfect, or of
defining standards of quality by law.
Id. at 273. If this approach seems far-fetched, keep in mind that this is essentially the approach we have
adopted for the sale of beef, generic drugs, and a variety of other products.
253 In the 1930s and 1940s, some commentators supported grade marks, that carefully describe exact
quantity and quality, as a superior alternative to trademarks. See, e.g., I LEvmRE S. LYON ET AL.,
GOVERNmENT & ECONOMIC LIr 222-29 (1939); M AaaRETG. REID, CONSUMERS AND THE MARKET 362-78
(1939); Carl A. Auerbach, Quality Standards, Informative Labeling, and Grade Labeling as Guides to Con-
sumerBuying, 14 LAw& CoNTEmp. PROBS. 362 (1949).
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(2) The marginal increase in the risk, expense, and time required for
competitors to develop an alternative that consumers will
recognize and accept as a substitute for the original as a result of
protection; and
(3) The extent to which the imitations become increasingly im-
perfect substitutes for the original as protection increases.
As trademark protection expands in various ways, the efficiency losses that
follow from one or several of these factors are likely to become more
significant. Even where protection does not go so far as to foreclose
competitive entry altogether, protection will necessarily entail some degree of
anticompetitive loss as it will require would-be competitors to undertake
greater effort to work around the protection provided. 4  As protection
expands, this task becomes more difficult, time-consuming, and expensive, and
consumers will likely perceive the offerings as increasingly less perfect
substitutes for the original or known brand. As a result, broader trademark
protection generally means higher prices for consumers and more extensive
anticompetitive losses for society.
On the other side of the coin, the informational advantages associated with
trademark protection also flow from three factors:
(1) The extent to which the thing claimed as a mark conveys other-
wise unavailable information concerning the associated prod-
uct;2
5
(2) The value of the information conveyed in terms of its materiality
to the purchasing decision; and
(3) The availability of, or ability to develop, alternative means for
conveying the information.
On this side, however, expanding trademark protection does not necessari-
ly generate a corresponding marginal increase in efficiency gains. The reason
for this is simple: If consumers already have one trademark available as a
source of information concerning a product, they gain little from having a
second, third, or fourth for the same information. 6 Additional marks largely
254 See Folsom & Teply, supra note 196, at 1334-37, 1345 (noting increasing costs for competitors as
protection expands given the need to develop alternate means of identifying potential substitute as viable
substitute).
255 See. e.g., id. at 1353.
256 A number of courts have pretended that the efficiency advantages from protecting product designs or
features as trademarks are comparable to those associated with protection of word marks. But this is obvi-
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duplicate information already available, and if the information really matters, a
reasonable consumer would both know to rely, and can rely, on the
information source already available.27  The third factor also expressly
recognizes that if we should consider a defendant's ability to develop
alternative designs as a factor that may limit the anticompetitive consequences
of protection, we must also consider a plaintiff's ability to develop alternative
marks as a factor that limits the procompetitive consequences of protecting any
given mark. Moreover, even where expanded protection is tied to an expanded
informational role, not all information has equal value. As discussed, the
efficiency advantages associated with being able to identify any given product
among a shelf full of similar products are clear, but information concerning the
legal permissions or corporate structure involved in the production of a good is
likely to prove of far less value to consumers. As a result, expanded trademark
protection is likely to generate only small marginal increases in the
information-based efficiencies associated with protection when compared to a
minimally-protective regime.
This balance tends to suggest that protection for trademarks serving an im-
portant informational role may well be desirable, but only if narrowly tailored
to avoid imposing any significant costs on the competitive process. Even here,
two caveats are in order. First, even narrow trademark protection may render a
popular brand a distinct product market, economically speaking, and generate
for the brand-owner the downward sloping demand curve of a monopolist.
Nevertheless, so long as the brand loyalty results from the producer's invest-
ment in product features desired given the price charged, which desirability the
mark uniquely serves to identify, we can reasonably conclude that protecting
the mark will, on balance, promote desirable competition, even if it also en-
sures the producer's exclusivity in the branded product market. Second, even
with narrow trademark protection, our conclusion that such protection is desir-
able must be tempered by the recognition that the information a mark conveys
is necessarily limited and often one-sided. While protecting a source of such
imperfect information may have value,2" in some cases, protecting trademarks
ously false. Once a consumer has one method of identifying precise product, such as a word mark, the mar-
ginal efficiency advantages from protecting additional "marks" for the product, whether trade dress, product
features, or product design, are slight and decreasing.
257 Coca-Cola's decision to continue marketing new and old Coke under variations of its Coca-Cola
trademarks provides one indication of the slight differences in marks required for consumers to distinguish
products when they have reason to do so.
258 See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information:
A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 638 (1979).
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will lead to a market share and price equilibrium further from a "perfect infor-
mation" equilibrium than would a refusal to provide trademark protection at
all.259
When we move beyond narrowly tailored protection for marks serving an
important informational role, the competitive balance suggests a different an-
swer, however.m As the value of the information conveyed by a given mark
lessens, consumers will, by definition, rely on other indicators to connect in-
formation to precise product and will therefore have other means to signal pro-
ducers concerning the mix of price, quality, and other unobservable product
features desired. The potential efficiency gains from protecting such a mark
decrease. At the same time, the anticompetitive risks associated with protect-
ing a mark valued for its own sake increase. When a word, or something else
that might serve as a trademark, has value to consumers for its own sake, aside
from its role in connecting information to precise product, protecting the mark
will require others to expend additional resources replicating the mark's at-
traction as product, without imitating the mark too closely. Such protection
will therefore increase the costs and risks associated with introducing a com-
peting product. Such protection will also lessen the extent to which consumers
will consider such "competing" products perfect substitutes for the original,
not merely because the information readily available concerning the products
will differ but because the products themselves will differ. Because protection
renders direct competition both more expensive and more difficult, it will tend
to increase the market power, prices, and rents associated with popular brands.
The inefficiencies associated with such protection will increase correspond-
ingly, as deadweight costs and rent-seeking are directly proportional to the
market power and rents available. When these potential efficiency losses be-
gin to outweigh the potential efficiency gains from providing protection, the
balance suggests that trademark law has reached its appropriate limits.
259 This is most obvious in cases where identical goods are produced and sold under different trade-
marks at different price points. See, e.g., Dateline: C-ing the Difference; Health Benefits of Vitamins, and
Tips on Which Brands to Buy (NBC television broadcast, Mar. 30, 1997) (finding that prices for various
brands of vitamin C varied 30-50% in the marketplace, where, in fact, the vitamin C tablets sold under the
various brandnames were identical and were all made by the same~company at the same factory; only the
labels changed). Here, there is no plausible argument that the trademark serves as "greater assurance that the
good will actually be manufactured to the specifications of the formula." See Landes & Posner, supra note
17, at 275.
260 See also Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for
Trademark Protection, 58 U. Prrr. L. REv. 789, 851-63 (1997) (suggesting a similar competitive balance
and arguing that dilution upsets it).
1999]
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
D. The Competitive Balance and Expanded Trademark Protection
As a general approach to trademark's proper scope, a competitive balance
not only suggests a rationale for and limits to traditional deception-based
trademark protection, but also raises serious questions about the desirability of
expanded trademark protection generally. Even where expanded protection
has some plausible tie to an expanded informational role, such protection, even
if it does not result in market foreclosure, is likely to increase significantly the
time and expense involved in introducing competing products and to increase,
by legal mandate, the differentiation present in the marketplace. Expanded
protection will therefore weaken competition as a force in the marketplace.
Even if the result in any given case is only "a relatively weak monopoly," ''
the marginal value of the information-based efficiencies associated with this
expanded protection is simply too slight to outweigh the anticompetitive po-
tential such protection entails.
Moreover, even if some parts of this expansion could be justified based
upon the efficiencies associated with improved information flow, still we must
acknowledge that much of this expansion has nothing at all to do with
deception-based concerns, but represents an attempt to protect the investment
in creating a desirable product for its own sake. Under trademark's traditional
balance, such property-based protection appears presumptively undesirable. If
the claimed "mark" serves no informational role at all, protection gains us
nothing and undoubtedly imposes some marginal increase in would-be
competitors' costs. Even where the claimed "mark" plays some informational
role, protection remains undesirable unless the marginal efficiencies associated
with this informational role exceed the anticompetitive losses protection would
entail. To the extent consumers value the mark or its appearance on an article
principally for its own sake, rather than for the information it may convey
concerning the quality, source, or other unobservable features of the article, the
anticompetitive consequences of excluding others from the market will
generally outweigh the efficiency gains generated by the mark's informational
role. In such cases, it is almost always easier for the would-be trademark
owner to devise an alternate means of conveying the relevant information than
it is for the would-be competitor to devise an alternate product that
nevertheless duplicates the appeal of the original. And, in many cases,
prohibiting a would-be competitor from introducing a product that incorporates
261 Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632,650 (7th Cir. 1993) (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
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the feature claimed as a trademark would effectively mean that the would-be
competitor cannot introduce a competing product at all.
Obviously, there will be close cases, where a mark has substantial value
both as product and as information source.262 But that does not mean that there
will not also be easy cases, where it is perfectly clear, at least if we are honest
with ourselves, which type of value is at stake. In such a case, where a mark's
value as product outweighs its value as information source, applying
trademark's traditional balance would suggest that extending protection to and
excluding others from using the mark would be undesirable.23 Whatever slight
efficiency gains might be realized from the information conveyed by the mark
would be outweighed by the efficiency losses that excluding others from a
distinct product market would create. Indeed, in such a case, the word,
symbol, or device at issue is not really serving as a trademark at all, but is
simply the product, or a feature of the product, being sold. Consequently,
unless some other efficiency gain can be tied to extending protection in such
cases, protecting marks based on their value independent of their informational
role risks creating monopolies, not merely in the neutral, descriptive sense, but
in the ordinary and pejorative sense of unjustified and inappropriate market
power.
III. PROPERTY-BASED RATIONALES FOR PROPERTY-BASED TRADEMARK
In expanding trademark's protection to encompass a trademark's value as
product, many courts and commentators have frankly acknowledged that
deception-based rationales do not support expanded protection, and have
proffered property-based rationales as an alternative justification for the
expansion.2" Often, these property-based rationales seem to begin with the
sense that the trademark owner is "naturally" entitled to full, complete, and
exclusive control over a mark that she has created.2 s Perhaps recognizing,
262 For an example of a close case, see Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enterprises, In., 644 F.2d 769
(9th Cir. 1981), where a prestigious manufacturer of accessories used a repeated image of its trademark as
the pattern for the fabric covering its goods. Even in these close cases, the very fact that a potential com-
petitor found imitation profitable should be sufficient to establish the property-based nature of the protec-
tion, at least where the goods are otherwise properly labeled.
263 See International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 918-20 (9th Cir.
1980).
264 See supra text accompanying notes 75-82, 103-05, 137-40.
265 See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: Hearing on H.. 1295, Before the Subcomm. on
Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 120-21 (1995)
(statement of Rep. Bono).
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however, that natural rights' day, if it ever was, has passed, few courts will rest
their conclusions on natural rights rhetoric or the simple-minded syllogism of
but-for causation. Moreover, courts have repeatedly emphasized that the mere
expenditure of money to promote and popularize a product, even if the
expenditure is substantial, is not sufficient to establish an individual's
exclusive rights in the product.2" These statements would seem to eliminate a
natural rights basis for property-based trademark protection. Rather than rely
on natural-rights reasoning, proponents of property-based trademark have
therefore turned to arguments that parallel those found in discussions of patent
and copyright, and in the field of property more generally, as to why private
ownership is desirable. These arguments take essentially two tacks. Some
courts have argued that a supposed need for incentives, and the threat that free
riders or other exploiters would present, justifies property-based trademark.
Others have argued for property-based trademark protection on the grounds
that only such protection can ensure assignment of scarce resources to their
highest and best use. As we shall see, these arguments prove ultimately
hollow in the context of trademark protection.
A. Property-Based Rationales I. Incentives, Free Riders, and Trademark
Protection
As their first argument for property-based trademark protection, courts and
commentators have worried that without protection, imitation and free riding
by others will undermine the incentive necessary to ensure sufficient invest-
ment in desirable trademarks. A similar argument has proven popular as a
justification for patent and copyright protectionY7 but for all its popularity,
266 See Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938); Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d
562, 568 (9th Cir. 1968) ("A large expenditure of money does not itself create legally protectable rights.
Appellees are not entitled to monopolize the public's desire for the unpatented product, even though they
themselves created that desire at great effort and expense."); American Safety Table Co. v. Schreiber, 269
F.2d 255, 272 (2d Cir. 1959); Millinery Creators' Guild, Inc. v. FTC, 109 F.2d 175, 177 (2d Cir. 1940)
("[The creator] suffers a real loss when the design is copied as soon as it appears; the imitator in turn reaps a
substantial gain by appropriating for himself the style innovations produced by the creator's investment. Yet
the imitator may copy with impugnity .... "); Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 279-80 (2d
Cir. 1929).
267 Public goods analysis as such began with Professor Samuelson's 1954 article, The Pure Theory of
Public Expenditure. See Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 Rsv. oF ECON. &
STATS. 387 (1954). Although his analysis focused principally on explaining and justifying government ex-
penditure on, and provision, of certain goods, id. at 387-88, in his later articles, Professor Samuelson used
"concerts" as an example of the type of good to which his analysis might apply. See Paul A. Samuelson,
Aspects of Public Expenditure Theories, 40 REv. OF ECON. & STATS. 332 (1958); Paul A. Samuelson, Dia-
grammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditure, 37 REv. OF ECON. & STATS. 350 (1955). Professor
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both the theory and the reality of the free-rider rationale remain poorly under-
stood.
In the traditional analysis, a lighthouse illustrates the problem that free
riders present for the private production of a public good.2 Once built and
placed in service, the lighthouse shines its light and warns of rocks both for
those who contributed to its construction and operation and for those who have
not. Moreover, because of practical considerations-broadly denominated
"transaction costs"-the owner or operator of the lighthouse often has no
effective way of preventing non-paying ships from using the lighthouse as a
navigational aid as they pass by.2" As a consequence, at least some ships are
able to obtain the benefit of the lighthouse without paying for its construction
or upkeep. We can label these non-paying ships "free riders" in the following
precise sense: They are willing to pay for the benefit of the navigational aid, in
that they value the light from the lighthouse at more than their pro rata share of
its construction and operations costs, yet transaction costs allow them to
escape contributing to the lighthouse's expense.2'0 When free riders are
present, producers in the market will receive compensation only from a
fraction of those who receive the benefits of their labor. As a consequence,
free riders will reduce the apparent demand for and the incentive to supply
lighthouses, and will lead to a marginal reduction in lighthouse supply, either
Kenneth J. Arrow first applied a public good analysis directly to intellectual property issues. See Kenneth J.
Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF
INVENTIVE AcnvrrY 609, 617 (1962).
268 See ARMEN A. ALCHIAN & WILLIAM R. ALLEN, UNIVERSITY ECONOMICS: ELEMENTS OF INQUIRY 246
(3d ed. 1972); SAMUEiLSON, supra note 213, at 45 n.1, 158-60. But see 1H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Eco-
nomics, 17 J.L. & ECON. 357 (1974) (noting that private, commercial operation of lighthouses was common
historical practice).
269 In economic parlance, the term "non-excludable" describes goods characterized by an inability to
exclude non-payers. See, e.g., ROBERT HANEY ScoTr & Nic NIGRO, PRINctPLEs OF ECONOMICS 444 (1982).
In his 1954 article, Professor Samuelson used the term "collective consumption goods" as the label for
goods where "each individual's consumption of such a good leads to no substraction from any other individ-
ual's consumption of that good." Samuelson, Pure Theory, supra note 267, at 387. Professor Demsetz sub-
sequently proposed a distinction between "public goods," which are characterized by nonrivalrous con-
sumption and an ability to exclude non-payers from access to the good, and "collective goods," which are
characterized by nonrivalrous consumption and an inability to exclude non-payers. See Harold Demsetz,
The Private Production of Public Goods, 13 LL. & ECON. 293, 295 (1970). The inability to exclude non-
payers was implicit in Professor Samuelson's definition of collective consumption goods. See Samuelson,
Pure Theory, supra note 267, at 387 ("[C]ollective consumption goods [are goods] which all enjoy in com-
mon.").
270 See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Towards a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REv. 347, 348
(1967) (providing parallel definition of externalities: "What converts a harmful or beneficial effect into an
externality is that the cost of bringing the effect to bear on the decisions of one or more of the interacting
persons is too high to make it worthwhile .... ").
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by reducing the number of lighthouses built or by delaying the construction or
reducing the features of any given lighthouse. The traditional analysis equates
such marginal reductions in supply with suboptimal or inefficient activity
levels.2' And on that basis, the traditional analysis concludes that free riders
are undesirable and their presence sufficient to justify government
intervention, at least where the degree of free riding present justifies the likely
administrative costs of intervention.
But the traditional analysis and its resulting conclusion are flawed. Free
riding does not necessarily equate with inefficient activity levels. Underlying
the traditional analysis are two necessary assumptions: first, all markets are
perfectly competitive; and second, all costs and benefits are fully internalized.
Neither assumption is in fact true. Real world markets contain substantial
elements of market power and cost-benefit externalization. When we adjust
our analysis to reflect these realities, we find that free riders are both desirable
and necessary to achieve efficient activity levels in the economy as a whole.
1. A Simple Model Illustrating the Interaction of Free Riding and Market
Power
To illustrate, consider a simple model of a two product world where the
two products have identical supply and demand curves, and a fixed amount of
resources are available for use in the production of the two products. Using
this model, we can work through the effects of free riding and market power
on the efficient allocation of resources within the market as a whole.
Example 1 - Perfect Competition, Perfect Internalization: To begin, we
start with the assumptions that: (1) both goods are produced within perfectly
competitive markets; and (2) the costs and benefits associated with the goods
are fully internalized. Under these assumptions, resources will flow into the
two activities until all available resources are consumed and will reach equilib-
rium at the point where price, marginal cost, and marginal utility from a given
unit of production are all equal for each good.2n Because we have assumed
identical demand and supply curves for our two goods, production of any
given unit of either good imposes identical costs and generates identical value.
As a consequence, resources will be allocated evenly between the production
of the two goods, until they are all consumed. In more practical terms, half of
271 See, e.g., SAMumsoN, supra note 213, at 465-66; Thomas E. Borcherding, Competition, Exclusion
and the Optimal Supply of Public Goods, 21 J.L. & ECON. 111 (1978).
272 See, e.g., JOAN ROBINSON, THE EcONOMIcS OWhvamuFT CoMwTrmoN 95, 317 (1933).
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the available resources will go into the production of Good A and half will go
into the'production of Good B. Such an equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 1.





Qi Quantity Qi Quantity
Under these assumptions, the allocation of resources between the two ac-
tivities and the activity levels in each market reflect the theoretical optimum
posited by the perfect competition model, where the market price for every
commodity equals its marginal cost and its marginal utility.23 With this opti-
mum as a basis for comparison, we can now relax our assumptions concerning
perfect competition and full internalization as a way of exploring the effects of
free riders and monopolization on activity levels.
Example 2 - Perfect Competition, Good A Free Riding: As a first step, as-
sume that there is some degree of free riding present in the consumption of
Good A. While the "actual" demand for Good A remains constant, the paying
or "revealed" demand for the good will fall because some part of the actual
demand will be satisfied by free riding. Producers in the market will not re-
ceive compensation for the free-rider portion of the actual demand and to the
273 See, e.g., id.
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extent they are rational, profit-making entities, they will respond only to the
revealed demand curve in making production decisions. As the degree of free
riding increases, an increasing part of the actual demand will be satisfied by
free riding and, as a result, the separation between the actual and revealed de-
mand curves will increase.2 4 If we assume a given level of free riding and
distribute available resources fully between the production of Good A and
Good B, under conditions of perfect competition, i.e., such that price (under
the revealed demand curve for Good A) equals marginal cost, society's re-
sources will be allocated unevenly between the production of the two goods.
Because the presence of free riders conceals, in a sense, a part of the actual
demand for and social value of Good A, the production of Good A appears less
valuable and less profitable than the production of Good B. As a result, the
market will allocate somewhat less of society's resources to the production of
Good A, and somewhat more to the production of Good B, than was the case
in our first example. The resulting equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Production under conditions of perfect competition and
free riding in the consumption of Good A.
GoodA Good B
,.- -."AcuaC Demand
Pi Revealed Demand Pi
P P
Q Qi Quantity Qi Q Quantity
274 If very little free riding is present, the revealed demand curve will fall only slightly to the left of the
actual demand curve. If a great deal of free riding is present, the revealed demand curve will fall substan-
tially to the left.
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If we compare the activity levels in Figure 2 with those in Figure 1, where
Q represents activity levels with free-riders and Qi represents the ideal activity
levels found in Example 1, we find that production of Good A is somewhat
lower and production of Good B somewhat higher than was the case in our
first example. To the extent the activity levels in our first example were opti-
mal, we can label the reduced production of Good A "suboptimal" or
"inefficient" in the following sense: Marginal resources continue to flow into
the production of Good B beyond the point at which society would have more
highly valued their use in the production of Good A.2 s One way to remedy
this inefficiency would be to eliminate, through government intervention or
private action, the free riders. Eliminating the free riders would cause produc-
ers of Good A to perceive and respond to the actual demand curve for Good A,
and would restore the optimal equilibrium achieved in our first example.
This example suggests that the presence of free riders can lead to
inefficient activity levels and waste2 6 To the extent its assumptions accurately
represent real-world markets, it provides a basis for concluding that free riding
may justify government intervention, where transaction costs prevent a private
law, negotiated solution and where the degree of free riding present justifies
the resulting administrative costs.
So far this tends to confirm the traditional analysis. This is not the end of
the story, however. To reach this point, the traditional analysis and its result-
ing conclusion have necessarily assumed perfect competition in all markets
and perfect internalization in all markets except for the one under considera-
tion. To the extent these assumptions are inaccurate, the traditional analysis
and its resulting conclusion must also be inaccurate. When we relax these as-
sumptions to examine the effects of free riding under more realistic assump-
tions concerning market conditions, we find that free riding may prove both
necessary and desirable to achieve an efficient allocation of resources, as the
following examples illustrate.
275 For similar definitions of allocative efficiency, see SuBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND
COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG. (prepared by Fritz Machlup); Lunney,
supra note 19, at 489, 598; and Robert M. Hurt & Robert M. Schuchman, The Economic Rationale of Copy-
right, 56 AM. ECON. REv. 421,429-30 (1966).
276 The additional resources unused in the production of Good A because of the presence of free riders
do not go unused in the market as a whole, but they shift to the production of Good B. Nevertheless, this
constitutes waste or inefficiency because society apparently values the additional units of Good A that would
have been produced more than the value of the additional units of Good B that were produced, but for the
presence of the free riders.
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Example 3 - Perfect Competion, Free Riding on Both Goods: In Example
2, we assumed that free riding was present only with respect to the consump-
tion of Good A, but that is unlikely to be true in the real world. In real-world
markets, free riding and other positive or negative externalities are ubiqui-
to us ,2" and we should account for this in our model. To explore this, we will
assume that Good B also experiences free riding in its consumption and, for
the sake of convenience, will assume that Good B experiences a level of free
riding similar to Good A. Again, we can illustrate the effects of such free rid-
ing on the markets for the two goods by creating a revealed demand curve for
each good. As above, free riding will satisfy a part of the the actual demand
for each good and thereby reduce the revealed demand for each good. The re-
vealed demand curve will fall below the actual demand curve, and the separa-
tion between actual and revealed demand curve will represent the degree of
free riding present in the two markets. As before, producers will make pro-
duction decisions and set their activity levels with respect to production of
Good A and Good B according to the revealed demand curves for each good.
In this case, however, because Good A and Good B experience similar degrees
of free riding, the revealed demand curves make the production of the two
goods appear equally valuable, both privately and socially, relative to one an-
other. As a consequence, if we divide society's resources between these two
activities, until all available resources are consumed and revealed price equals
marginal cost, the available resources will be allocated evenly between the two
goods, as shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3. Production under perfect competition and free riding in the
consumption of both goods.
Good A Good B
U U
"-~. Actua Demand Actual Demand
Pi "- Revealed Demand Pi ed Demand
Q QP
QIQi Quantity QIQi Quantity
277 See infra text accompanying notes 285-87.
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As Figure 3 suggests, where Good A and Good B experience similar de-
grees of free riding, the activity levels for each good, or Q, are identical to
those that would be found in the optimal case, Qi. Because both goods experi-
ence similar degrees of free riding, they appear, as they are, equally valuable
and available resources are divided equally between them, as they should be.
As in our first example, half of the available resources go to the production of
Good A and half to Good B. The market is, therefore, allocating available re-
sources efficiently.2 t
If we followed the traditional analysis, however, and focused solely on the
free riding present with respect to the consumption of Good A, the traditional
analysis would suggest that we should take steps to eliminate the free riding
and would further suggest that doing so would improve the efficiency of the
market. Yet, if we did so, without simultaneously correcting the free-rider
situation for Good B,2" activity levels for Good B would remain dictated by its
revealed demand curve, while activity levels for Good A would now follow
the actual demand curve for Good A. Such "partial internalization" would
generate a misleading impression in the marketplace by falsely suggesting that
the production of Good A was more valuable than the production of Good B.
As a result, taking action to correct the Good A free-rider situation would lead
more resources into the production of Good A and fewer resources into the
production of Good B. Government action to correct the Good A free-rider
situation would generate precisely the sort of inefficiency we were trying to
prevent. Resources would continue to flow into the production of Good A be-
yond the point at which they would otherwise have been more valuably used to
produce Good B.2 °
278 While production levels are identical in Figure 3 to those found in Figure 1, some might point to the
lower prices found in Figure 3 (P) compared to the ideal prices (Pi) as evidence of inefficiency or perhaps of
labor exploitation. However, there is nothing to substantiate such a suggestion. While the lower market
prices for the goods may suggest lower wages for labor or other inputs, the buying power of the wage
remains the same because any reduction in labor or other input price is exactly offset by the lower market
price for the finished goods.
279 Such partial internalization might result for any number of reasons. Most importantly, Congress is
likely to respond to internalize an externality when the cost of the externality falls on a concentrated interest
group, such as authors and publishers or the owners of popular trademarks, and the benefits fail on a dis-
persed group, such as the public generally. In such a case, the disproportionate lobbying advantages of the
concentrated group make government action to internalize the externality likely, even when it is objectively
undesirable. On the other hand, if the benefit of an externality falls on a concentrated group and its cost on a
dispersed group, the government is less likely to act to internalize fully the externality, as in the case of pol-
lution by the coal industry of the Northeast.
280 Some might argue that the appropriate course is for the government to act to address both free-rider
situations. But this is incorrect. Because resources were optimally allocated before government interven-
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From this example, we can derive the first principle limiting application of
the traditional analysis: Relative externality. To the extent that free riding ex-
ists in one sector of the economy, the presence of free riding in other sectors is
essential to achieve an efficient allocation of resources in the market generally.
Where free riding exists in several sectors of the economy, eliminating free
riding from one sector may reduce the efficiency of the market as a whole.
Example 4 - Good A Produced Under Monopoly Conditions with Free
Riding: To reach the conclusion that free riding was undesirable in Example 2,
we also assumed that the goods were produced within perfectly competitive
markets. But perfectly competitive markets, like full cost/benefit internaliza-
tion, are rare outside of economic theory.2" Our model should therefore ac-
count for how the presence of market power affects the analysis. To explore
this, we will focus on the production of Good A and assume that the produc-
tion of Good A occurs under conditions of monopoly, rather than perfect com-
petition. In contrast to our previous three examples, production of Good A
will no longer fall at the point where marginal cost equals price. Rather, the
producer of Good A will, following the typical principles for a monopolist,
maximize her profit by setting an output lower, and a price level higher, than
was the case under perfect competition, as illustrated in Figure 4.1.
tion, intervention cannot improve the allocation of resources. All intervention would accomplish in Exam-
pie 3 is an additional expenditure of the resources required to administrate the internalization mechanism.
Such a result also applies to free-rider situations more generally. For example, assume that a coastline has
six harbors, that each harbor requires a lighthouse, and that each harbor receives an equal share of the ship-
ping traffic. In such a case, we can allow each harbor to charge a lighthouse fee only for that shipping that
visits the harbor, allowing ships that do not stop in a given harbor to free ride on that harbor's lighthouse, or
we can establish a uniform lighthouse tax for the harbors as a group and then divvy up the resulting-revenues
among the six harbors. Under these assumptions, there is no reason to believe that the second system will
prove more efficient, either at ensuring an optimal supply of lighthouses or otherwise. (A formal proof of
this proposition is beyond the scope of this paper, but such proof would merely show that there is a given
sum of money that the shipping industry is willing to pay for these lighthouses and given the equal levels of
shipping at each port, it is irrelevant to the funding of the lighthouses whether each harbor receives one-sixth
of the available lighthouse funds from a levy for ships that dock in that harbor or as its share of the general
lighthouse fund.) Indeed, the second system may prove less efficient, as the central collection of the light-
house fees provides a pool of money at greater risk of being distributed on a patronage and pork basis rather
than legitimate need. We might identify this sort of efficient free riding, reciprocal free riding, as it suggests
a corollary limiting principle.
281 See, e.g., SCHMER, supra note 5, at 10; see also supra note 208.
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Figure 4.1 Good A Production: Perfect competition and monopoly




Thus, quantity under monopoly conditions, or Qm, is less than quantity un-
der conditions of perfect competition, or Qi, and price under monopoly condi-
tions, or Pm, is higher than price under conditions of perfect competition, or
Pi. This result is unsurprising as it merely confirms the traditional analysis of
monopoly. If we continue the analysis, however, by assuming that free riding
exists -with respect to the consumption of Good A, we find a somewhat sur-
prising result. When Good A's production takes place under conditions of
monopoly, the presence of free riders will reduce the price for, and increase the
supply of, Good A in the market. As free riding increases, it will tend to drive
the Good A price, or Pf, towards the theoretical optimum identified in Exam-
ple 1, as illustrated in Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2 Good A Production: Perfect competition and monopoly





Moreover, while free riding under these conditions also appears to reduce
Good A production levels, as the shift from Qm to Qf on Figure 4.2 suggests,
Qf reflects only paid-for production and does not include that portion of the
demand satisfied by free riding. When we account for that portion of the de-
mand for Good A satisfied through free riding, we find that total Good A pro-
duction levels, or Qt, defined as paying production plus free-rider
"production," more closely approach the perfect competition ideal, as illus-
trated in Figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3 Production of Good A: Perfect competition and monop-




Qm Qt Qi Quantity
This example suggests that free riding can counterbalance the inefficiency
that market power otherwise generates. Where market power tends to restrict
output and increase prices, free riding tends to increase output and reduce
prices. 2  If we nevertheless followed the traditional analysis and attempted to
eliminate the Good A free riding, we would eliminate this important counter-
balance and thereby increase the degree of allocative inefficiency present in
the market as a whole.
282 To determine the effect of such free riding on the allocation of resources to Good B, we must first
distinguish between cases of true free riding, where the free rider obtains the benefit of the activity at no
additional cost to society, and imitative or competitive free riding, where another producer satisfies part of
the demand for a good by imitating a successful product. With competitive free riding, satisfying the "free-
rider demand," defined as the difference between the actual and revealed demand curves, will require the
expenditure of resources in order to create the competing products. While an imitator might require some-
what fewer resources to satisfy any given demand than the originator, competing free riders will use, at least,
some resources to satisfy the free-rider demand and will therefore reduce by a like amount the resources
available for production of Good B. As a result, competitive free riding will not only tend to bring Good A
production and price levels closer to the theoretical optimum from Example 1, but will also tend to bring
Good B production and price levels closer to optimum, as well.
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From this example, we can derive a second principle limiting application of
the traditional analysis: competitive free riding. To the extent that there is
some degree of market power present in a market, some degree of free riding is
essential to achieve a more efficient allocation of resources.
Example 5 - Innovation & Incentives: As a corollary to the conclusion
that free riders necessarily lead to inefficient activity levels, the traditional
analysis also suggests that the presence of free riders will reduce the incentive
to invest in creative and innovative products to a level where too little innova-
tion occurs. Yet, like the principal conclusion of the traditional analysis, this
corollary is also flawed and for similar reasons.
To examine this, consider the competitive market structure for a new prod-
uct over time. When first introduced, the new product is likely to have some
distinct attraction or appeal over preexisting products. If the new product is
successful, our innovator will likely face a downward sloping demand curve
for her product, at least initially, and will be able to charge a price for her new
product in excess of marginal cost. She will earn "rents" on her new product
when first introduced. When competitors learn of these rents, they will likely
seek to imitate the original in an attempt to capture some part of the available
rents for themselves. But this process will require time both to identify those
successful products where imitation will prove profitable and to introduce the
competing imitation into the market. Nevertheless, competitors will, over
time, gradually begin to introduce products that duplicate the precise appeal of
our innovator's. Our innovator will, as a consequence, face an increasingly
competitive market for her good. Even after competitive entry has occurred,
our innovator may retain some market power."' But competition from the
newly available substitutes will almost certainly reduce, compared to the lead-
time period, our innovator's market power and profit-maximizing price for her
product.
In the context of this dynamic market structure, the incentive to innovate
comes from the rents that the innovator can earn during the lead-time and post-
entry period. While sometimes discounted, the advantages available from the
lead-time period can prove substantial. In any number of markets, innovators
have built first mover advantages into a near-permanent market share domi-
283 During the lead-time period, the innovator will have an opportunity to develop a reputation and cul-
tivate a loyal consumer base that can insulate her from competition to some extent in the post-entry period.




nance of the resulting industry.2" A legal prohibition on imitation can increase
these advantages, and the rents associated with innovation. Such a prohibition
serves both to delay competitive entry until someone happens to stumble upon
or re-create the appeal of the innovator's product without copying, and to in-
crease the expense of creating a competing product. But the fact that prohib-
iting imitation can increase the incentive to innovate does not establish the de-
sirability of such a prohibition.
First, such protection would increase the monopoly costs associated with
innovation. For reasons similar to those explored in Example 4, imitation, and
competitive free riding more generally, is affirmatively desirable to counter-
balance the inefficiencies associated with the more extensive lead-time mo-
nopoly that broader protection would bring. Competition would become a
weak and sporadic force if we were to rely on coincidence and happenstance
alone to create it. For this reason, the notion that an individual is entitled to
perpetual exclusivity in a market that she has created is simply foreign to our
law.
. Second, once we have decided that we are-going to allow some imitation in
order to ensure competition, allowing competitors to imitate a new product in
any given market does not necessarily lead to inefficient incentive levels for
reasons similar to those explored in Example 3. As in Example 3, the analysis
should focus on the relative extent of the copying advantages and resulting in-
centives available. That competitors can save some expense over an innovator
by copying becomes an efficiency problem only when the copying advantage
available for a given innovative product substantially exceeds that available
generally in the economy. Unless a competitor can copy a given innovative
product or product type much more quickly, more easily, and more exactly,
than the typical innovative product, then the ordinary operation of the market,
including the first mover advantages available, will ensure an appropriate in-
centive for innovation.
Third, as we saw in Example 3 with partial internalization, prohibiting
imitative free riding in one sector of the economy, when imitation remains
permissible in other sectors of the economy, will generate an excessive incen-
tive in the protected market sector. Such a prohibition would not only generate
284 Examples abound, ranging from Coca-Cola to Listerine to Reynolds Wrap. Bayer only recently lost
its position as market leader for aspirin, nearly a century after Bayer first introduced the product. See, e.g.,
Move by McNeil May Intensify Competition in Internal Analgesics, CHAIN DRUG REv., Aug. 11, 1997, at 11
(chart showing that Excedrin's dollar value of sales exceeded Bayer's sales).
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a windfall for producers and impose deadweight costs on consumers. without
countervailing public benefit, but also would lead individuals to devote addi-
tional marginal resources to the protected market activity when those resources
would otherwise have been more valuably used elsewhere in the economy.
Thus, when applied to a dynamic model of innovation, the two principles
of relative free riding and competitive free riding suggest a third, corollary
principle: sufficient incentive. So long as the copying advantages available to
competitors are not excessive, imitation, even if it deserves the label "free
riding," will not lead to suboptimal levels of innovation. Rather, imitation will
tend to promote the efficiency of the market as a whole, by reducing the
monopoly costs otherwise present for innovative goods, while ensuring that
the innovator nevertheless retains a reasonable opportunity to recover an
appropriate return on her effort.
2. Sensible Rules for A Second-Best World
This two-product model and associated analysis suggest that the policy im-
plications of free riding in the real world are far less clear than the traditional
analysis suggests. At the very least, we must acknowledge that free riding
alone does not establish market failure, nor does it suffice to justify govern-
ment intervention. This is true even where the degree of free riding present
would otherwise appear to justify the administrative costs of intervention.
Based upon the model, we can go further than this and identify several princi-
ples for defining the relationship between free riding and justified government
intervention. First, free riding can justify government action only where the
degree of free riding present in a given market substantially exceeds the degree
of free riding present in the marketplace generally. Second, in such a case, any
action taken to address the free-rider problem should not attempt to eliminate
the free riding altogether, but should seek only to reduce it to the level gener-
ally present in other sectors of the economy. Third, even where an unusually
high degree of free riding is present in a market, government intervention will
remain unjustified if the free riding is serving to counterbalance market power
otherwise present.
To apply these principles requires some empirical sense for the degree of
free riding and market power that are present generally in real-world markets.
Even a cursory glance reveals that both are exceedingly common in the real
world. The intellectual property system itself, for example, leaves consider-
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able room for free riding.a We can find such room in the express refusal to
protect some types of information, such as industrial design, unauthored facts,
and new, but obvious inventions. We can find such room in the limitations we
place on the protection available, such as the limited times of patent and
copyright protection, and the refusal to bar non-equivalent imitations of a
patented invention and the taking of ideas from a copyrighted work. We even
find room for free riding in Justice Pitney's Lochner-era paean to property
rights, International News Service v. Associated Press, in his express recogni-
tion that a competitor may lawfully use another's work as a "tip" to guide and
direct the competitor's newsgathering efforts.2 As a result of these and other
factors, considerable free riding occurs. Although the empirical evidence is
sparse, it suggests that the cost to develop and introduce a product for an
imitator is about sixty-five percent of the innovator's costs even with the
availability of patent and copyright protection.m The presence of such
extensive free riding does not, under the guidelines we have developed,
suggest that too little legal protection presently exists and that more is
required. Rather, that this degree of free riding exists generally in the market
suggests that property-based trademark can be justified only to the extent that
it protects subject matter which, as a class, is subject to a degree of free riding
substantially in excess of this threshold.
Similarly, we have already discussed how traditional deception-based
trademark protection can serve as a tool for establishing and preserving market
power and much of this analysis carries over to property-based trademark pro-
tection. Property-based protection goes further than deception-based protec-
tion, however, and expressly prohibits imitation as imitation, not just imitation
as misrepresentation. By doing so, property-based trademark poses a more se-
rious threat to competition. To the extent that devising an alternate means of
285 See James Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens, Blackmait and Insider
Trading, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1413 (1992) (suggesting that law must generally divide information into public
and private).
286 See International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 243-44 (1918). During his ten years
on the Court, Justice Pitney also authored Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915), one of the pillars of the
Court's Lochner jurisprudence.
2n See EDWIN MANSFIELD Er AL.. TECHNOLo Y TRANSFER, PRODUCTIVrrY, AND ECONOMIC POUCY
132-53 (1982) (summarizing empirical investigation of imitator's cost advantage); Edwin Mansfield et al.,
Imitation Costs and Patents: An Empirical Study, 91 ECON. J. 907, 909 (1981) (noting average ratio of
imitiation cost to innovation cost of "about 0.65" in various industries where products receive patent protec-
tion); see also Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocop-
ies, and ComputerPrograms, 84 HAiV. L. REV. 281,293-302 (1970) (detailing imitator's cost advantage for
creative efforts protected by copyright); Lunney, supra note 19, at 606-28 (exploring imitator's cost advan-
tage for creative efforts protected by copyright).
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conveying information that identifies a product as an acceptable substitute re-
quires less time and expense than devising an alternate product that consumers
will accept as a substitute, property-based trademark is likely to have a more
substantial anticompetitive impact than deception-based trademark.
3. Applying the Derived Rules to Evaluate Property-Based Trademark
Having identified the relevant principles, application of them reveals that
the free-rider rationale cannot support property-based trademark. Although
free riding may occur in two situations that property-based trademark could
address, the degree of free riding present is not excessive and will likely prove
affirmatively desirable to counterbalance market power otherwise present.
Protection against such free riding is therefore not warranted and is indeed
undesirable. Moreover, even if such protection were desirable, the
prerequisites for, and scope of, trademark protection are inherently unsuited to
identifying and addressing cases where the free riding inefficiencies present
would justify protection.28
In the first free-rider situation that property-based trademark might address,
an individual begins marketing an innovative good. The product may repre-
sent only a slight variation from existing products or services or it may repre-
sent a more substantial innovation, but in either case, there was some effort
and expense involved in coming up with the new good and in bringing it to
market. If, for some reason, neither patent nor copyright protection was avail-
able for the innovative aspect of the good, competitors would, absent some
other protection, be able to copy the advance and enter the market with a com-
peting product at a somewhat lower cost than our innovator. To the extent that
consumers desire the innovative feature, competitors would likely engage in
such "free riding.''289 Property-based trademark can prevent this, by pretending
that the innovative aspect is serving as a trademark and protecting it directly
against imitation or by leaving open that possibility and thereby heightening
the prospect of litigation against those who would otherwise consider imitating
the innovation.
Yet, in cases where courts have extended such trademark protection, there
is neither evidence nor reason to believe that the copying advantage available
288 See Dreyfuss, supra note 24, at 399,409 (noting parallel flaws in the patent/copyright analogy).
289 As I have explained elsewhere, because the competitor typically pays for at least one unit of the
original, the label "free" riding is literally inaccurate with respect to copying competitors. See Lunney, su-
pra note 19, at 581 n.353.
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substantially exceeds that which we tolerate generally in the market. The abil-
ity to see that an innovator's "igloo-shaped" doghouse, upscale, drive-through
Mexican restaurant, or golf-course hole design has proven popular, may pro-
vide some information concerning potentially profitable markets for entry, but
does not save the competitor much when it comes to producing a competing
product. It is not as if the would-be competitor can simply place the doghouse,
restaurant, or golf course on a mechanical copying device, and run off "copies"
at a fraction of the original's price.
More generally, patent and copyright already substantially address the
circumstances where a disproportionate copying advantage will likely arise.
Undoubtedly, these statutes, like any other, are somewhat over- and under-
inclusive, and it is certainly possible that they may leave unprotected some
identifiable class of innovative goods where disproportionate copying
advantages exist. Yet, given the political dynamic involved, Congress is far
more likely to over-protect innovative goods than under-protect9' making it
very unlikely that any significant, deserving class of innovative goods remains
unprotected.29'
In any event, even if there were some class of identifiable innovative goods
that remains under-protected, trademark protection is inherently ill-suited to
address that need. Aside from the jurisprudential concerns that would arise
from a court-driven attempt to expand trademark law to fill that gap,29 the
290 See John Kay, The Economics ofintellectual Property Rights, 13 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 337, 347
(1993); Lunney, supra note 19, at 629 n.476; Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94
MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1244-46 (1996). The drafters of the Constitution recognized this tendency and at-
tempted to address it by drafting the patent and copyright clause of Article I as much as a limitation on, as a
grant of, congressional power to enact such statutes. See Trade-mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) (striking
down the Trademark Act of 1870 on the grounds that trademarks did not satisfy the constitutional limitations
embodied in the patent and copyright clause).
291 Industrial design represents the most plausible instance of an innovative good left under-protected by
patent and copyright protection, but Congress has repeatedly rebuffed pleas for additional protection specifi-
cally tailored to such goods. See Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985)
(noting Congress's refusal to adopt copyright protection for industrial design); The Industrial Innovation
and Technology Act: Hearings on S. 791 Before the Subconm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 213 (1987) (statement of Ralph Oman, Register of Copy-
rights); J.H. Reichman, Design Legislation and the Legislative Agenda, 55 LAW & CONTEM . PRoBs. 281
(1992) (discussing Congress's refusal to enact design legislation). Again, given the political dynamic in-
volved, Congress's refusal to provide such protection is a virtually conclusive indication that such protection
is undesirable.
292 See International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215,262 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)




central prerequisite for trademark protection, distinctiveness, is incapable of
distinguishing between those cases where the copying advantage becomes
disproportionate and justifies protection and those where it does not.
Distinctiveness focuses on whether consumers recognize a feature as an
identifier of the good's manufacturer, not on whether the feature is one the
copying of which enables a competitor to obtain a disproportionate advantage.
As a result, even if there were an under-protected class of innovative goods,
using property-based trademark to fill this gap in protection would result in
protection radically over- and under-inclusive. Extensive property-based
trademark protection might, on occasion, extend protection to an otherwise
under-protected innovation, in cases where distinctiveness and disproportion-
ate copying advantage happen to coincide. But because distinctiveness and
undue copying advantage focus on entirely different issues, there is little
reason to believe that such coincidences will prove common. Property-based
trademark is therefore an exceedingly poor tool for identifying innovative
goods left under-protected by patent and copyright, even if we assume that a
class of such goods exists.
Further, even if an under-protected class of innovative goods exists and
even if property-based trademark protection could adequately identify and
extend protection only to this under-protected class of goods, the resulting
protection trademark law would provide is not tailored to providing an
appropriate incentive level. As discussed, even where excessive free riding
exists, appropriate protection should reduce, but not eliminate, the free-riding
advantage available. Unlike patent and copyright law, however, trademark
protection is neither necessarily limited in duration, nor does its infringement
standard incorporate the allowance for free riding found in patent's and
copyright's infringement standards.2 3 Rather than allow an appropriate degree
of free riding, attempting to use trademark protection to address this assumed
gap would tend to prohibit free riding altogether, given the susbtantial
differences between an innovator's and a would-be competitor's goods that
trademark's infringement standard would typically require.2 As a result, even
293 See Jeffrey Milstein, Inc. v. Greger, Lawlor, Roth, Inc., 58 F.3d 27, 31-33 (2d Cir. 1995) (attempting
to narrow the permissible scope of trademark protection in ways corresponding to the limitations in patent
and copyright protection).
294 For example, if the Court had not stepped in, the trial and appeals courts' decisions to find unfair
competition when Sears marketed a look-alike pole lamp would preclude anyone from marketing a lamp too
similar in appearance to Stiffel's pole lamp. While there are certainly other lamp designs available, a prohi-
bition on lamps that look too much like a pole lamp might well prohibit others from manufacturing lamps
that consumers would consider acceptable as a near-perfect or reasonable substitute for the pole lamp. In
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if there were a deserving class of goods that property-based trademark could
distinguish and protect, property-based trademark would almost certainly
substantially over-protect this class of goods. Over-protection would in turn
lead to undue deadweight costs and to excessive investment in the protected
class. For these reasons, the possibility that copyright and patent have left
unaddressed some instance of disproportionate free riding does not justify
crafting a property-based trademark regime to fill this supposed gap.
In the second situation where property-based trademark might address a
potential free-rider issue, an individual has been marketing a product for some
time and has thereby developed recognition and perhaps fame for the trade-
mark associated with the product. The individual then seeks to exploit,
through merchandising or other methods, the value of the trademark as product
that has also thereby developed. Here, the argument is that the individual has
created the trademark's value as product and should therefore be able to ex-
ploit exclusively this value. In economic terms, a proponent of such protection
might identify the trademark use and the product use of the mark as joint
goods similar to those that arise from raising cattle.295 Like the hide and other
byproducts obtained when raising cattle for beef, the product use of the mark is
a byproduct of the trademark use and ought to belong to the trademark owner,
just as the whole cow belongs to the rancher, or so the argument would go.
This implicit appeal to adopt a treatment for trademarks similar to the one
we have for cattle, holds a dangerous, if superficial, attraction, but has little
substantive merit, as both economists and courts have recognized. 296 The
consequence, if the finding of unfair competition had not been overturned, consumers desiring a pole lamp
would have had to turn to Stiffel as the only source for such lamps.
295 See JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE DEMAND AND SUPPLY OF PUBLtc GOODS (1968); Demsetz, supra note
269, at 293, 304-06. Demsetz argues:
The allocation of resources to the production of public goods can be understood with the aid of
the model formulated long ago by Alfred Marshall for the analysis of joint supply. Just as the
slaughtering of steer provides goods to both leather users and meat consumers, so the production
of a public good, by definition, yields benefits that can be enjoyed by more one individual....
Id. at 304-06.
296 See National Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 853-55 (2d Cir. 1997) (refusing to
extend exclusive ownership rights to noncompeting uses under misappropriation doctrine); United States
Golf Ass'n v. St. Andrews Sys., 749 F.2d 1028, 1037-41 (3d Cir. 1984) (same); National Football League v.
Governor of Del., 435 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Del. 1977); Paul A. Samuelson, Contrast Between Welfare Condi-
tions for Joint Supply and for Public Goods, 51 REv. EcON. & STAT. 26, 26, 30 (1969) ("In this sense I find
it misleading to characterize the public case as a case of joint supply."). But see Board of Trade v. Dow
Jones & Co., 456 N.E.2d 84, 91 (111. 1983) (finding that plaintiff had the right, under unfair competition law,
to extend exclusive control over the trademark Dow Jones Industrial Average and portfolio of stocks from
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central difference is that, with cattle, no one has the exclusive right to raise
cattle and cattle-raising is, in fact, one of the more competitive markets in our
economy.2 Moreover, whether we assign ownership of any given cattle hide
to one person or another, or to no one at all, does not ipso facto increase the
supply of hides, nor is it likely to affect their market price.2 In contrast,
trademark law does limit the right of others to use an individual's trademark,
and by doing so, can exclude others from producing a mark that consumers
consider a market-defining feature. As a result, a decision to assign ownership
of the mark as product to no one at all can increase the supply of, and reduce
the price for, the mark as product. If, for example, we assign ownership of the
DALLAS COWBOYS mark as product to one entity, then that entity will, like
any profit-maximizing monopolist, reduce the output and raise the price of
DALLAS COWBOYS merchandise.29 If, on the other hand, we allow anyone
to make such use, that decision will ensure competition in the supply of such
merchandise, and we should expect both increased output and lower prices.
Moreover, so long as the various producers have some other way to identify
their particular DALLAS COWBOYS merchandise to consumers, consumers
will be able to identify the precise product, product quality, and product price
they desire. There is, therefore, little reason to believe that allowing anyone to
produce such merchandise would necessarily lead to a race-to-the-bottom in
the quality of such merchandise.o
As a variation on this argument, some would point out that assigning the
exclusive right to the mark as product to the trademark owner may lead the
owner to reinvest some of the rents thereby earned back into the good
underlying the trademark. Such an assignment may lead to increased quality
in the underlying good. This may be true, but cannot justify protection. As
which it is calculated, to noncompeting use for commodity futures contracts because plaintiff created un-
derlying good).
297 See SAMUELSON, supra note 213, at 43 (noting that "imperfect competition" is the rule, "except pos-
sibly [for] the millions of farmers who individually produce a negligible fraction of the total crop"); Scorr
& NIGRO, supra note 269, at 178-79 ("Perfect competition does not exist in the real world, although several
major industries approximate it surprisingly well. Among them are farming .....
298 At least so long as we do not assign ownership of all hides to one entity.
299 Almost by definition, property-based trademark protection only comes into play when the mark de-
fines a distinct product market. If the trademark owner was not earning supracompetitive profits (or rents)
from the mark as product, the market would not attract competitive entry. See, e.g., SCHERER, supra note 5,
at 13. As a result, a trademark owner will need to seek legal protection against such entry only where he is
earning rents on his mark as product.
300 Quality might fall somewhat below that maintained by the NFL, when it is the exclusive lawful sup-
plier of such goods, but this merely suggests that the NFL, like many monopolists, overinvests in quality,
compared to actual consumer desires.
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Arnold Plant once said, "a special case for a monopoly ... cannot rest on the
general proposition that if business men are enabled to make monopoly profits,
some of them will be devoted to good works."3°' The point of trademark is not
to "encourage" ever-higher quality goods; consumers may actively prefer a
good with something less than the highest possible quality, particularly when it
comes at something less than the highest possible price. Trademark's task is
simply to help identify goods accurately to consumers, so that they may obtain
the precise price/quality mix they desire. If consumers desired and were
willing to pay for higher quality in the underlying good, presumably the
market would so signal, and the producer could respond accordingly. If
consumers are unwilling to pay for such higher quality directly, then the
possibility that granting the producer a monopoly in the mark as product may
enable the producer to force consumers to pay for such higher quality
indirectly cannot justify such protection.
In addition, with or without such protection, there will always be one prod-
uct and only one product that is the most popular in an industry. Such a result
is inherent in the nature of "most popular"; it is both a natural (because there
can only be one) and a network (because it depends on what people as a group
believe) monopoly. The trademark associated with the most popular product
in an industry shall, in turn, often have value as a product, whether embla-
zoned across apparel or embossed on a wide array of other consumer goods.3
Allowing the mark owner, through a property-based trademark regime, to ex-
ploit this product value exclusively, may well generate rents for the owner, be-
cause of the monopoly character of the resulting market. Some of these rents
may even be reinvested in the quality of the underlying good, as proponents of
property-based protection have suggested. But such protection would not only
force consumers to pay indirectly for quality that they were unwilling to pay
for directly, it would also allow the owner to cross-subsidize production of the
underlying good and thereby obtain a cost advantage over less popular rivals in
the underlying good. As a result, property-based protection tends to insulate
the underlying good from competition, reinforce the dominant brand's market
position, and generate corresponding anticompetitive losses.
301 ARNOLD PLANT, THE NEW COMMERcE IN IDEAS AND INTEU.wwAL PROPERTY 15 (1953).
302 See Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336 (C.C.P.A. 1981)
("We also find no error in the board's conclusion that it is a matter of common knowledge that famous
marks are frequently used on items such as clothing, glassware, and trash cans ...."); see also 15 THE
COcA-CoLA CATALOG (Spring 1997) (showing 32 pages of merchandise of various types bearing Coca-Cola
trademarks) (on file with author).
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Moreover, establishing such protection, because some part of the available
rents might be reinvested in the underlying good and thus contribute to the
mark's value as product, would violate a basic tenet of intellectual property. It
would award a mark owner the entire value of the mark as product when the
effort, i.e., the partial reinvestment of rents, that is the basis for protection,
contributes only a small part of that value. It would also award that value
even though there was already sufficient incentive, from sales of the
underlying good, to achieve the product quality that consumers desire.
Extending property-based trademark because of potential free-rider issues
thus appears undesirable. Some of the conduct that property-based trademark
addresses may well fall within a broad conception of free riding,3m but even if
property-based trademark prohibits free riding in some cases, it prohibits free
riding that almost certainly advances consumer welfare. Given the availability
of patent, copyright, and other legal and technological fences against free rid-
ing, it is unlikely that some distinct class of innovative goods remains under-
protected. Even if there were, property-based trademark is simply unsuited to
identify and protect such class of goods appropriately. As a result, a careful
analysis of the fTee-rider rationale reinforces our initial conclusion that prop-
erty-based trademark fosters monopoly and impairs desirable competition,
without creating offsetting efficiency advantages.
B. Property Based Rationales II. Highest Valued Use
As an alternative to the free-rider rationale, some courts and commentators
have suggested that property-based trademark is desirable because exclusive
ownership of a mark, like exclusive ownership of tangible property, serves to
ensure that the mark is devoted to its highest valued use. In the context of
tangible property, or private goods, the argument is that assigning a single,
3o3 Cf. Edwin C. Hittinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFp. 31, 37 (1989).
Hittinger explained the principle as follows:
[A]ssuming that labor's fruits are valuable, and that laboring gives the laborer a property right in
this value, this would entitle the laborer only to the value she added, and not to the total value of
the resulting product. Though exceedingly difficult to measure, these two components of value
(that attributable to the object labored on and that attributable to the labor) need to be distin-
guished.
Id.
304 Although someone who has bought an original on the open market and then copies it is not, in a lit-
eml sense, a free rider (because she paid for the original), the term free rider is sometimes extended to such
copying. See Chas. D. Briddell, Inc. v. Alglobe Trading Corp., 194 F.2d 416,418 (2d Cir. 1952) (recogniz-
ing the use of the term 'Tree ride" to describe such conduct).
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exclusive owner tends to ensure that the property will end in the hands of the
individual who values it most highly.3 Exclusive ownership tends to
minimize the coordination problems inherent in joint ownership and reduce
other transaction costs associated with ownership transfers.3 For private
goods, it tends, therefore, to ensure that, however ownership is initially
assigned, the individual who values the good most highly will be able to outbid
all others for the good. By analogy, ownership of a mark should also be
exclusively assigned to ensure that it is put to its highest valued use. As with
tangible property, if someone plans a potentially inconsistent, or conflicting,
use of a trademark, and that use is more valuable, the individual can purchase
the mark away from its present owner. If that use is less valuable, and the
present use is the more valuable, then assigning exclusive ownership to the
present user will bar the less valuable use, because the individual planning the
new, less valuable use will be unable to purchase the mark from its existing
owner. As a result, where the present use is more valuable, assigning
exclusive ownership ensures that such use will continue without interference,
and where the new use is more valuable, assigning exclusive ownership will
provide a means for the new user to acquire, without undue transaction costs,
ownership of the mark.
There are two central difficulties with this analogy, however. First, absent
legal protection, a trademark is a public good, not a private good. As a result,
there is ordinarily no need to assign exclusive ownership. Unlike a private
good, where it is usually the case that one use of the good physically precludes
another," for trademarks, it is physically possible for both uses to proceed.
The physical fact of rivalrous consumption that is central to the justification of
private ownership of private goods is simply absent for trademarks.3m
Nevertheless, something like rivalrous consumption can arise with trademarks
in the situation where one individual's use generates value in one sense but
reduces the mark's value in some other. For example, use of a well-known
305 See, e.g., RICHARD A. PosNER, ECONOMCc ANALYSIS OF LAW 11 (4th ed. 1992) ("By a process of
voluntary exchange, resources are shifted to those uses in which the value to consumers, as measured by
their willingness to pay, is highest. When resources are used where their value is highest, we may say that
they are being employed efficiently.").
306 See, e.g., Demsetz, supra note 269, at 354-59 (arguing that private property regime is generally more
efficient because it reduces transaction costs and collective action problems).
307 See, e.g., Alfred C. Yen, The Legacy of Feist: Consequences of the Weak Connection Between Copy-
right and the Economics of Public Goods, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1343, 1365 ("If someone eats an apple, no one
else may do so.").
308 See Dreyfuss, supra note 24, at 407 ("Accordingly .... the rationale that supports exclusive rights in
real property [e.g. physical fact of rivalrous consumption] has no application here.").
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mark for beer in an effective parody may generate value as humor, but it may
also reduce the selling power of the mark for beer. The conflicting messages
that the two uses convey may represent a form of rivalrous consumption
sufficiently analogous to the rivalrous consumption of private goods to justify
some protection against the second use.
At best, however, this type of rivalrous consumption would justify protec-
tion only in those cases where the value lost for the one use exceeded the value
generated through the second.0 This "net-lost-value" condition is usually
satisfied where there is a true probability that consumers will be materially
misled by the second use, and deception-based trademark appropriately resorts
to an exclusive ownership regime in this instance. But when we move beyond
such deception-based protection into the realm of imaginary confusion dis-
cussed above, the likelihood of confusion standard simply fails to address the
net value gained or lost as a result of the second use. Use of the phrase
"Mutant of Omaha" on a t-shirt certainly generates some value-consumers
were buying the shirt, after all; it may also reduce the selling power of the
"Mutual of Omaha" mark for insurance, though this was simply assumed and
not proven. But the relative magnitude of the values gained and lost is a ques-
tion that, once we leave the issue of material consumer confusion, the likeli-
hood of confusion does not address. As a result, property-based trademark is
poorly suited to identifying cases where the net-lost-value condition has been
satisfied.
Moreover, while satisfying the net-lost-value condition is necessary to
justify an exclusive ownership regime, it is not sufficient. The value
potentially lost as a result of a conflicting use is a type of negative externality,
and as such, is subject to the relative externality and the sufficient incentive
principles identified above. Under these principles, the externality created by
such conflicting uses justifies government intervention only if disproportionate
to the externalities associated with other productive activities, and only if so
large as to eliminate a sufficient incentive to create popular marks. In terms of
the relative externality that arises from such conflicting uses, we permit
ridicule and outright misuse of another's goods, subject only to the constraints
of product disparagement and false advertising. If we exempt trademarks from
309 Alternatively, we might assume that the net-lost-value condition will usually be satisfied and seek to
justify exclusive ownership for all cases on that basis without actually requiring proof of net lost value in
any given case. However, it is certainly easy to imagine many cases where the second use of a mark will not
satisfy the net-lost-value condition. We cannot, therefore, assume that the net-lost-value condition will so
often be satisfied as to justify an across-the-board exclusive ownership regime.
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these activities, such a decision will over-protect trademarks, relative to the
protection we extend other productive activities. By crafting a regime that
provides relatively greater protection for investments in trademarks, we will
attract excessive investment into the creation of selling symbols, causing
marginal resources to continue to flow into the protected area when they would
otherwise have been more valuably used elsewhere.
The sufficient incentive principle also suggests that such protection is
undesirable.3 '0  As a general rule, only popular and well-known marks will
become targets of such use. For such brands, the potential revenue and rents
available from sales of the underlying good provide an incentive sufficient to
ensure that becoming a market leader remains a profitable endeavor. If there
were any doubt concerning the sufficiency of the incentive available, we need
only note that famous marks did, in fact, develop during the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries when such property-based protection remained
unavailable.1 In a sense, these types of conflicting uses of popular trademarks
simply parallel the effects of competition on innovative goods. Both may
"compete away" the higher prices and rents otherwise available to the mark
owner or product innovator, but such competition is, in either case,
affirmatively desirable. It ensures broader availability and use at more
reasonable prices, and thereby minimizes deadweight losses. Moreover, it
does so without unduly undermining the incentives available, and as we have
seen, a contrary decision to protect the mark against such competition would
over-protect the mark relative to the protection other productive activities
receive and encourage overinvestment in selling symbols.
310 See Dreyfuss, supra note 24, at 409 ('he exigencies of the marketplace require its participants to
develop signals in order to differentiate their goods from those of their rivals.").
311 See, e.g., Robert S. Lynd, Report of President Hoover's Research Committee on Recent Social
Trends in the United States, in 2 THE PEOPLE AS CONSUMERS 876 (1932); Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental
Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 809, 815 (1935) (rejecting plea for broader le-
gal protection on the basis of higher economic value because such an approach "purports to base legal pro-
tection upon economic value, when, as a matter of actual fact, the econonic value of a sales device depends
upon the extent to which it is legally protected"); Dreyfuss, supra note 24, at 404-06 (providing similar
analysis for "if value, then right" approach); see also National Fruit Prod. Co. v. Dwinell-Wright Co., 47 F.
Supp. 499, 506 (D. Mass. 1942) (noting that "businessmen previously have been willing to place as high as
value as forty-two million dollars upon a single trademark"). In National Fruit Product Co., Judge WVyzan-
ski argued that the increasing value of trademarks justified further broadening of trademark protection. Id. at
506 ("Courts should hesitate, by reversing the trend of their decisions, to destroy the economic values which
those very decisions created."). The difficulty with this rationale is that it justifies ever-broadening protec-
tion. Broader protection generates higher value which justifies even broader protection generating even
higher values and so on.
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Second, even if one found the private good analogy fully persuasive,
adoption of a private property and market regime to reconcile these conflicting
uses would remain inappropriate. The assumption behind the efficiency of
assigning exclusive ownership of private goods is that market transactions will
occur that will lead the goods into the hands of the highest valued user. If the
second use generates more value, the second user will be able to offer the first
user a price that the first user will accept to transfer ownership. But the simple
fact is that once ownership of a trademark is assigned to a particular
individual, that owner is not likely to license, at any price, uses that the owner
finds unpalatable. Consumers may value the humor content of a parody, but a
trademark owner will rarely find a parody of her mark funny.12 Given the
nature of the typical second use found in the imaginary confusion cases,
however the right is initially assigned, there it will remain. Market
transactions reassigning the right from its initial owner(s) are unlikely, even
where an objective evaluation would reveal the potential for a net value gain."
In the absence of such transactions, there is simply no reason to believe that a
regime of exclusive ownership is more likely than some other property regime
to ensure the highest valued use of public goods, such as trademarks .
4
312 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994) ("Yet the unlikelihood that
creators of imaginative works will license critical reviews or lampoons of their own productions removes
such uses from the very notion of a potential licensing market.").
313 As I have explained elsewhere, these uses represent an extreme form of the offer-asking problem. If
we grant the trademark owner the right to control these uses, she will set her asking price for this right at a
level that will ensure that such uses do not occur. If we grant others the right to make such uses, the trade-
mark owner will be unable to offer a price sufficient to buy up this right from those who would like to exer-
cise it. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Protecting Digital Works: Copyright or Contract?, 1 TuL. J. TEcH. &
INTE. PRoP. 1, 141 (1999), available in <http.//www.law.tulane.edu/JOURNALS/jtipIVll /copycon.hm>.
314 See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM.
L. REV. 839, 875-77 (1990) (noting reasons why seemingly-rational exchanges in the patent area may not go
forward and suggesting that we cannot rely on an exclusive rights approach to assign resources optimally in
such cases). Because potentially conflicting uses of the trademark will not be valued rationally in monetary
terms, the issue becomn a question not of property, but of liberty. The proper question, therefore, is not
whether the second use generates a net loss or a net gain from an economic perspective, but whether the loss
in liberty from a government prohibition on speech is justified by the potential devaluation of a mark that
the speech may otherwise cause. An extended discussion of the resolution of this issue is beyond the scope
of this argument, but although there are free speech interests on both sides, government intervention to pre-
clude others from using a mark in their speech, commercial or otherwise, is an undue burden on important
First Amendment interests. See L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Pub., Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 33-34 (1st Cir. 1987)
(holding that a parody of another's trademark is protected by First Amendment); Robert C. Denicola,
Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Implications of the Emerging Rationales for the Protection of Trade
Symbols, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 158; Harriette K. Dorsen, Satiric Appropriation and the Law of Libel, Trade-
mark, and Copyright: Remedies Without Wrongs, 65 B.U. L. REV. 923 (1985); Dreyfuss, supra note 24; Di-
ane L. Zimmerman, Information as Speech, Information as Goods: Some Thoughts on Marketplaces and the
Bill of Rights, 33 WK & MARYL. REV. 665 (1992).
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C. Prestige Goods and Artificial Scarcity
Conceding that property-based trademark cannot be justified generally, an
argument might still be made for such protection in the special case of prestige
goods. For ordinary consumer goods, demand for the good increases, more or
less steadily, as the price of the good falls."5 If cars or computers or houses
become less expensive, people who already have one may buy a second (or a
third) or upgrade to a higher quality version; people who could not previously
afford one may find themselves able to. For prestige goods, this relationship
between decreased price and increased demand does not hold true .3 6 In fact,
just the opposite will, at some point, occur. If diamonds became as common
and inexpensive as polished pebbles, demand for diamonds as a symbol of
love and affection would, after people adjusted their thinking, fall rapidly.
Would you give your fianc6e a pretty pebble on her engagement ring? If not,
why would you give her a diamond ring if diamonds were every bit as com-
mon?"7 For prestige goods, demand increases initially as prices fall, but if
prices fall too much and the object becomes too common, it becomes useless
as a status symbol, and demand will fall as prices fall." 8 For that reason, we
might consider the costs of limiting the supply and increasing the market price
of prestige goods different from those costs for ordinary goods. With ordinary
goods, higher prices and limited supply force some to do without that would
otherwise have purchased the goods, and the disutility they experience as a re-
sult is a pure economic or deadweight loss. But with prestige goods, similar
losses resulting from limited supply and higher prices may be necessary to pre-
serve the prestige value of the good. This may suggest that, in evaluating the
efficiency consequences of artificially limiting the supply of prestige goods,
the disutility of those deprived of access should be balanced against the higher
prestige value made possible by the supply reduction.
315 See, e.g., William F. Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An Eco-
nomic Analysis, 76 YALE LJ. 267, 358 (1966).
316 Harvey Leibenstein developed the leading model of prestige goods reflecting this tendency in 1950.
See Harvey Leibenstein, Bandwagon, Snob, and Veblen Effects in the Theory of Consumers' Demand, 64
QJ. ECON. 183 (1950), reprinted in READINGS IN PRICE THEoRY (William Breit & Harold M. Hochman eds.,
1971); see also Richard S. Higgins & Paul H. Rubin, Counterfeit Goods, 29 J.L. & ECON. 211, 214 (1986)
("Each snobbish consumer has a demand curve that depends both on price and on the consumer's expecta-
tion about the total number of units consumed. Ceteris paribus, the law of demand holds, but, additionally,
quantity demanded by each individual is negatively related to total expected consumption.").
317 I use the diamond ring/fiancde example not to be sexist, but as an example of a prestige good that
has become accepted as a defacto standard in our society.
318 See, e.g., Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc. v. Canner, 645 F. Supp. 484, 495 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (noting that
the seeming increase in commonness of the watch would lead some would-be purchasers to look elsewhere).
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This analysis omits two central considerations, however. First, to the
extent that one good loses value as a signifier of prestige, a new prestige good
will arise to take its place. As a result, increasing the supply of one prestige
good, even if it entails the complete destruction of the good's value for
purposes of prestige,1 9 does not represent an economic loss, but a transfer of
prestige value from the old standard to the new.t ° If diamonds become as
common as pebbles, individuals owning diamonds as prestige goods would
lose that prestige value, but some other good would arise as the new prestige
standard and individuals holding the new standard would find the prestige
value of their goods increased proportionately. As a result, the supposed
balance between higher and lower prestige value as supply increases is simply
wrong. It is an illusion maintained by ignoring the transfer of prestige value
that would occur from one prestige good, should its supply expand, to its
replacement status symbol. Because the prestige value is not lost, but simply
transferred to another good, the disutility experienced by those deprived of a
given prestige good because of artificial supply limitations is a deadweight
loss, just like the loss created by limiting access to ordinary goods. In
consequence, that the prestige value of any particular good depends on scarcity
does not justify expanding trademark protection to ensure such scarcity.32 '
319 If a second party is offering an imitation of the prestige good at a lower price, consumer demand for
the imitation will remain only so long as the original good retains some prestige value. As a result, the
second party has a strong incentive not to market such a large supply of imitations indistinguishable from
the original as to destroy altogether the prestige value of the original.
320 A similar process would likely occur if a refusal to protect celebrities' right of publicity caused a
loss in any given celebrity's advertising value. Some new celebrity or perhaps some other advertising gim-
mick would arise to take the old celebrity's place. There is no reason to believe that a refusal to protect any
given celebrity's advertising value would reduce the total advertising value present in our economy. But see
Mark F. Grady, A Positive Economic Theory of the Right of Publicity, 1 UCLA J. ENT. L. 97, 102-05 (1994)
(trying to suggest that a refusal to protect each individual celebrity's advertising value would reduce the total
advertising value present in the economy); see also Posner, supra note 305, at 43 (making similar argument
for right of publicity). If worse comes to worse and all celebrity values are depleted, advertisers can always
resort to describing the factual characteristics and prices of their goods honestly. Cf. Robert P. Merges, Rent
Control in the Patent District: Observations on the Grady-Alexander Thesis, 78 VA. L. ReV. 359, 370-71,
373-74 (1992) (critiquing similar analysis by Professor Grady in the patent area on the grounds that inven-
tion, unlike tangible property, "is not a zero-sum game").
321 Professor Gordon has pointed out that reduced protection for prestige items may lead to increased
"churning," as we rotate through a succession of goods each becoming in turn a prestige standard. Although
this chuming will likely consume resources, both for the creation of new prestige goods and for the imitation
of existing ones, these effects would be largely offset however by the fact that greater leeway to imitate will
also decrease the potential rents available from becoming a prestige good standard. The decreased rents
available make both the imitation of existing prestige goods and the creation of new prestige goods less at-
tractive. As a result, even if some churning results, the resources expended on maintaining and imitating a
prestige good may decrease with less protection for prestige goods as compared to the resources expended in
a high protection regime.
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Second, precisely to the extent that it depends on denying others access to
the good, the prestige value of a good is illegitimate and undeserving of legal
protection. 'm When purchasing prestige goods, more so than ordinary goods,
the value of the purchase derives not merely from how the good makes an in-
dividual feel, but how it makes the individual feel relative to others. There is a
certain one-up manship inherent in acquiring prestige goods such that one per-
son's acquisition of a prestige good imposes substantial dissatisfaction on oth-
ers. Seeing a prestige good in another's hands will lead many individuals to
reevaluate and revise downward the satisfaction level each associates with her
current possessions.aas That individuals spend money "keeping up with the
Jones's" not only confirms the accuracy of an aphorism describing our con-
sumption-driven lifestyles, but provides one measure of the negative external-
ity that the "Jones's" acquisition of a prestige good imposes on others. 24 As a
result, when we focus on the net social value of prestige goods, by adjusting
their private value for the purchaser by the negative externality the acquisition
imposes on others, there is good reason to question whether such goods gener-
ate any net increase in social welfare. While refusing to provide property-
based trademark protection will not necessarily eliminate ostentatious displays
of wealth, the substantial negative externalities associated with such displays
eliminates any plausible claim for special treatment of trademarks in an effort
to preserve marks as signifiers of prestige.
D. Formal Justifications for the Expansion
As an alternative to policy-driven justifications for the property-based
expansion of trademark protection, some courts and commentators have
offered the formal justification that they are simply implementing the policy
choices that Congress has made.32s In particular, they have commonly
322 Cf. Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34, 41 n.13 (2d Cir. 1945) (Frank, J., concurring) ("It
is perhaps not inappropriate to ask whether snobbism and catering to ignorance are important social interests
deserving governmental assistance.").
323 See ScHERE, supra note 5, at 21 (noting "that there are external diseconomies in consumption, e.g.,
that the purchase of a new hair shirt by Mr. Willoughby may not only increase his utility, but simultaneously
reduce the utility of envious neighbors").
324 Another tragic measure are the lives lost in those instances where someone is murdered for posses-
sion of a prestige good. See, e.g., Clarence Moore, Style Is a Matter of Life and Death Among Teenagers,
COM. APPEAL, Dec. 19, 1991, at E9 (citing murders over Fila sneakers, Air Jordan basketball shoes, and
Georgetown University jacket, and noting that "[s]ome child psychologists and sociologists believe that shoe
manufacturers such as Reebok, British Knight and Nike should be held responsible for some of the vio-
lence").
325 See, e.g., Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1244 (6th Cir. 1991) (relying on "1967
[sic]" amendment as evidence that Congress intended public confusion generally to be actionable); Rolex
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identified a 1962 Housekeeping Amendment as reflecting Congress's decision
to recognize property-based trademark protection. In the 1962 Amendment,
Congress changed the infringement standard for registered marks set forth in
section 11 14(1)(a) of the Lanham Act by deleting the italicized phrase:
(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant-
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or
colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection
with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising
of any goods or services on or in connection with which
such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake,
or to deceive purchasers as to the source or origin of such
products or services.'26
As the legislative history accompanying the Act explains, Congress modified
the statutory language in this way for two reasons-one a matter of form and
one a matter of substance.3
In terms of form, the Trademark Act incorporates a likelihood-of-confusion
standard with respect to registered marks, or marks seeking registration, in four
different sections. Section 1051(a)(1)(A) requires an applicant seeking regis-
tration of a mark to state that the mark for which registration is sought is not
likely to cause confusion with a valid, prior mark. 3s Section 1052(d) author-
izes the Patent and Trademark Office to refuse registration of a mark that is
likely to cause confusion with a valid, prior mark . Section 1066 authorizes
the Commissioner of the Patent and Trademark Office to declare an interfer-
ence where a mark for which registration is sought is likely to cause confusion
with a previously registered mark .3' And section 11 14(1)(a) authorizes an in-
fringement action when another uses a mark that is likely to cause confusion
with a registered mark.
33'
Before the 1962 Amendment, these four sections expressed the likelihood
of confusion standard in three different ways. Section 1114(1)(a) defined
Watch U.S.A., Inc. v. Canner, 645 F. Supp. 484, 492 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (relying on 1962 Amendment as
evidence that confusion of public, and not just purchasers or prospective purchasers, now actionable); Rolls-
Royce Motors Ltd. v. A&A Fiberglass, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 689, 694 n.10 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
326 See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(a) (1994).
327 See S. REP. No. 87-2107 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2844,2845,2847,2850.
328 See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(l)(A).
329 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d).
330 See 15 U.S.C. § 1066.
331 See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(l)(a).
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likelihood of confusion in the terms of whether a mark "is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive purchasers as to the source or
origin of such goods or services. 332 Section 1051(a)(1)(A) defined likelihood
of confusion in terms of whether a mark was "in such near resemblance there
to as might be calculated to deceive."'333 Sections 1052(d) and 1066 defined
likelihood of confusion in terms of whether a mark so resembled another's
prior mark "as to be likely ... to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive purchasers."" 4 Congress's first purpose in amending the Trademark
Act was to replace these inconsistent expressions of the likelihood of
confusion standard with a single, consistent expression: "is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive."
In terms of substance, Congress struck the word "purchasers" that had ap-
peared in sections 1052(d), 1066, and 1114(1)(a) in order to ensure that the
likelihood-of-confusion inquiry considered the effect of a mark on potential
purchasers as well as actual purchasers of the goods or services at issue."s
Congress intended this deletion to effect a substantive change in the infringe-
ment standard and said so."' There is no indication that Congress intended any
other substantive change in the infringement standard.
Nevertheless, some courts and commentators have argued that Congress,
by deleting the language "as to the source or origin of such goods or services"
from section 1114(1)(a), intended a much more substantial expansion of the
infringement standard.337 Specifically, they have argued that Congress in-
tended to expand the infringement standard to encompass not only prospective
purchaser confusion as to source, but confusion of any one as to any relation
between the trademark owner and the allegedly infringing use.3
332 See S. REP. No. 87-2107 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2850.
333 See id. at 2847.
334 See id.
331 See id. at 2847.
336 See id.
337 See James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 274 (7th Cir. 1976); Boston
Prof'l Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1010 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 868 (1975); Syntex Labs., Inc. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 437 F.2d 566, 568 (2d Cir. 1971); Rolex
Vatch U.S.A. v. Canner, 645 F. Supp. 484,492-93 & n.2 (S.D. Fla. 1986); Rolls-Royce Motors Ltd. v. A&A
Fiberglass, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 689,694 & n.10 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
33P See James Burrough Ltd., 540 F.2d at 274; Boston Profl Hockey Ass'n, Inc., 510 F.2d at 1010; Syn-
tex Labs., Inc., 437 F.2d at 568; Rolex Watch U.S.A, 645 F. Supp. at 492-93 & n.2; Rolls-Royce Motors Ld.,
428 F. Supp. at 694 & n.1O.
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Although examining the change in section 11 14(1)(a)'s language in
isolation appears to provide some support for such an argument, three
considerations conclusively refute it. First, we must recall the context in
which the deletion of the "as to source or origin" language from section
11 14(1)(a) occurred. Congress was seeking to render consistent four statutory
sections that had previously contained varying expressions of the likelihood-
of-confusion standard. Two of the sections had identical language and defined
the standard as whether two marks were likely "to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive purchasers." '339 After deleting the word "purchasers"
from this language to expand the infringement inquiry to encompass
prospective purchasers,O the easiest way to render the four statutory sections
consistent was simply to amend the other two sections, including section
11 14(a)(1), to use the same language. Moreover, even though the other three
statutory sections had not been expressly limited to confusion as to source, the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, which was principally responsible for
interpreting those sections, had focused the confusion inquiry under those
sections on confusion as to the source or origin of the goods at issue.m' In
339 See supra text accompanying notes 321.
340 See supra text accompanying notes 322-23.
341 See, e.g., Sakrete, Inc. v. Slag Proc., Inc., 305 F.2d 482, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (interpreting section
1052(d) to require a likelihood of confusion with respect to the source or origin of the goods at issue even in
the absence of express language so defining the confusion requirement); Clinton Det. Co. v. Procter & Gam-
ble Co.. 302 F.2d 745, 746 (C.C.P.A. 1962). The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals sometimes sug-
gested that confusion as to source could include, in an appropriate case, confusion as to endorsement or cor-
porate affiliation. See, e.g., General Shoe Corp. v. Hollywood-Maxwell Co., 277 F.2d 169, 171 (C.C.P.A.
1960) (Rich, J, concurring) ("I agree that the concurrent use of the identical mark on women's shoes and
brassieres would be likely to confuse purchasers of the goods as to their commercial sponsorship, which is
what I take to be the meaning of the expression 'source."'). In practice, however, the court did not use an
endorsement approach to extend a mark's protection very far beyond the products to which it was tied until
after the 1962 Amendment. See, e.g., George A. Dickel Co. v. General Mills, Inc., 317 F.2d 954, 956
(C.C.P.A. 1963) (finding no likelihood of confusion between mark CASCADE for baking mixes and same
mark for whiskey); Fred W. Amend Co. v American Character Doll Co., 223 F.2d 277, 280-81 (C.C.P.A.
1955) (finding no likelihood of confusion between mark CHUCKLES for candy and same mark for dolls);
Joseph S. Cohen & Sons Co. v. Hearst Magazines, Inc., 220 F.2d 763, 765 (C.C.P.A. 1955) (finding likeli-
hood of sponsorship confusion between mark GOOD HOUSEKEEPING used as certification mark for goods
identical to those on which another was using GOOD HOUSEKEEPER mark); Pep Boys v. Edwin F. Guth
Co., 197 F.2d 527, 529 (C.C.P.A. 1952) (finding no likelihood of confusion between mark CADET for stor-
age batteries and same mark for electric lighting fixtures); Alligator Co. v. Larus & Bro. Co., 196 F.2d 532,
537 (C.C.P.A. 1952) (finding no likelihood of confusion between mark ALLIGATOR for tobacco products
and same mark for raincoats, topcoats, and jackets). Even where the court found a likelihood of confusion as
to similar marks on somewhat unrelated goods, it did so on the basis of likelihood of confusion as to source
given the facts presented. See In re Sylvan Sweets Co., 205 F.2d 207, 208 (C.C.P.A. 1953) (finding that use
of CAMEL mark on candy cigarettes, packaged and marked almost identically, to CAMEL mark as pre-
sented on real cigarettes created a likelihood of confusion as to "origin in view of the great similarity of the
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essence, because all four sections of the statute concerned trademark confusion
and trademark confusion had traditionally concerned confusion as to source,
confusion as to source was implicitly required, even in the absence of an
express statement to that effect. As a result, Congress could reasonably
believe that an express declaration of the nature of confusion required to
establish trademark confusion for infringement purposes was unnecessary.
And Congress could delete the "as to source or origin" language from section
11 14(l)(a) without intending to change the type of confusion that would count
as trademark confusion.
Second, if we move beyond how the Amendment changed the statute's
plain language, the legislative history accompanying the 1962 Amendment
provides no support for inferring that Congress intended such a substantial, in-
deed radical, change in trademark's infringement standard. To the contrary,
the Amendment itself was labeled a "Housekeeping Amendment," and the
legislative history specifically described the Amendment as being "in large
part a housekeeping measure, making minimal substantive changes in the
trademark law."'' 2 Moreover, when Congress intended the Amendment to ef-
fect a substantive change in the infringement standard, as it did with respect to
potential purchasers, the legislative history expressly stated that intention!"
Against this background of "housekeeping measure," "minimal substantive
changes," and express statement when a substantive change was intended, the
proposition that Congress intended to expand the infringement standard to en-
compass confusion of any sort, and yet failed to mention such intention, is
more than a little difficult to accept.3"
In addition, a certain level of estoppel comes into play in properly
interpreting the 1962 Amendment. Based upon concerns that had arisen in the
operation of the Trademark Act, a committee was formed in 1948 to study and
marks and the manner in which they are used on the packages containing the goods of the parties"). This
simply represented a continuation of the court's approach under the 1905 Act. See Radio Corp. of Am. v.
Rayon Corp. of Am., 139 F.2d 833, 837 (C.C.P.A. 1943) (finding likelihood of confusion under 1905 Act
between mark RCA for radios and electrical apparatus and RCA for knitted rayon materials).
342 See S. REP. No. 87-2107, reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2845; see also Pollack, supra note 141,
at 1480-81.
343 See S. REP. No. 87-2107, reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2847.
344 See, e.g., Serbin v. Ziebart Int'l Corp., 11 F.3d 1163, 1177-78 (3d Cir. 1993) (relying on similar rea-
soning to conclude that Congress did not intend to recognize consumer standing for false advertising claims
in the 1988 amendments to section 43(a) of the Lanham Act); Colligan v. Activities Club of New York, Ltd.,
442 F.2d 686, 689-94 (2d Cir. 1971) (same for consumer standing under original language of section 43(a)).
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recommend changes in the Trademark Act.34s Based upon these discussions,
proponents of broader protection had introduced, in 1951, a bill to amend the
Trademark Act in various ways, including a substantial expansion in the scope
of the infringement inquiry under section 11 14.m A similar, but less far-
reaching, bill was introduced in 1953 and again in 1954.m7 In each case,
Congress refused to accept the proposed changes.3 In fact, Congress did not
agree to amend the Trademark Act until the proposals for change were
narrowed to the point where they became merely technical. Only then, did
Congress adopt the 1962 Amendment.39 Given the inability of proponents of
broader trademark to obtain the express substantive expansion they were
looking for, the 1962 Amendment should be read simply as the housekeeping
amendment it was and not as an acceptance of the substantive expansion that
Congress had specifically rejected.5 0
Third, immediately following the 1962 Amendment, courts gave no
significance to the deletion of the "as to the source or origin" language and
continued to interpret the infringement standard to require confusion as to the
source or origin of the goods at issue.31 Only after more than ten years had
345 See S. REP. No. 87-2107, reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2846.
346 See S. 1957, 82d Cong. § 19 (1951), reprinted in 9 JERoME GILSON & JEFFREY M. SAMUELS,
TRADEMARK PROTEC1IOt1 AND PRACrICE, pt. IV, at 205, 207 (1998) (proposing to delete the "among pur-
chasers as to the source or origins of the good at issue" language and proposing to add subsection (c) that
would prohibit the use of "a registered mark in commerce otherwise than as a trade or service mark in such
manner as to be likely to cause the mark to lose its significance as a mark").
347 See S. 2540, 83d Cong. (1953), reprinted in 9 GILSoN & SAMUELS, supra note 346, pt. IV, at 211
(1998); S. REP. No. 87-2107, reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2846.
34" See S. REP. No. 87-2107, reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2846 (noting the history of amendment
attempts).
349 See id. at 2844. The Report stated:
The purpose of this [1962 Amendment] is to make a number of miscellaneous changes in the
Trademark Act of 1946 so as to clarify the meaning of several of its provisions. The provisions
of the bill affect details of registration, administrative and court procedure, internal organization
of the Patent Office regarding trademark matters, and refinements in language that experience
has shown to be desirable. It also corrects typographical errors in the Trademark Act of 1946.
Id.
350 See, e.g., Serbin v. Ziebart Int'l Corp., 11 F.3d 1163, 1177-79 (3d Cir. 1993) (concluding that Con-
gress did not intend to recognize consumer standing for false advertising claims under section 43(a) by 1988
Amendments, where legislative history stated desire to change the rule, but Congress had specifically re-
jected proposed statutory language that would have done so); see also Pollack, supra note 141, at 1481-86
("This narrow reading of the Report's ambiguous language is supported by its careful omission of the
broader statements made by several witnesses at the hearings.").
351 See, e.g., Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 434 F.2d 794,799-800 (9th Cir. 1970); Sun-
Maid Raisin Growers of Cal. v. Sunaid Food Prods., 356 F.2d 467,469 (5th Cir. 1966).
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passed did courts begin to attach any significance to the deletion and rely on it
as a basis for broadening the types of confusion that would constitute
infringement. 2  That the discovery of Congress's supposed intentions with
respect to the infringement standard came only after considerable time had
passed reinforces the conclusion that Congress had not, in fact, intended to
eliminate the confusion-as-to-source requirement. Rather, this delay suggests
that these courts attributed this intention to Congress simply to conceal their
unsanctioned, expansionist rewriting of trademark's infringement standard.
Others have pointed to the 1988 amendments to section 43(a) and the Fed-
eral Dilution Act of 1995 as justification for expansive, property-based trade-
mark protection. However, in both instances, Congress appeared to retain
trademark's traditional focus on a mark's value as information source, rather
than as product. Thus, the 1988 amendment to section 43(a) prohibits the use
of a trademark, or colorable imitation thereof, where the use is likely to cause
confusion not only as to source, but also as to sponsorship or endorsement by
the trademark owner of another's products. While this amendment may have
accepted an expanded infringement standard for unregistered marks, and per-
haps, by implication, for registered marks as well, the expanded infringement
standard simply recognized additional types of information that a mark may
convey as deserving of protection. 353
The Federal Dilution Act, which adds a federal dilution cause of action for
famous marks to the Trademark Act, comes closer to express congressional
recognition of property-based trademark protection, but even here, interference
with a mark's information function remains the central consideration. To see
that the dilution amendment does not reflect a purely property-based view of
trademarks, we need only compare section 43(c) to a statutory section where
Congress has expressly provided for property-based trademark protection-
352 See James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 274 (7th Cir. 1976); Boston
Prof'l Hockey Ass'n. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1010 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 868 (1975); Syntex Labs., Inc. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 437 F.2d 566, 568 (2d Cir. 1971). A similar
change in position concerning the Amendment is found in Callmann's treatise. Compare 3 RUDOLF
CALLMANN, CALLMANN ON UNFAM COMPEITION AND TRADE-MAmKS § 80.1, at 120 (1965 Supp.) (noting
that Amendment expanded confusion inquiry to encompass "potential as well as actual purchasers," but
complaining that the Amendment did not "go far enough"), with 3A LouIs ALTMAN, CALLMANN ON UNFAIM
COMPEOrroN, TRADEMARKS, AND MONOPOLIES "§ 20.01, at 4 (boldly proclaiming that the Housekeeping
Amendment means that "Itihe Lanham Act is no longer limited to confusion of source; it covers all kinds of
trade identity confusion").
353 Moreover, the Amendment simply acknowledged what the courts had already done. See S. REP. No.
100-515, at 40 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5603 ("Section 35 revises Section 43(a) of the
Act (15 U.S.C. 1125(a)) to codify the interpretation it has been given by the courts.").
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section 110 of the Amateur Sports Act of 1978.3M The key language of these
two sections differs markedly. While section 110 prohibits any use "for pur-
pose of trade" of certain symbols and marks associated with the Olympic
Games, section 43(c) prohibits only those uses of a famous mark that "cause
dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark." '355 Section 110 thus does not tie
protection of the Olympic marks to their information function, and in that
sense, provides express property-based protection. 6 Section 43(c), on the
other hand, expressly limits its protection to uses that interfere with the infor-
mation function or distinctive quality of the famous mark. The difference in
statutory language between these two sections demonstrates that Congress
both knows how to provide property-based protection for trademarks and
chose not to do so in the Federal Dilution Act of 1995.
When we move beyond whether section 43(c) expressly recognizes prop-
erty-based protection to the question of precisely what sort of information-
based protection the Federal Dilution Act provides for famous marks, the an-
swer is less clear. A key difficulty in interpreting section 43(c) is that the op-
erative language-"dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark"-is inher-
ently ambiguous. On its face, this language is simply unclear as to whether
Congress intended to recognize both blurring and tamishment of a famous
mark as actionable, and if so, what conduct might rise to the level of actionable
blurring or tarnishment3 7 Perhaps more importantly, the language also fails to
explain how blurring or tarnishment relates to trademark's likelihood-of-
confusion standard. As discussed, 358 dilution in practice has proven redundant,
simply duplicating protection available to mark owners under the expanded
likelihood-of-confusion standard that courts have created over the last thirty
years. As a result, it is simply unclear what effect the dilution provision in
section 43(c) should or will have on the protection available for famous
marks.
359
354 Amateur Sports Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-606, § 1(b), 92 Stat. 3048 (codified at 36 U.S.C. § 380
(1994)).
35 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
356 See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
357 The House Report accompanying the Act suggested that dilution should encompass both
"subsequent uses that blur the distinctiveness of the mark or tanish or disparage it." H.R. REP. No. 374, at 2
(1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029. But the Court has warned against trusting such statements in
legislative history where they are often inserted at the request of a special interest group.
358 See supra text accompanying notes 160-66.
359 If we turn to the legislative history to resolve these ambiguities, Congress's strongest motivation for
recognizing a dilution cause of action appears to have been a desire to provide famous mark owners a basis
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Moreover, whatever protection Congress may have intended section 43(c)
to provide, Congress specifically tied the scope of that protection to "the dis-
tinctive quality of the mark." In the trademark field, distinctiveness is a term
of art that refers to a mark's ability to identify the source of particular goods or
services. As a general rule of statutory construction, when Congress includes a
term of art in a statute, courts should assume that Congress both was aware of
the term's special meaning within its field and intended for courts to interpret
the statute in the light of that meaning. t ° We can get a sense for how this rule
of statutory construction would apply in interpreting section 43(c) by substi-
tuting the meaning of the phrase "distinctive quality" for the actual statutory
language. If we were to do so, and were also to replace the ambiguous phrase
"causes dilution" with its statutory definition of "lessens," section 43(c)(1)
would read:
The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the
principles of equity ... , to an injunction against another person's
commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use
... [lessens] the [famous] mark['s ability to identify the source of the
particular goods or services with which it is associated] ....
Interpreting section 43(c)(1) in this way suggests that a use "causes dilution"
only when it reduces the famous mark's ability to identify a product's source.
Such a plain language interpretation reinforces our practice-based observations
for seeking special protections for their marks abroad. See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 4 (1995), reprinted in
1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1031. As the House Report explains:
Passage of a federal dilution statute would also assist the executive branch in its bilateral and
multilateral negotations with other countries to secure greater protection for famous marks
owned by U.S. companies. Foreign countries are reluctant to change their laws to protect famous
U.S. marks if the U.S. itself does not afford special protection for such marks.
Id. The legislative history identifies national uniformity to prevent forum shopping and to decrease litiga-
tion as another key purpose. See id. at 1030-3 1. As the House Report states:
A federal dilution statute is necessary because famous marks ordinarily are used on a nationwide
basis and dilution protection is currently only available on a patch-quilt system of protection, in
that only approximately 25 states have laws that prohibit trademark dilution. ... Protection for
famous marks should not depend on whether the forum where the suit is filed has a dilution
statute. This simply encourages forum-shopping and increases the amount of litigation.
Id. Perhaps courts should interpret the dilution provision simply to implement this purported purpose and
read section 43(c) as providing no increased domestic protection for such marks.
360 See, e.g., Chas. D. Briddell, Inc. v. Alglobe Trading Corp., 194 F.2d 416, 421 (2d Cir. 1952)
("[When the legislature borrows [words of art], they are deemed to retain their previous meaning unless
there is a contrary legislative intention clearly expressed in the statute or its history.").
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that section 43(c) merely duplicates the protection already available to famous
marks under the likelihood of confusion standard.
In consequence, adoption of section 43(c) should not be read to reflect
Congress's acceptance or endorsement of property-based trademark. And
courts need not feel constrained to recognize and continue expanding property-
based trademark protection. Rather, courts retain considerable leeway to de-
termine the availability, nature, and scope of protection available under the
Trademark Act. Moreover, given that courts, and not Congress, have been the
principal architects of property-based trademark protection, courts bear a
heavy responsibility for the unjustified market power and associated efficiency
losses such protection has created. They should therefore take an a~tive role in
restricting protection for marks where a mark's value as product exceeds its
361value as information source.
IV. RESTORING THE BALANCE
We can make a start on returning trademark law to a sensible, and legiti-
mate, footing by taking three simple steps. First, we must abandon the myths
that have grown up around trademark law. Second, we must again recognize
copying as essential to the existence of desirable competition and restore imi-
tation to its central and lawful place in a desirably competitive market. And
third, we must limit actionable confusion to cases where, if the use is allowed
to continue, a substantial number of purchasers or prospective purchasers will
actually become confused concerning information that will materially influ-
ence their buying decisions.
Three trademark myths are particularly troublesome. The first is the mis-
taken notion that Congress adopted a broad view of both trademark subject
matter and the bundle of rights associated with trademark ownership in the
Trademark Act. This is simply false. During the debates leading to the
Trademark Act, Congress specifically rejected any number of proposals re-
flecting the broader approach to trademarks in favor of the traditional ap-
proach. 62 Even in the 1988 Amendments and the Federal Dilution Act of
361 This is a shorthand phrase for the balancing test and factors previously identified. See supra text
accompanying notes 249-60.
362 See supra notes 39-48, 171-74, 214 and accompanying text. On Congress's generally conservative
intent, consider the following colloquy concerning the proposed trademark bill generally and the generic
words doctrine specifically:
Senator Lucas. I, for one, do not want to pass any legislation that is going to change the fundamen-
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1995, Congress did not embrace a property-based approach to trademark, re-
taining instead a broader, but still deception-based, focus. Moreover, coming
as late in the day as they did, Congress's actions in 1988 and 1995 simply ac-
knowledged some of the steps on the path that the courts and a large number of
states had taken long before and so provide little independent support for prop-
erty-based trademark.
The second myth is that trademark protection cannot create monopoly or
otherwise engender anticompetitive losses. Proponents of broader protection
often rely on this myth when confronted with the argument that protection in
any given case would prove anticompetitive, insisting that protection will not
result in "market foreclosure" or that the functionality defense will necessarily
preclude anticompetitive results. 63  The recital of platitudes does not change
economic realities, however. Under present doctrine, neither black jeans nor
two-piece swimwear would qualify as functional, in the sense of superior to
the preexisting color or style, when first introduced.3'6 Yet, assuming on that
basis that no anticompetitive losses would result from assigning the exclusive
right to produce such apparel color or style to its originator is foolhardy.
Consumer preferences are too widely varied and idiosyncratic, and individual
producers too imperfect in their ability to identify and satisfy those desires, to
believe that a single producer will be as able to satisfy consumer desires as
tal law that has been handed down here by the courts for a long, long time, on trade-
marks.
Rep. Lanham. I don't think that does.
Senator Lucas. I do not think so either.
Rep. Lanham. No.
Senator Lucas. I think the fundamental law should be preserved.
1942 Trade-Mark Hearings, supra note 8, at 44.
363 For examples of such comforting reassurances, see Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Prods. Co., 514 U.S.
159, 164 (1995) ("The functionality doctrine prevents trademark law, which seeks to promote competition
by protecting a firm's reputation, from instead inhibiting legitimate competition by allowing a producer to
control a useful product feature."); id. at 169 ("The functionality doctrine, as we have said, forbids the use of
a product's feature as a trademark where doing so will put a competitor at a significant disadvantage because
the feature is 'essential to the use or purpose of the article' or 'affects [its] cost or quality."') (quoting In-
wood Lab., Inc. v. Ives Lab., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.L10 (1982)).
364 See W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 343 (7th Cir. 1985) (ruling that hexagonal shape of
plastic stacking office trays was not functional because traditional rectangular-shaped trays were more
popular, though maybe "too drab to be a good substitute for a fancier shape").
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would a large number of producers."' Moreover, even if the differences
between blue and black jeans, or between one- and two-piece swimwear, are
not sufficient to render one or the other "functional," as presently defined,
consumers are likely to have distinct preferences for particular styles or colors
and will often be relatively unwilling to substitute one style or color for
another. As a result, "competition" between blue and black jeans, or between
one-piece and two-piece swimwear, is likely to prove far less effective at
constraining supracompetitive pricing than the competition that would
otherwise be present. Even if producers remain formally free to offer other
jean colors or swimwear styles, assigning the black jeans market or the two-
piece swimwear market exclusively to one entity will necessarily generate
higher prices and rents and impose corresponding welfare losses.
The functionality defense may once have served, in combination with other
aspects of traditional trademark doctrine, as an effective limit on trademarks
becoming anticompetitive weapons. But the present doctrine does not address
market foreclosure in some cases at all'6 and, even when it applies, limits pro-
tection only after significant anticompetitive losses have ensued.
The belief that no anticompetitive consequences will follow unless market
foreclosure results is equally problematic. '67 Any degree of protection in-
creases the expense and risks for would-be competitors and thereby increases
the prices that consumers will pay for goods in the marketplace. Any degree
365 Cf. Merges, supra note 320, at 372-75 (noting that assigning broad patent rights to single holder
creates risk that patent holder will not perceive and pursue vigorously desirable improvements and add-on
inventions).
366 See, e.g., Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 F.2d 327, 331-32 (2d Cir. 1983) (refusing to ap-
ply functionality defense to allow defendant to produce toy car that imitated appearance of car on television
series even though there appeared to be distinct consumer demand for this particular toy car on grounds that
appearance of toy car was not "an advance in the useful arts"); National Football League Props., Inc. v.
Wichita Falls Sportswear, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 651, 663 (W.D. Wash. 1982) ("Even assuming the marks are
functional does not, however, preclude trademark protection. A functional feature may additionally serve as
a trademark and be protected as such.").
367 In Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 1Ltd., 155 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 1998), for example, Judge King as-
serted that there were no anticompetitive consequences from applying what she inaccurately characterized as
"traditional trade-dress analysis" to a golf hole design because Tour 18 was left free to copy the golf holes,
"enjoining only its copying of the lighthouse." Id. at 552. Yet, even if Judge King's implicit assertion that
the presence of the lighthouse was not a feature that consumers desire was accurate--a point strongly refuted
by the fact that Tour 18 spent the time and money necessary to have the feature built-the very fact that
Tour 18 had to spend thousands of dollars defending against a lawsuit, where its entire investment was at
risk, even though there was not the slightest evidence of a single consumer who had been materially influ-
enced by whatever false information might have been conveyed by Tour 18's imitation, was itself conclusive
evidence of the anticompetitive consequences of the court's approach.
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of protection also mandates differences between the original good and later
entries and thereby renders the later entries less perfect substitutes for the
original. Even if it does not result in "market foreclosure," legal protection in-
creases costs and product differentiation and generates corresponding anti-
competitive losses.es In some cases, these anticompetitive losses may be small
enough to be offset by improved information efficiencies. But they will exist,
and given that other means of conveying information as to source are usually
available, the traditional definition of functionality more realistically captures
the point at which the anticompetitive losses will likely justify a refusal to
protect a product feature as a trademark.369
The third myth is that the likelihood of confusion analysis can resolve dif-
ficult questions concerning the appropriate scope of trademark protection. As
the above discussion concerning circular, imaginary, and irrelevant confusion
suggests, the issue of whether confusion should be actionable turns not merely
on a factual analysis of whether confusion exists, but on a policy determination
that the type of confusion present warrants legal intervention. Too often courts
simply plug the facts of a case into their version of the Polaroid factor test and
pretend that the result is necessarily a sensible one.370 By doing so, they fore-
close a careful consideration of whether the confusion present is a type of con-
fusion that is likely to generate inefficiencies sufficient to justify a legal prohi-
bition in the first place.
368 Moreover, while some degree of product differentiation may prove desirable as a response to con-
sumer preferences, see CHAMBERLIN, supra note 3, at 93-94; SAMUELSON, supra note 213, at 492
(recognizing desirability of some, but not too much differentiation, while noting inability of conventional
economics to predict optimal level of differentiation), there is little reason to believe that differentiation
dictated by legal command, rather than consumer desires, is necessarily efficient.
369 Alternatively, we can discuss functionality and its anticompetitive potential in terms of the avail-
ability of alternative designs. But again, a definition of "alternative designs" that appropriately balances the
competitive consequences of protection must closely parallel the traditional definition of functionality.
Competition is not adequately protected simply because there are, in theory, equally attractive designs that
might be created. The question is whether there is another design, readily identifiable or known, that could
be created or adopted at no more cost and risk than imitiating the design claimed as a trademark, that con-
sumers will consider a substitute for the original as perfect as an imitiation of the original. If the cost and
expense of the "alternative" design, and its acceptability as a substitute, are not substantially the same as for
the imitiation, then forcing the would-be competitor to turn to the alternative would entail anticompetitive
losses that would almost certainly outweigh the informational efficiencies protection would generate.
370 See Pebble Beach Co., 155 F.3d at 543 (noting that "no golfer will stand on the tee at Tour 18 and
believe that he or she is playing at Pebble Beach, Pinehurst, or Harbour Town," yet determining factor test
weighed in favor of finding likelihood of confusion; after warning that factor test is not the end of the in-
quiry, nevertheless holding conduct actionable without expressly considering whether whatever information
presence of lighthouse may convey is worth protecting).
1999]
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
Along with abandoning these myths, courts must recognize, once again, the
central role of copying in a competitive economy. Imitation to deceive
consumers may be a legitimate target for trademark law, but imitation as
competition is not."' Too often, courts recently have found imitation
actionable simply because the defendant intentionally imitated a popular
product.m Of course, this is precisely the sort of imitation that is most
desirable from a competitive and consumer welfare standpoint. Allowing fact
finders to infer infringement from this sort of imitation will necessarily limit
the level of desirable imitation in the economy and reduce the economy's
competitiveness. In dealing with imitation, we should follow the course the
Court has set in antitrust law where an action that is as consistent with a
legitimate purpose, as an illegitimate one, cannot serve as a basis for inferring
illegitimate behavior.373 Because imitation generally is as consistent with the
legitimate goal of simply competing, as it is with the illegitimate goal of
deception, imitation should not serve as a basis for inferring actionable
deception.374
371 See Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 271 F.2d 569, 571-72 (2d Cir. 1959). The court
explained:
Moreover, the essential distinction in this area of the law, overlooked by the court below, is the
difference between a deliberate attempt to deceive and a deliberate attempt to compete. Absent
confusion, imitation of certain successful features in another's product is not unlawful and to that
extent a 'free ride' is permitted.
Id.
372 See, e.g., Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1242 (6th Cir. 1991) (relying on
intentional imitation of successful product as evidence of unfair competition); Boston Athletic Ass'n v.
Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 34 (1st Cir. 1989) (finding intentional use of plaintiff's mark on defendant's t-shirts
to created presumption of actionable confusion); Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 F.2d 327, 334 (2d
Cir. 1983) (finding intentional imitation of car associated with a given television series sufficient to establish
actionable infringement under section 43(a)).
373 See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986) ("[Clonduct as
consistent with permissible competition as with illegal conspiracy does not, standing alone, support an infer-
ence of antitrnst conspiracy."); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984).
374 See Norwich Pharmacal Co., 271 F.2d at 573 ("[A]ny notion that mere proof of deliberate copying
without more shifts the burden [on secondary meaning] to the defendant [is mistaken]."); Remco Indus., Inc.
v. Toyomenka, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 948, 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) ("'he inference of intent to deceive that
plaintiff seeks to draw from copying is not a permissible one and plaintiff's theory that palming off may be
inferred from mere copying is erroneous."). More recently, several courts have recognized that copying and
imitation serve legitimate and desirable functions and on that basis have refused to presume that imitation
establishes trademark infringement or unfair competition. See, e.g., Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others,
Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 844-45 (9th Cir. 1987). Yet, even courts that have recognized the legitimate interests
served by imitation nevertheless allow imitation alone to serve as a basis for inferring infringement. See id.
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As the third and final step, courts should focus the confusion analysis on
material information, defined as information about a product that will
influence consumer buying." 5 Under such a standard, confusion as to source
can be actionable where source matters to consumers. Similarly, confusion as
to endorsement can be actionable, but only if the factual situation is one where
endorsement is typically found and likely to influence consumer buying. On
the other hand, information concerning permission to use another's mark or
corporate ownership structures should not generally serve as a basis for finding
trademark infringement. Although mistakes concerning information on these
subjects may qualify as confusion, this information is less often material to
consumer buying decisions than confusion as to source and moreover, risks
limiting desirable forms of competition.
If, for example, we used the "permission" approach to judge the legality of
comparative advertising involving another's trademark, or of an unauthorized
retailer's sale of a branded product, we would often find a likelihood of
confusion.376 Many consumers may well (mistakenly) believe that a mark
owner's permission is required to use the mark in a comparative advertisement
or to resell a branded product.3 But this is not material confusion. For
375 As Judge Learned Hand once warned:
There is always the danger that we may be merely granting a monopoly, based upon the notion
that by advertising one can obtain some "property" in a name. We are nearly sure to go astray in
any phase of the whole subject, as soon as we lose sight of the underlying principle that the
wrong involved is diverting trade from the first user by misleading consumers who mean to deal
with him.
S.C. Johnson & Sons, Inc. v. Johnson, 116 F.2d 427, 429 (2d Cir. 1940).
376 For either use, the defendant is using the same mark on the same product in the same market chan-
nels to reach the same consumers. In Pebble Beach Co., the Fifth Circuit recognized that application of the
factor test will generally lead to a finding of likelihood of confusion for comparative advertising, but sug-
gested that the nominative fair use doctrine can address this problem. 155 F.3d 526, 546 (5th Cir. 1998).
Unfortunately, the court did not explain how the nominative fair use defense could apply when a likelihood
of confusion was otherwise found.
377 Such a result is particularly likely if the survey question begins with a leading introduction. See
Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 1 Ltd., 942 F. Supp. 1513, 1549 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (relying on survey results
where survey questions began 'Tour 18 advertises it has copied 18 of America's most famous golf holes
from different courses" and 'Tour 18 also uses the names of these other golf courses to advertise its holes
and course to the public"), affd, 155 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 1998). As soon as a survey question begins by
stating that one party has copied another's product or is using another's name, the survey will inevitably
reveal that many consumers believe that permission was required or obtained for the action. Such apparent
confusion is not so much evidence of material deception that will divert sales, however, as it is a reflection
of ordinary conceptions of "ownership." Control questions that attempt to distinguish this permission con-
fusion from material deception must, at the least, focus on an instance where one party's use of another's
well-known trademark is legal. A refusal to use such an appropriate control question represents a frank ad-
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example, even if consumers believed that Coca-Cola gave permission for Pepsi
to use the Coke trademarks in a Pepsi advertisement, they are not likely to
believe that Coca-Cola is thereby substantively endorsing or standing behind
Pepsi products. Consumers may simply believe that permission is a formality
that the law requires for comparative advertising with which companies
comply as a matter of course. Because of this (mistaken) belief, the Pepsi
advertisement may generate some "permission" confusion, but is unlikely to
generate confusion material to Pepsi versus Coke buying decisions. Moreover
prohibiting comparative advertisements on the basis of "permission" confusion
would substantially limit "'[a] competitor's chief weapon is his ability to
represent his product as being equivalent and cheaper.'
378
In any event, because protection always imposes some anticompetitive
costs, we must remain careful that the information that we are protecting has
some real value to consumers and is not serving as a mere pretext for property-
based protection. Even if we are willing to presume that confusion as to
source is usually materialy confusion as to other issues is inherently less
likely to involve an issue that will actually matter to consumers when they
decide which products to buy. As a result, when confusion concerns
something other than source, courts should expressly require the plaintiff to
establish that the confusion concerns material information, just as we do with
implicit false advertising claims more generally. 8°  Otherwise, the
anticompetitive consequences such expanded protection entails will almost
invariably outweigh the associated informational efficiencies.
mission by the surveyor that his survey reveals nothing other than misconceptions about the nature of trade-
mark ownership, rather than material confusion. See id. at 1550 n.34 (using control question- that failed to
guage level of inherent belief that permission required whenever one party uses another's mark).
378 R.G. Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 567 (9th Cir. 1968) (quoting George J. Alexander, Hon-
esty and Competition, 39 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1966)).
379 Even for confusion as to source, the traditional trademark approach required proof that source mat-
tered to consumers. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
380 See, e.g., U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross, 898 F.2d 914, 922 (3d Cir. 1990); Lillian R. BeVier,
Competitor Suits for False Advertising Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act: A Puzzle in the Law of De-
ception, 78 VA. L. REV. 1, 29-30 (1992) (noting that courts have found false advertising for explicitly false
claims without proof of materiality, but warning that courts should be hesitant to presume that an advertise-
ment will materially mislead consumers).
[Vol. 48
TRADEMARK MONOPOLIES
V. THE DEATH OF COMPETITION?
Until recently, courts have remained cautious that they not convert into
legal command their instinctive dislike of a "copyist's opportunism."'' "No
copying, do your own work" may prove an appropriate, if misleading,
3 2
admonition for the educational process and its associated examinations. But
extending it too readily to the market directly threatens competition and its
associated welfare benefits. In the marketplace, imitiation and copying are
essential for competition to remain an effective force for the public good. If
we cannot, for that reason, embrace the copyist, we must, at the very least,
tolerate her efforts, not for her own sake, but for the broader public interest
that she serves. 83
Over the last thirty years, however, judges, commentators, and administra-
tors have moved sharply against the common law's presumption that
competition and copying are legal and desirable. Based in part on an
instinctive reaction to copying, in part on a mistaken assumption that free
riding is invariably inefficient, and in part on a pretense of consumer
deception, courts have taken trademark law and fashioned it into a legal regime
that expressly excludes would-be competitors from copying features essential
to entering distinct product markets and that substantially limits the degree of
competition in the marketplace generally. By excluding the copying of
features that consumers desire for reasons other than the source-related
information they convey, the resulting legal regime of "property-based"
trademark tends to divide industries into distinct market segments and then
assign each segment exclusively to one producer. While there is at least some
potential for product substitution across these market segments, this indirect
38t R.G. Smith, 402 F.2d at 568; see also Brown, supra note 58, at 1227. Brown argues:
The imperfect stabilization of the concept of functionality (and related issues) probably
stemmed, not from judicial obtuseness, but from the sort of pressures typified by the Seventh
Circuit decisions now reversed [in Sears and Compco]. The short-comings of these decisions are
not the result on ineptitude; they are rather still another reflection of what I have several times
referred to as a persistent urge to create some general protection against copiers. That urge has
never achieved dominant expression in the cases. But it runs along like the Manichean heresy,
forever pitting the forces of light and the alleged forces of darkness.
Id.
382 Such a command is misleading because most education, certainly through the undergraduate level,
consists of little more than copying. We copy the letters as the teacher writes them on the board, the math
tables in our books, and the histories that others have prepared.
383 See R.G. Smith, 402 F.2d at 568 ("By taking his 'free ride,' the copyist, albeit unintentionally, serves
an important public interest by offering comparable goods at lower prices.").
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"competition" will generally prove less effective at imposing price discipline
than the direct competition that would exist absent property-based trademark's
legal command. Moreover, even in cases where property-based trademark
does not foreclose competitive market entry altogether, it substantially
increases the costs and risks associated with entry, and by mandating
differences between products, increases the extent to which consumers will be
unwilling to substitute one product for another. For these reasons, property-
based trademark protection necessarily results in higher prices, more extensive
deadweight losses, and inefficiently allocated resources.
Against these very real costs, proponents of broader trademark protection
have offered very little. In terms of deception-based justifications, these cases
almost invariably involve no real possibility of actual and material consumer
deception--certainly no more than is inevitable if there is to be competition at
all. The proffered property-based justifications for expansive trademark
protection are similarly unavailing. Even if there are gaps for free riding left
by copyright and patent protection, the free riding that remains is almost
certainly affirmatively desirable, and even if not, trademark law simply cannot
identify and redress appropriately whatever undesirable free riding copyright
and patent leave unaddressed.
In delineating the boundary between fair and unfair competition, we must
keep firmly in mind that if competition is to remain an effective force for pro-
moting social welfare, we must leave room for would-be competitors to oper-
ate. Which lawyer to hire cannot become the first and most important decision
that a would-be entrepeneur faces in deciding to enter a market or otherwise
satisfy some perceived consumer demand. In this light, property-based trade-
mark goes too far toward prohibiting imitation as imitation, rather than limiting
itself to imitation as material deception.
In recognizing property-based trademark, we have moved sharply from a
legal regime where copying and competition were the norm and protection the
exception, toward a regime where protection is the norm and copying and
competition the exceptions. We have moved from a regime where the burden
was on the party seeking legal protection to establish the need for protection,
toward a regime where the burden is on the party seeking to compete to
establish the need for competition. And we have divorced trademark law from
its historical and sensible policy focus on the probability of material confusion,
and crafted an overbroad, ill-considered legal regime that serves simply to
enrich certain trademark owners at the expense of consumers, the market's
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competitive structure, and the public interest more generally. By creating
market power and anticompetitive losses without offsetting efficiency
advantages, property-based trademark protection fully deserves the label
"trademark monopoly."

